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
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
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**APPROACHES TO THE
GREAT SETTLEMENT**



APPROACHES TO THE GREAT SETTLEMENT

By EMILY GREENE BALCH

WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOME OF THE MORE
RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES DEALING
WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION BY
NORMAN ANGELL



PUBLISHED FOR THE
AMERICAN UNION AGAINST MILITARISM

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

This brief objective account of the successive steps in approaching a settlement of the war begins with President Wilson's Peace Note of December, 1916, and closes with the various replies to the Pope's Note of August, 1917. Mr. Angell's Introduction refers to this same stage of proceedings.

Although events have moved while the book has been passing through the press nevertheless it has more than mere historical interest. To-day's events cannot be understood, nor the latest pronouncements as to peace terms intelligently weighed, without that background which this account aims to present.

For instance, the genesis of the Russian peace formula, the interpretation from different points of view of the phrases "no annexations" and "no indemnities," the history of the attempted Stockholm Conference, successive pronouncements as to Alsace-Lorraine and the Colonies, are here set forth, supplying elements essential to an understanding of later phases.

It is very difficult in war time to secure current material in satisfactory form. Originals are not accessible, and excerpts and translations (often obviously faulty) which appear in the daily press are in many cases the best that is to be had. The only way appeared to be to give these as they stand without attempted emendations.

It was originally intended to include the text of all the documents referred to, but for reasons of space this was found to be impracticable; it was therefore decided to retain only those of the Socialist and Labor groups, as being in general less readily accessible than State papers and official pronouncements. Of these last a reference list is included showing where they can be found.

All this, with Miss Angell's excellent bibliography, will, it is hoped, prove of service and value to students of the problems involved in the great settlement.

EMILY GREENE BALCH.

New York City.

January, 1918.

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INTRODUCTION

BY NORMAN ANGELL

This book has a special interest for all who wish to help and not hinder the great international effort to destroy German militarism.

One way to hinder that effort — a way in which many people who really want to assist are now actually hindering it — is to regard any preparation for the peace as inconsistent with the effective prosecution of the war.

The internationalist may, with no surrender of his creed, fully admit that American coöperation with the Allies is a necessary step towards an organized internationalism of the future. But American participation, and victory however complete, will fail to achieve the declared objects of the war, unless they are used to enforce the right policy.

It is easy — and it is disastrous — to assume that all America needs to do is help defeat Germany: that German defeat will by itself cause the destruction of German militarism. But to act on that assumption is to make it certain that the defeat of Germany will have no such result. The distinction between what is necessary, and what is enough, is in war-time particularly hard to establish. German defeat may be necessary: but it is not enough.

Our military defeat of the German Government

will contribute to the future security of democracy if we can use it for the purpose of establishing, by some means, at some point, however slowly, an understanding with the German people. But if we fail to use our victory for that purpose, if on the contrary we encourage the German people to go on supporting a militaristic Government, then the future of the world will not be for democracy but for that group which can militarize itself most successfully.

"This I know," said Mr. Balfour recently in the House of Commons, "if Germany does not become free, Europe cannot become free." And in the same speech he made this further significant statement: "No one is foolish enough to suppose that it would be possible to impose on Germany a constitution made outside Germany."

In order to destroy German militarism, then, something more than German defeat is required. The democratization of Germany is essential. And that democratization must come from within; force of foreign arms will not effect it. Upon the self-conversion of the German people from militarism, depends the future security of the whole world.

If, further, it can be shown that our attitude, in America and in the Allied nations, is a large factor in the process which will result either in liberating the German people from the spell of militarism, or in attaching them more firmly to its rule — then a plain duty will have been set before all who wish to bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion.

Our own attitude is a large factor in that process. But here we come upon a truth which, because it runs counter to our instinctive feelings, is likely to be taken as an attempt at paradox-mongering — a

thing silly enough at all times, but unpardonable in these. I beg the reader to believe that in what follows I mean exactly what I say in this proposition.

When a country goes to war, it usually proceeds to organize the public expression of its popular opinion and feeling in such a way as to give the maximum of encouragement to the enemy, and the prolongation of his resistance to the utmost.

This unconscious conspiracy in the enemy's interest has been particularly effective in the present war; it threatens to ensure the resistance of the enemy long after the period when, but for it, that resistance would break down; and will certainly cost the Allied nations thousands of lives, and many conceivably cost them the victory.

Those who make any attempt to stop this aid and comfort to the enemy are regarded by the majority as traitors and anti-patriots, and every effort is made to keep their attempt from succeeding.

There is, of course, in this unconscious conspiracy, no desire to aid the enemy or any knowledge that such aid is being given. It is set in motion by the need to satisfy certain "hungry emotions"; and, as is the case with any emotion that has reached a high pitch of intensity, those who act in this manner are blinded to the ultimate results of their behavior.

It is especially important that the attention of Americans should be called to the workings of an impulse which has wrought havoc among the moral and intellectual forces of the European Allies, since a similar phenomenon is already beginning to be manifest in this country.

Let us examine, in this light, the present situation in our war with Germany. Is it not obvious, to begin with, that the facts which we regard as true about the origin and purposes of this war — that

it was on Germany's part an act of unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression; that no one threatened either Germany's national safety or her economic interests; that the German policy of which this war was the outcome was based on autocratic and dynastic ambition, and not on national welfare; that the Allies are fighting, not against any rights of the German people, but against the interests of a little group of ambitious men; that our aim is to make such tyranny impossible in the future, and to liberate all peoples, including the Germans — is it not clear that these facts have either been withheld from the German people or that they have been led to believe something of a contrary nature?

Suppose that what we believe to be true were so self-evident, even to the German people, that their government were obliged in effect to take this position:

“The war is not for the defense of the Fatherland or its future; is not for the good of your country or for any great or noble end; it is not even for your material welfare or for that of your children. It is from first to last for the personal aggrandizement of that class whom most of you particularly dislike, for the subjugation of the country to its interests and of your descendants to its rule. The vast suffering, the sacrifices, the death, the enslavement, is all in order that Germany may continue to be what you Socialists and Liberals have for generations tried to prevent it being. You shall die by hundreds of thousands in order that the ends for which you lived and worked shall be defeated.”

If that had been the situation as Germans see it, the German Government would not have been able to keep the war going a week. German mothers

would not still continue gladly to give their children, all their children; lads would not tie themselves to their machine guns — as our men have known them to do — so that when the hour of supreme temptation came they would not fail to die at their posts.

Those things are possible because the German people as a whole have been persuaded that if they are beaten their whole future as a people will be blighted, and their nation at the mercy of envious and resentful enemies.

“The German people,” says Lord Northcliffe, head of the British War Mission in America, writing in *Current Opinion* for October, 1917, “have been purposely deluded into the belief that they are defending themselves against foes who are set upon crushing them out of existence.” Lord Northcliffe’s observation is confirmed by Mr. Gerard, ex-ambassador from the United States to Germany, in his book, “My Four Years in Germany”: “We are engaged in war against a people whose country was for so many centuries a theater of devastating wars that fear is bred into the very marrow of their souls, making them ready to submit their lives and fortunes to an autocracy which for centuries has ground their faces, but which has promised them as the result of the war . . . security.”

The German people as a whole — the great mass of the middle and upper classes, the merchants, manufacturers and traders, the University professors and students, the scientists, writers and journalists, even the majority of the Social Democratic party — take the view, however mistakenly, that the Government, notwithstanding its autocratic form, is fighting their battle, ensuring their security as a nation, establishing their legitimate place and rights in the

world. And when the Kaiser declares, as he did the other day in addressing the troops on the Western front, "I need not tell you why you must hold on—it is that the Germany of your children may live," there can be no doubt that most of them believe him. The power of the German Government to carry on the war, resides ultimately in the maintenance of that conviction; and on its intensity depends the degree of German resistance.

It is, plainly enough, to the interest of the German Government to represent the aims of the Allies with regard to Germany as intolerable; while on the other hand, it is to our interest to give to the German Government no grounds for such misrepresentation, no excuse for such misunderstanding. Indeed, it is our duty to make plain to the German people how near our aims are to their own desires.

Is there anything questionable in this reasoning, anything indeed which is other than obviously true? Yet not only is its truth not realized by the general public of the belligerent countries (on either side), but any attempt to act upon it is immediately repressed and punished with extreme severity. Organized and spontaneous efforts of private individuals and public officials alike are directed toward assisting in the maintenance of enemy resistance in the way just described.

Take the question of the Press. The German Government maintains in Berlin a special Bureau whose duty it is to select from American, British, French and Italian papers just those paragraphs which would help persuade the German people that unless they hold out to the end their nationality will be destroyed; thus making use of assistance fur-

nished by the Allies for the maintenance of German morale.¹

The Press of the Allied countries may be divided roughly into two groups: the group that favors a punitive and severe settlement with Germany, and the group that favors a milder one. It is, of course, the papers of the former group which the German Government uses for the purpose of its propaganda. The latter group is used by the Minority Socialists for the purpose of *their* propaganda — for the purpose of proving to the German people that the German Government is deceiving them in representing Allied intentions toward Germany as destructive. One might assume, in view of these facts, that the foreign circulation of this latter group — Socialist papers, or Liberal journals in favor of a moderate settlement — would be encouraged. In every case, however, it is these papers that the various Censorships prevent from going abroad, that they sometimes suppress at home and always discourage. It is the former group, used by the enemy Governments, that are immune from such prohibition or embarrassment.

It is not merely a matter of official censorship, but of the public temper. Left to themselves, the Governments — who can hardly be ignorant of the services which these minority organs could perform, or of the woeful mischief that the chauvinist organs do — would scarcely pursue a policy which often is

¹ This was revealed in the Reichstag debate (see reports in the American press of Oct. 7) in which the Minister of War von Stein, replying to the accusation that the Government had been carrying on political propaganda in the army, said: "It is clear that our soldiers must be enlightened concerning the enemy's real intentions and the consequences if we lost."

quite obviously the exact contrary of the public interest. But public clamor compels them to adopt it.

Dr. Helfferich, the German Minister, replying to a peace speech of the Socialist, Cohn, in the Reichstag debate of May 5, said:

"The peace which you advocate does not mean bread, but hunger for our people. It does not mean liberty, it means slavery. That is not just my opinion. These are the words of our enemies. Just read their speeches and their newspapers. The Deputy Haase [of the Social Democratic Minority] shakes his head. I know the newspapers which suit you deserve credit, but the others which do not suit you do not exist for you. I repeat it, you need only look at the foreign press, and you will find no other peace suggested than one which would bring our German people slavery and serfdom. The other day I read in committee an article by the French Senator, Humbert, which closed with something like the following words: 'This race of slaves dreaming of world-hegemony, must be made into slaves.' That is the sort of peace which our enemies allow us and wish to give us. Such a peace can only be promoted through speeches such as Dr. Cohn's — a peace such as the German nation could not tolerate."

Another illustration is afforded by an article, typical of what may be read any day in the German press, in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of April 27. After quoting the kind of terms in which the British Press of the chauvinist school is so fond of indulging,¹ the article goes on:

¹ This kind of thing: "The main conditions of peace are, first the complete dismemberment of the German Empire, its separate States each under the control of a governor to be nominated by the

"If any one amongst us believes that moderation or discernment exists in the ranks of our opponents, such a press opinion . . . should enlighten him thoroughly. Only a few days ago, the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* pointed out the mistake made by Social Democrats who hope to make an impression on the agitators in London and Paris by peaceful and moderate resolutions. Every one of our steps is watched—every wish for peace, every inclination to strike, every superfluous lament about shortness of food."

In general it may be said: the more a paper, or a public man, or a proposed measure, serves the purposes of the enemy in this fashion, the greater the popularity of that paper, or man, or measure, at home.¹ Few political personages have been so popular in England during the war as Mr. Hughes,

Allies . . . a war-indemnity charged upon the revenue . . . no army or fleet . . . the German navy must be split up among Britain and her Allies . . . the German colonies divided among them . . . until the indemnity is paid, an army of occupation in the various German and Austrian States."—*John Bull* (two million circulation a week), London, Sept. 16.

¹ The Administration, following the precedent set by the Allied Governments in Europe, has laid down the rule that there should be no discussion of peace-terms. Such a "truce to controversial matter" is always one-sided. What it means in fact is, not that there shall be no discussion of peace-terms, but that there shall be no *liberal* contribution to that discussion. The Paris Economic Conference was a discussion of peace-terms—of a most mischievous kind. There is plenty of discussion of peace-terms in America by the very persons who insist that they should not be discussed. Thus Mr. Roosevelt, at a meeting in Madison Square Garden, laid down elaborate peace-terms—"complete overthrow of Germany and the dissolution of Austria and Turkey," with such details as an independent Poland including "the whole Baltic coast"—whatever that may mean. There is to be no disarmament after the war. One doubts whether the Austro-German authorities could ask anything better for their purpose than a speech along just such lines from an ex-President of the United States.

the Australian Premier; and the speeches which contributed to win him this popularity were those which subsequently the German Government is said to have translated and circulated in the German trenches to show the soldiers the kind of fate against which they were fighting. It was Mr. Hughes who was largely responsible for giving a Protectionist interpretation to the Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference. The subject-matter of that Conference had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of the war; it was concerned purely with after-the-war conditions. But nothing that the veriest pro-German could have devised, was so calculated to aid the enemy's propaganda. It enabled the German bureaucracy to declare that the real objects of England and "her dupes"—objects such as the destruction of German commerce—were now revealing themselves. It was not long after the Paris Conference that Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking through Alfred Zimmermann of the Foreign Office, said to Mr. Bayard Swope: "There can be no doubt as to what Germany is fighting for: it can be reduced to a one-word formula—Existence. . . . We fight for the right to live and earn our living, for which we must have room for commercial expansion." Indeed, if we could imagine the Paris Resolutions being taken seriously, it would mean the riveting of militarism on Germany and the permanent conversion to it of the whole nation.

Yet that Conference, which so played the game of the enemy, was imposed upon the British Government by sheer force of popular opinion.

All these manifestations were very natural and seemingly excusable surrenders to a deep-seated hu-

man instinct. But there are circumstances when our salvation depends upon the control of strong natural instincts. It is "natural" for the thirst-maddened shipwrecked sailor to drink salt water. But unless he can control the instinct which urges him to satisfy his thirst, he will perish. The future salvation of our society depends upon a like discipline of certain of our instincts.

The Governments of the Central Powers have realized that they can make the *morale* of their people almost impregnable if they can create a "defense psychosis." Any people, savage or civilized, will fight to the last against what it believes to be national annihilation. To continue to bolster up such a belief in the minds of the German people, is to-day the prime need of the German autocracy.

And in that task the German and Austrian Governments have been greatly helped by the political and diplomatic strategy sometimes adopted by the Allied Governments.

The Allied Governments, it is true, proclaimed at the beginning of the war that their major object was the destruction of German militarism, and the aggression and wickedness for which it stood. That was and remains the highest object of our arms. But we failed to make clear to the enemy what this meant. Did it mean that in the future Germany and Austria were to have no armies? How were they to protect themselves and ensure respect for their rights? On that point there was no declaration (there is still no declaration). And this silence has enabled the enemy Governments to say to their peoples: "This talk of the destruction of German militarism really means that you are in the future

to be at the mercy of your enemies, and to be deprived of any means of defending your Fatherland's rights and interests."

It does not suffice that we have disclaimed the intention of destroying the German nation or of putting it at a disadvantage. No virile people will accept mere general declarations from its enemies as sufficient basis of its future security and rights. Mr. H. G. Wells — who will certainly not be accused of pro-Germanism — wrote recently of this situation:

"This is the argument that holds the German people stiffly united. For most men in most countries it would be a convincing argument, strong enough to override considerations of right and wrong. I find that I myself am of this way of thinking, that whether England has done right or wrong in the past — and I have sometimes criticized my country very bitterly — I will not endure the prospect of seeing her at the foot of some victorious nation. Neither will any German who matters. Very few people would respect a German who would."

Now the thing which would make it possible for Germans to repudiate German militarism and turn against the present German Government, would be some plan of reciprocal disarmament; or at least some real international organization which would furnish a possible, if distant, alternative to German military power as a means of national security. When Germans in the mass see in internationalism a means of defending German rights and interests, German militarism will be doomed.

Meanwhile, it is to the interest of the German Government to prove to its people that we are not

sincere when we speak of such things as disarmament and arbitration. It wants to create the impression at home that it is willing to abandon militarism for international organization, but that when this plan is really offered to the Allied Governments they refuse to consider it.

And that argument of the Central Governments will remain plausible if the debate is left in its present stage. The Central Powers have, in fact, made what will appear to their people a sincere offer to go into the questions of disarmament and arbitration, of a new international order. Silence on our part will be interpreted as proof that we want to avoid any definite and practical discussion of the subject; that our previous talk was mere diplomatic camouflage.

The situation must be reversed. We must show that we are serious in our desire for internationalism, on the basis of respect for the rights of all nations, small as well as great — not on the basis of the right of great States to override the will either of subject peoples or of their own peoples; and we must make it plain that in such a world the German people, like any other, would be secure.

But there is a further reason why the German Government should wish at this juncture to prove that our talk of internationalism is insincere, and any attempt to realize world-arbitration impracticable. Its only hope of obtaining the support of its people to a program of annexations, is to show that such annexations are necessary to national security. While the Reichstag vote of July 19 makes it plain that the Government could never hope to secure popular sanction for annexations as part of a Pan-German or Industrialist policy, it might conceivably

do so as part of a policy of self-defense; by the argument that Germany has nothing to depend on but her own resources in men and materials, and the strength of her frontiers.

The truth is that unless the problem of security, by means of some reasonably feasible plan of international organization, is on a fair way to solution before we come to deal with nationality and territorial readjustments, these latter will prove to be well-nigh insoluble. It is not alone the claims of the Central Powers that will make them so. Nations among the Allies are presenting claims which do violence to the principle of nationality. Most powers are moved by two great considerations: national security and the need of economic expansion. These things, it is felt, must come first; and every nation will attempt to make sure of its own safety and rights by the increase of its power and territory — so long as a League of Nations, or other similar plan for preventing aggression of one nation upon another, is merely a vague possibility in the background, and not a clearly-envisaged political reality.

The Pope's note, together with the Austro-German reply, at least places the discussion for the time being on this major problem of security by international organization. It is to the interest of the United States, as of the Allies, not to let it slide from that plane. And for the purpose of forming a sound public opinion, upon which a wise diplomatic strategy can most securely be based, some intimate knowledge of the data so clearly analyzed and presented in this volume, is indispensable.

PART ONE

APPROACHES TO THE GREAT SETTLEMENT

CHAPTER I

THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN PEACE NOTES OF DECEMBER, 1916

I.

PRESIDENT WILSON's efforts to assist in bringing about a satisfactory ending of the present war date back to its very beginning. On Aug. 3, 1914, six days after Austria had declared war on Serbia and the very day on which Germany invaded Belgium, he made a formal offer to mediate, which was formally declined.

Early Peace Discussion. There followed sixteen months of inconclusive fighting. Then on December 9, 1915, the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in a speech to the Reichstag, announced that Germany was ready for peace. This was understood as an invitation to a general preliminary discussion of peace terms, and it was in fact followed during the succeeding six months by a series of speeches and debates and interviews on the part of statesmen on both sides.

The most significant of these were the debates in Parliament of February 23 and May 24, 1916; the Reichstag debates of April 5 and 6; Sir Edward Grey's interview of May 15, and that of von Bethmann-Hollweg on May 22

in reply; the Reichstag debates of June 5 and 6, and von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech of November 9.¹

The fact that an informal discussion of peace had been entered upon gave rise to the hope that the warring countries were approaching a common ground of agreement; and it seemed for a time as though this might be the case. But their mutual distrust was too profound,² and in the end the discussion came to nothing.

During this discussion rumors of peace moves by the Pope and of mediation by the President of the United States were current in Europe, in connection, especially, with President Wilson's address of May 15 before the Press Club. In this speech he said: "If somebody does not keep the processes of peace going, if somebody does not keep the passions disengaged, by what impartial judgment and suggestion is the world to be aided to a solution when the whole thing is over?" Five days later at Charlotte, N. C., he spoke of Americans as imagining themselves "lifting some sacred emblem of counsel and of peace, of accommodation and righteous judgment, before the nations of the world." A few days later, in an address before the League to Enforce Peace, the so-called "Declaration of Interdependence," he stated, as a profession of faith, the principles upon which he was later to formulate a definite policy of international relations:

¹ These debates and interviews, except the last, for which see N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, may be found in *Governments and Parliaments on Peace*, a pamphlet published by the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, 51 Theresiastraat, The Hague.

² The Paris Economic Conference was held in April of that year. It proposed a "trade war after the war" against Germany. British, French, Italian, Belgian, Servian and Russian delegates were present, and a program was adopted, which had, however, no binding force upon their Governments.



Photo by Paul Thompson

PRESIDENT WILSON





First, that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live;

Second, that the small States have the same right as the great to have their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected;

Third, that the world has the right to be free from having its peace disturbed by aggression and disregard of the rights of others.¹

On this occasion, moreover, he foreshadowed the offer, made formally in his "peace note" of the following December, of American participation in a league of nations to maintain peace. "If it should ever be our privilege," he said, "to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines"—namely, first, a settlement such as the belligerents may be able to agree on as regards their own immediate interests, with which we have nothing to do, and finally, "a universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas . . . and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without . . . full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world."

The most propitious moment for such a movement seemed, perhaps, not yet to have arrived, and the President deferred further action until December.

2.

Germany Proposes Peace Negotiations. In the meantime Germany made a new peace move. On December 9, 1916, a year after his first suggestion

¹ For text see *Independent*, June 5, 1916.

of Germany's readiness to make peace, the Chancellor gave notice, at the reassembling of the Reichstag, of a proposal from the Central Powers to the Allies, to enter into peace negotiations.

The Emperor, it was announced, "in a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, toward humanity," "considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace." It was soon afterward made known that this peace movement had its origin in a letter of the previous October, in which the Kaiser instructed the Chancellor to make all necessary arrangements for such a move without delay. In the meantime the Central Powers had made a successful campaign against Roumania, a fact which it was felt would leave no opportunity for the misinterpretation of their peace offer as a confession of defeat.

The official German peace note (December 12, 1916), addressed to the neutrals for transmission to the Allied governments, is quite brief. It says that the four Central Powers make the proposal to enter forthwith into peace negotiations. They firmly believe that the propositions which they are prepared to bring forward for such negotiations are an appropriate basis for a lasting peace. "Their aims are not to shatter nor annihilate their adversaries." Their object is a guarantee for their nations of their existence, honor and free development. The note speaks of the war as having been forced upon the Central Powers, and calls attention to their military situation as demonstrating their invincibility.

Germany's separate note to the Vatican, of the same date, is somewhat more specific in its indication of the aims which Germany was fighting to realize and which must be secured in a peace satisfactory to her. These are "the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German nation," and "the right which she claims freely to develop

her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations." This latter clause may refer to her conviction before the war — manifested notably in the Moroccan affair — that she was being systematically excluded from an equal chance at colonial expansion; or it may refer more particularly to the plans of the Paris Economic Conference for a trade war after the war against Germany.

Allied Criticism of the German Peace Proposal.

The German proposal was received coldly in all the Entente countries, both because of its failure to state definite terms, and because of what was regarded as its insincerity. It was at once denounced on the latter grounds by Premier Briand in the French Chamber as "a crude trap."¹ Speeches in the parliaments of the Entente by Sonnino, Pokrovsky, Henderson, Asquith, Lord Curzon, Bonar Law and Lloyd-George, revealed the unanimous conviction that no good results could be expected from a proposal which showed no sense of wrong-doing on Germany's part, which contained no hint of reparation for such wrong-doing, and offered no guarantee against its repetition. These views were summed up by Lloyd-George, speaking for the first time as Prime Minister, on December 19: "Let me repeat again — complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantees. Did the German Chancellor

¹ A view which later events were held to substantiate. "In the light of subsequent events it seems most probable that the German peace offer was . . . a scheme to place the Allies in a diplomatic dilemma; if the Allies consented to negotiate, seeds of dissension might be sown among them; if the Allies brusquely rejected the offer, the German government in continuing the war would then stand justified in the eyes of the German people and might resort to extreme measures, ruthless submarine warfare, for instance."—Edward M. Sait and Thomas Parker Moon in the *Political Science Quarterly Record of Political Events*, Sept., 1917 (Supplement).

use a single phrase to indicate that he was prepared to concede such terms? . . . The very substance and style of the speech constitutes a denial of peace on the only terms on which peace is possible." ¹

The first official reply to the German note from any Entente country came from Russia, in the shape of a Duma resolution unanimously passed December 15. It was understood in this country that her allies had urged Russia to take advantage of this occasion to put an effectual quietus to the rumor that she was disposed to desert the Entente and make a separate peace. The Duma states that "it considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory, and after the definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it is accompanied."

3.

President Wilson's "Peace Note." It was in the midst of this unpromising situation that President Wilson's "peace note" of December 18 most unexpectedly appeared. Apparently the President had been contemplating this move for some time, waiting for the opportune moment; then the German peace note was interjected into the diplomatic situation.

¹ Lloyd-George proceeds to quote in substantiation of this statement a passage from the German note which is amazingly different from the version printed in this country. In neither version does the passage make good sense. The State Department, in response to a request for a copy of the original or of an official version, replied that they have no copy of the German note for distribution. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its useful collection of reprints and documents, has recourse only to the *New York Times* for its version of this and various other important state papers.

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Secretary of State Lansing explained, in the note as sent to the Allies, that "The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in his mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered, but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances."

The full grounds of the President's action are of course not public property; but the situation was that Germany showed herself not ready to state her terms except in a peace conference, and that the Entente seemed likely to answer in such a way as to close the door on peace discussion for an indefinite period. This may have led him to feel that he could delay no longer if he was to have any hope of success.¹

Request for a Statement of Peace Terms. The President's note suggested to all the belligerents the advisability of making avowals "of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be

¹ Further light may or may not be thrown on the President's decision to make his offer at this particular time, by the statement of Secretary Lansing, on December 21, that the country was "drawing nearer the verge of war," and was therefore "entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks." This alarming statement, which created a frantic sale of war-stocks, was followed the same day by a reassurance from Secretary Lansing that he "did not intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality."

concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future," such avowals, moreover, "as would make it possible frankly to compare them."

The President, it is carefully stated, "is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an increasing longing."

"It may be," he points out, "that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference, and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future. . . ." He reminds them that "the concrete objects" for which the war is being waged "have never been definitively stated," and that such aims as have been adduced by the belligerents, "as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world," are "virtually the same."

Common Ground. This common ground of aspiration, "as stated in general terms," is as follows: "Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each

would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amid multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world."

He directs their attention toward the necessity of immediately taking all possible steps toward this organized peace, in words of eloquent warning which have already taken rank among the great utterances of mankind: "If the the contest must continue to proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition until one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted; if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool, and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle."

Promise of American Participation in a League of Nations. And finally, in the great work of establishing such a universal peace-league, he offers the participation of the United States. "In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world, the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command."

Discussion of the Note. This note met with a variety of response, as was indicated by the discussions which preceded the formal replies of the belligerent Governments. In the United States, the President's hearty promise of American coöperation in a League of Nations did not meet with unanimous favor. A resolution expressing approval of the President's note, introduced into the Senate, precipitated much adverse criticism. It ran counter to the feeling widely held in the Senate that it would be unwise for the United States to leave her traditional isolation and impair in any degree her independent power and sovereign self-direction by entering a mutually responsible society of nations. In the end, the President's note was endorsed only so far as it was a request for a statement of peace-terms.

The neutral nations, to whom the note was also sent for their information and with a request for their support, responded with cordiality, but in the main without assent beyond vague general terms, to the proposal of a League of Nations.¹

Central Powers' Reply to the President. Of the belligerents, the Central Powers were the first to answer the President's note. Their replies, sent December 26, were all practically to the same effect. They did not state their peace-terms, but proposed

¹The Scandinavian countries addressed to the belligerents a joint note in support of the President's request for a statement of peace-terms. Switzerland took the same action, and also declared her willingness to help "lay the foundation for a fruitful collaboration of the peoples." Spain preferred to "suspend action." Persia and Greece took occasion to plead their own cases. China expressed her readiness to coöperate in the international organization suggested by President Wilson.

"an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerent States at a neutral place." They were "also of the opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can be begun only after the end of the present struggle of the nations." When the time for such work shall have come, they will "be ready with pleasure to collaborate entirely with the United States in this exalted task."

Joint Reply of Allies to German Note. The Allies' reply to the President's note was postponed until eleven days after their reply to the German peace-proposal, discussion of which it had interrupted. Attention was now turned to the Allies' joint reply of December 30 to the German proposal.

The reply showed resentment at what was regarded as the claim of victory in the German note, and asserted that the military successes to which that note alluded represented "nothing more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation, and not the real strength of the belligerents." It accused the Central Powers of falsely disclaiming responsibility for the war, and argued the point at length. It characterized the German proposals as "sham offers," "empty and insincere"—constituting in fact "a war-manceuvre," an attempt "to justify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes" including unrestricted submarine warfare. The Allies "refuse to consider" such proposals. "Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation of violated rights and liberties, recognition of the principle of nationalities, and of the free existence of small States; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end, once and for all, causes of long-standing menace to the

nations, and to afford the only effective guarantees for the future security of the world."

Russian Demands. Specific terms insisted upon by Russia were stated in a general order by the Czar, December 25, as follows: "the regaining of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, as well as the creation of a free Poland from all three of her now incomplete tribal districts"—in addition to guarantees against repetition of aggression by the Central Powers when "finally broken."

Central Powers in Criticism of the Allies. The Central Powers retorted to the Allies' reply in a statement of their case addressed to the neutrals. Notes from Germany and Austria, January 11, 1917, protest against the "falsification of their motives" in offering peace; present their own views as regards responsibility for the war; and undertake to show that the moral pretensions of the Allies are hypocritical. "The sincerity which our enemies deny to the proposal of the four allied [Central] Powers can not be allowed by the world to these demands [of the Entente Allies] if it recalls the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the freedom and independence of the Boer Republics, the subjection of Northern Africa by England, France and Italy, the suppression of foreign nationalities in Russia, and, finally, the oppression of Greece, which is unexampled in history." The plans of the Allies, "according to the statements of their responsible statesmen, are directed, among other things, toward the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of Austria-Hungary, the disintegration of Turkey, and the dismemberment of Bulgaria. In view of such war-aims, the demand for reparation, restitution

and guarantees in the mouth of our enemies sounds strange."

5.

Allied Reply to President Wilson. The Allies, having answered the Central Powers on December 30, turned to reply to the note of President Wilson. A joint official reply was transmitted from Paris on January 10, 1917. It was supplemented by a Belgian note of the same date, expressing gratitude for America's moral support and material aid, and noting with pleasure America's intention of co-operating in post-bellum measures to guarantee the rights of small nations.

The joint note expresses cordial appreciation of the idea of a league of nations to be formed after the war, with some emphasis on the necessity of penalties to give it force. The Allied Governments believe that there is no present possibility of a peace assuring them of reparation, restitution, and the guarantees to which the aggression of the Central Powers entitles them. Their war-aims are stated to be well known, having been "formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers Governments." These aims "will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply, in all necessity and in the first instance"—

- (1) "restoration
of Belgium,
of Servia,
and of Montenegro,
and the indemnities which are due them";

- (2) "evacuation of the invaded territories
of France,
of Russia,
and of Roumania,
with just reparation";
- (3) "restitution of provinces or territories
wrested in the past from the Allies by
force or against the will of their popu-
lations";
- (4) "liberation from foreign domination
of Italians,
of Slavs,
of Roumanians,
and of Tcheco-Slovaques" (*i.e.*,
Bohemians and Slovaks);
- (5) "enfranchisement of populations subject
to the bloody tyranny of the Turks,"
and "expulsion from Europe of the
Ottoman Empire, alien as it is to
Western Civilization";
- (6) as to Poland, "the intentions of His
Majesty the Emperor of Russia . . .
have been clearly indicated in the pro-
clamation which he has just addressed
to his armies" (*i.e.*, the creation of a
"free Poland" from Russian, German
and Austro-Hungarian territory).

These aims also imply a "reorganization of
Europe" founded upon

- (a) "respect of nationalities, and full security
and liberty of economic development"
for all nations, great and small;
- (b) "international agreements" which would
"guarantee territorial and maritime
frontiers against unjustified attacks."



[Courtesy of the *New York Times Current History Magazine*]

THE ALLIES' ANSWER REJOICES DEATH
[Dutch Cartoon]

4

But, while reiterating the "wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism," the Allies disclaim any design to compass "the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance."

A British note amplifying the joint reply was sent (January 13) by Balfour. It was a reasoned plea on behalf of the Allies' terms. Three conditions were stated as necessary for an enduring peace. (1) That existing causes of international unrest should as far as possible be removed or weakened. (2) That the aggressive aims and unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. (3) That international law, and treaties for preventing or limiting hostilities, should be backed up by some form of international sanction "which would give pause to the hardest aggressor." These conditions could only be fulfilled by the success of the Allied cause.

Particular reference is made to the proposed expulsion of the Turks from Europe, which, it is said, "will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied note."

Italian Claims. The claims of Italy were more particularly specified by the Italian Minister of Instruction, Ruffini, in a speech on January 14. American public opinion would not, he was sure, "confound brutal lust of conquest with a justified claim to territories like those of the Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia." ¹

¹ The Italian claim to Dalmatia has been severely criticized. According to the census of 1910, only 2.8 per cent. of the population of Dalmatia were Italian-speaking. Only in Zara were there any considerable number, 11,768 out of 83,359. It has been estimated that it is safe to add 10 per cent. to the Austrian statistics of Italian population, in which case the Italian claim, so far as it

Japanese Claims. A Japanese appendix to the peace-terms of the Allies was revealed January 23, in a speech by Viscount Motono, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. "The Imperial [Japanese] government, when they adhered to the project of the response to the American note, knew that the Allied Powers had not neglected to take into proper consideration the just claims which Japan would present at the peace negotiations. . . . A most satisfactory understanding exists on this subject among all the Allies." The nature of these claims is suggested by another sentence in his speech, in which he says that the absence, in the Allies' joint note, of any reference to "the further disposition of the German colonies has justly attracted the attention of the Japanese public." That document, he reminds his people, "by no means contains all the conditions of peace."

British Discussion of Allied Peace-terms. The question of what was implied in the Allies' answer to the President was raised in the House of Commons on February 20. Mr. Ponsonby, of the Union of Democratic Control, complained that the reply was in direct conflict with the assertion that this was not a war of aggression. "We entered into the war most undoubtedly for the protection of small nationalities but we seemed to be prosecuting it now for the extension of large empires." He pointed out that territory amounting to 1,500,000 square miles had already been added to the empire. The note implied the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the dismemberment of Turkey. As for punish-

concerned "unredeemed" Italians, would be based on a percentage of 3.08. See Dominian, Leon, "The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe" (Holt, 1917), p. 76, note.

ing Germany, " Our extreme demands only crushed the moderate party and united the whole nation together under the most extreme party."

Mr. Snowden " regarded the minimum conditions of peace as the complete restitution of Belgium and of the conquered territories of France, and adequate compensation."

Mr. McNeill thought that " whilst the last thing this country desired was to increase our imperial responsibilities or acquire territory it did not follow that . . . it might not be necessary to transfer territory from the enemy to ourselves or our dominions, or to our Allies."

6.

Germans Blame Allies for Continuance of War.
On January 6, the German and Austrian Emperors issued orders announcing the Allies' refusal and laying upon them the blame for the continuation of the war. They had " dropped the mask," said the Kaiser, and " admitted the lust of conquest."

The German reaction to the Allies' terms as stated to President Wilson, is given specifically in a comment on January 15, by Zimmermann, German Minister of Foreign Affairs:

" There is not a German who would not rather die than see the accomplishment of the announced intention of the Entente Powers with respect to Germany, to see German provinces with predominant German populations torn from the German Empire, and United Germany, which our fathers labored to achieve, torn asunder and the country reduced, as the Allies have plainly announced as their ambition, to a condition of subjection to rival great powers of Europe.

"The conditions for Austria-Hungary are even more difficult. Its dismemberment to satisfy the passion for territorial aggrandizement of Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania, would leave the State not even a third-rate power, while who can say what would be the fate of the 'redeemed small nationalities' when brought under the sway of Russia? Bulgaria, of course, would be bitterly punished and Turkey would practically cease to exist if the plans, contemplated in the Entente's answer, were attained."

CHAPTER II

THE PRESIDENT'S SENATE ADDRESS THE BREAK WITH GERMANY

I.

WITH the statement of the Allies' war aims and the German rejection of such terms, it seemed once more as though discussion had reached a dead end.

The President's Senate Address. The situation was, however, abruptly altered by President Wilson's dramatic appearance on January 22 before the Senate and his great "peace without victory" address.

He notes that in reply to his request for terms: (1) The Central Powers state merely their readiness for conference. (2) The Entente Powers have stated "with sufficient definiteness to imply details" what they regard as "indispensable conditions of a satisfactory peace." (3) The statesmen on both sides "have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted," that it was "no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists." (4) In every discussion it is taken for granted that there must hereafter be "some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."

His purpose is now to formulate the conditions upon which the Government would feel justified in asking the American people to approve its formal adherence to a League for Peace.

His thesis is that though the United States can not decide what the peace-terms are to be, it may decide whether or not they shall be made lasting by international agreement.

What Peace America Would Help Assure. Further, American coöperation in guaranteeing peace must depend on the character of the peace settlement. Therefore the United States should state at once what kind of peace it will help to make permanent.

Accordingly he named these specific conditions:

First, it must be a "peace between equals": both sides have said that it was no part of their purpose to crush their antagonists;¹

Second, it must be a peace founded on "equality of rights" among nations, irrespective of their size or strength;

Third, it must be a peace based on the acceptance of the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed: the acceptance of which principle would imply the inviolable security, henceforth, of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own — and, as a single further instance, the existence of a united, independent and autonomous Poland;

Fourth, so far as is practicable, every great peo-

¹ These assurances imply, President Wilson goes on to say, "a peace without victory." This phrase, especially when taken apart from the explanatory passage which followed it, was the subject of much critical comment by the belligerents and their advocates. It was only gradually that the speech came to be appreciated as a whole and in its true perspective as a piece of constructive statesmanship.

ple now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured — either by cession of territory or by neutralization of rights of way — of direct access to the sea;

Fifth, freedom of the seas, with whatever changes of international law may be required to assure that freedom “in practically all circumstances”;

Sixth, limitation of armaments, military and naval.

2.

Discussion of the Senate Address. This address was widely recognized as the first formulation, within the sphere of practical statesmanship, of that world-order which has long been pursued as an ideal.

Nevertheless, in the discussion which it provoked, both at home and abroad, there was some tendency to regard it in an immediately partisan light.

In the United States Senate, a resolution calling for discussion was tabled by a strictly party vote.

The first expression of official European opinion came from the Russian Foreign Office. It specifically approved the President's position on access to the seas, limitation of armaments, Polish freedom and no crushing of the enemy.

German Note of January 31. Germany's response was contained in an official note under date of January 31, in which she formally expressed her acceptance of:

Self-government and equality of rights of all nations;

Freedom of the seas and open door;

Repudiation of competing alliances;

Repudiation of effort to destroy or annihilate enemies.

With regard to Belgium she stated that "the Chancellor had declared only a few weeks previously that its annexation had never formed part of Germany's intentions. The peace to be signed with Belgium was to provide for such conditions in that country, with which Germany desires to maintain friendly neighborly relations, that Belgium should not be used again by Germany's enemies for the purpose of instigating continuous hostile intrigues. Such precautionary measures are all the more necessary as Germany's enemies have repeatedly stated, not only in speeches delivered by their leading men, but also in the statutes of the Economic Conference in Paris, that it is their intention not to treat Germany as an equal, even after peace has been restored, but to continue their hostile attitude, and especially to wage a systematic economic war against her."

She expressed her readiness to coöperate in all efforts to prevent future wars.

3.

The Submarine Notification. The note expressing this degree of agreement with the President's proposal was the note announcing an unrestricted submarine campaign.

This decision of Germany's seemed under the circumstances doubly a tragedy for mankind. The President's address, after the first difficulties of partisan misinterpretation, had evoked an increasing enthusiasm among liberals throughout Europe. There was a growing appreciation of the significance of this desire to lift the world-struggle to a plane of conscious and unselfish effort on which constructive statesmanship could achieve permanent re-

sults. The German note cut square across all such high debate.

American attention now concentrated on the varying phases of the situation which the threat of unrestricted submarine warfare had created — armed neutrality, the delegation of special powers to the President, and ultimately the declaration of war.

While the country was still upon the brink of war, the President, in his inaugural address, repeated in even more emphatic terms the propositions of his address before the Senate, as “the things we shall stand for whether in war or in peace.”

President Wilson's Inaugural Address. Feeling that “some of the injuries done us have been intolerable,” nevertheless “we have still been clear that we wished nothing for ourselves that we were not ready to demand for all mankind — fair dealings, justice, the freedom to live and be at ease against organized wrong. . . . We desire neither conquest nor advantage. We wish nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people. We always professed unselfish purpose, and we covet the opportunity to prove that our professions are sincere.”

CHAPTER III

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AMERICA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR POLITICAL UNREST IN GERMANY

I.

A NEW and powerful element of change, profoundly modifying every aspect of the situation, revealed itself in the Russian Revolution.

The Coming of the Revolution. Milyukov gave warning in the Russian Duma, in his speech of February 28, 1917, of the storm that was to break a week later.

"When the nation finds that, in spite of all its sacrifices, its destinies are being endangered by a clique of incompetent and corrupt rulers, then the people become a nation of citizens; they become determined to take their case into their own hands. Gentlemen, we are approaching that point."

"Separate Peace" Repudiated. On March 12 the Duma met in defiance of Imperial orders. On the 15th the Czar abdicated. With the fall of the Romanoff régime, there was swept completely from power that pro-German element of the Russian bureaucracy whose activities had caused in Allied councils so much fear of Russian defection. One of the first actions of the revolutionary Government, under the temporary leadership of the Milyukov

ministry, was the definite repudiation both of a separate peace and of desire for conquest.¹

Almost immediately, however, the Milyukov ministry was revealed as out of sympathy with the revolutionary masses. The middle-class liberalism of Milyukov's party had in fact shared the political and diplomatic theory of current European practice, and was not prepared for so complete an abandonment of national ambition, especially of the desire to secure Constantinople and the Dardanelles, as the workers' and soldiers' party demanded. Neither did the two parties feel alike about the separatist movements of the Ukraine and non-Russian parts of the Empire.

Socialist Terms of Peace. Milyukov resigned on May 16 and the power came into the hands of Kerensky and the moderate Socialists. This group, like that of the extreme Socialists, naturally desired peace — not a separate peace for Russia, but a world-peace effected by revolutionary working-class action in all nations. Already, within two weeks after the Revolution, the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates announced that "the time has come to begin a decisive struggle against the imperialistic designs of all countries; the time has come for the peoples to take the settling of the question of war and peace into their own hands."

In accordance with this policy, a definite program was formulated — the famous "Russian peace formula," which was thus stated editorially in the Bulletin of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates.

"The laboring masses of Russia stand for a ter-

¹ For the declarations of April 9 and May 19 as to foreign policy, see note 1, p. 72-3.

mination of the war without any conquests, without imposing contributions, and with the recognition of the free development of nations.”¹

For Russia this meant that “we give up the intention of conquering Constantinople, Galicia, Armenia, and are granting complete independence to Poland. The other peoples of Europe should follow our example, and the causes and the very possibility of war will be removed.”

With the imperialistic ambitions of the old régime, these spokesmen of new Russia discarded also the desire for a “decisive victory” over their foes — to whom instead they turned with the appeal to “throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic régime,” and “unite to end the terrible butchery, and reëstablish and strengthen international unity.”

These were the views of Russia as voiced by the Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Delegates. Meanwhile the government under the leadership of Kerensky, agreed upon an opportunistic foreign and domestic policy.

Plan to Secure a General Peace. The hope was to bring pressure to bear upon the Allies and to secure a general adoption of the Russian peace-formula: and this policy was expected either to bring about a general and satisfactory peace, or, if the German military bureaucracy refused to accede to such terms, to provoke a revolution in Germany.

¹ This took the brief popular form of “No annexations, no indemnities, free development for all nationalities.” It is interesting to note that this coincides in substance with the “Terms of Peace at the Close of the Present War,” as drafted by the National Committee of the American Socialist Party, in May, 1915. Those terms read: “(1) No indemnities. (2) No transfer of territory except upon the consent and by the vote of the people within the territory. (3) All countries under foreign rule to be given political independence if demanded by the inhabitants of such countries.”



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

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But in order to be in a position to bring pressure upon the Allies it was necessary for Russia to fulfill what the Allies understood to be her obligations. What may be called the Kerensky plan was to back up, with powerful and effective military operations, the request to the Allies for adherence to the Russian peace-terms.

From the Russian point of view, the Allies' response to the Russian renunciation of imperialistic conquest and aggrandizement, was inadequate. President Wilson's note to Russia,¹ made public June 10, was a bitter disappointment. It might have been over-sanguine to expect more than a tardy and gradual conversion of her allies to these terms, but it appeared to Russian public opinion that the Republic was being treated with a coldness never manifested to the Czar.

Meanwhile the Kerensky plan for a powerful blow at the Central Powers was proceeding under heavy difficulties. Aside from the activities of German agents with their propaganda of a separate peace, and the sincere conviction of many extremists that a separate peace would afford Russia her best opportunity to enjoy the blessings of proletarian communism, there was the huge fact of disorganization to cope with. Added to the chaos inherited from a corrupt and inefficient bureaucratic régime, was the tumult and confusion of a social and industrial revolution. Under these circumstances, the apparent lack of official sympathy from the Allied Governments for the aims, or even for the difficulties of Russia, could not but stimulate that process of independent thought so disastrous to the *morale* of an army. The great Russian blow, having been launched early in July, failed of its purpose. And with it the Kerensky plan was for the time at least frustrated.

¹ This and other Allied discussion of the Russian peace-terms will be found in Chap. V, p. 72 *sq.*

Effect of Russian Revolution on International Situation. In renouncing imperialism and with it the traditional rôle of menace to Germany, Russia had weakened the position of German military bureaucracy. At the same time, by appealing over the heads of rulers to the peoples, and especially to the highly organized Socialists with their internationalist principles, it had become an embarrassment not only to Germany but to its Allies. On the other hand, the fall of the Autocracy relieved the Allies of an embarrassment both political and moral, and—in spite of Japan, Roumania and other undemocratic Governments—gave further substantiation to their claim to be fighting for democracy.

Perhaps its most momentous effect was exercised on American destinies. All that lay back of the decision of the President to urge the immediate entry of the United States into the war, will not be known till history gives up its secrets; but it was in the chronological sense at least a consequence of the Russian Revolution. The press may or may not have been right in representing that the United States had had to replace Russia. Undoubtedly the democratization of Russia made it much easier for America to join the Allies.

American War-aims. On April 2, President Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress to ask for a declaration of a state of war with Germany. He took the occasion to pay tribute to "the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia." He stated that the United States would fight "for democracy," for the rights and liberties of small

nations,— for a “universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.” In subsequent addresses he repeated and emphasized his pledge of our national disinterestedness.

The Flag Day Speech, a bitter indictment of the German bureaucracy, with especial reference to the Mittel-Europa plan and the “intrigue for peace,” amplifies a distinction earlier made between the German ruling class and the German people — with whom we “have no quarrel.” Austria, as well as the German people, is stated to be a victim of the German rulers. “Its people now desire peace, but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin.”

News of the Russian Revolution Reaches Germany. The influence of the Russian Revolution on Germany was immediate, if not as profound as had been hoped. It provoked a violent parliamentary discussion of German peace terms and re-opened the old question of political reform.

In the Prussian Diet, on March 14 — the day preceding the formal abdication of the Czar — occurred the first of many stormy scenes, in which the Socialists in particular were outspoken in their attacks on German militarism. One of them, Adolph Hoffman, declared: “We shall refuse to vote for the budget. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg is merely the fig leaf of military absolutism. Militarism bears the responsibility for the blood-shed in Europe, and only when militarism and despotism are removed will the people breathe freely. Force of arms will not lead to a decision and peace. Distress, desperation, and general collapse will do it.

"When both enemies are equally strong, the threat of crushing is sheer nonsense. Germany, despite many successes, has not conquered. The German peace proposal, with its tone of victory, was bound to cause vexation and distrust. She should have communicated her peace terms and thereby have dissipated her enemies' distrust.

"The revolution in Russia should be a warning to our rulers. The German submarine warfare is opposed to the laws of humanity and international law."

On March 22 there was a similar storm, this time in the Reichstag. An indication of the temper of the times was the election of Franz Mehring, a member of the minority, or anti-war group of the Socialists, to fill Liebknecht's seat in the lower house of the Prussian Diet. On April 5, von Bethmann-Hollweg made a speech on peace-terms which was applauded by the Liberals, Socialists, and most of the Catholic Center, the Pan-Germanists and annexationists remaining silent.

Reichstag Debates Peace-terms. A parliamentary "drive" was under way in which it seemed for a time that the Chancellor would be compelled to reveal the German peace-terms. The crisis came on May 15. Scheidemann, of the Majority Socialists, declared: "On both sides the nations are being put off with the promise of an imminent final decision [decisive victory]. It is our task to expose this playing with the life of peoples, and we cry to all Governments, 'it is enough!'"

Speaking for the Socialists, he repeated that they stood for "the territorial integrity of Germany and her economic independence and development," and against the oppression of foreign peoples. "We are convinced that the

Central Powers will stand fast in repelling intentions of annihilation, but also that the wishes of the French, English and German annexationists will not be realized. Thus think the Socialists, and millions are with us.

"The supporters of conquest shout for increase of power, increase of territory, money and raw material. That can only be wanted by a nationally organized gang of robbers." (This statement provoked a storm of indignation on the Right.) "The drawing of the Kaiser into this agitation has as a result that abroad the Kaiser is made responsible for Pan-German madness and the outbreak of war, and that he is continually being insulted.

"Peace by agreement would be good fortune for Europe. Ninety-nine per cent. of all the peoples look with hope and longing to Stockholm. If France and Great Britain renounce annexation and Germany insists thereon, we shall have a revolution in the country." This brought "prolonged shouts of indignation and cries of 'Shame! Stand Down!'" Herr Scheidemann was called to order, but continued.

"It has not gone so far as that yet; the enemy does not renounce annexation. A peace just to all parties should be concluded. I am firmly convinced that no peace can be concluded without an alteration of frontiers, and that must be arranged by mutual understanding. I am bitterly opposed to the slaughter of another million men simply because certain Germans desire peace that would follow conquests. Long live peace! Long live Europe!"

The Chancellor was at the same time challenged by the Conservatives to make "a clear reply" which would show that Germany had not renounced annexations and indemnities. Dr. Roesicke, for instance, brought forward the tactical objection that to announce a policy of renunciation "gives our enemies a charter to prolong the war without risking anything."

The Chancellor's Non-committal Policy. Under

this pressure from both sides, it was hoped, not only in Germany but throughout the world, that the Chancellor would reveal the German terms. This he categorically refused to do.

"Does any one believe, in view of the state of mind of our western enemies, that they could be induced to conclude peace by a program of renunciation?"

"It comes to this. Shall I immediately give our western enemies an assurance which will enable them to prolong the war indefinitely without losses to themselves? Shall I tell these enemies: 'Come what may, we shall under all circumstances be people who renounce: we shall not touch a hair of your head. But you want our lives — you can without any risks continue to try your luck?'"

"Shall I nail down the German Empire in all directions by a one-sided formula which only comprises one part of the total peace conditions and which renounces successes won by the blood of our sons and brothers and leaves all other matters in suspense? No. I will not pursue such a policy.

"Or ought I, conversely, to set forth a program of conquest. I decline to do that . . . we did not go forth to war and we stand in battle now against almost the whole world, not in order to make conquests, but exclusively to secure our existence and to establish firmly the future of the nation. A program of conquest helps as little as a program of renunciation to win victory and the war.

"On the contrary, I should thereby merely play the game of hostile rulers and make it easier for them further to delude their war-weary peoples into prolonging the war immeasurably."

The Chancellor referred to the possibility of a separate peace with Russia, on terms which would leave in the Russian nation "no germs of enmity." Nevertheless, Ledebour, a Minority Socialist, still maintained that the Chancellor desired "annexations both in the East and in the West."

On May 17 the Reichstag was adjourned, without any definite statement of the German peace-terms having been secured.

Demand for Political Reforms. The campaign for political reforms was equally inconclusive.

Demands for internal reforms had long been pressed, and not by Socialists alone. As early as the spring of 1916, it was understood in the Reichstag that the abolition of the objectionable three-class system of voting for the Prussian Diet, awaited only the end of the war. This three-class system, which gave an inordinate representation to the landlord and capitalist classes, was the more disliked in contrast with the thoroughly democratic Reichstag suffrage. The Reichstag constituencies, however, badly needed redistricting, for the growth of cities had left their masses of voters inadequately represented; but as such redistricting would have increased the Socialist representation and decreased that of the Junkers, it had been resisted by the Government. Another main point of attack was the position of the ministry, which, unlike that of Great Britain and France, is not responsible to the legislative body. The Bundesrath, or Upper House, moreover, is made up of appointees of the rulers of the several States of the Empire, so apportioned as to give Prussia effective control. These, and perhaps also the super-constitutional prerogatives of the Kaiser, are the long-standing objects of attack by German constitutional reformers.

Promises and Delays. The "party-truce" which had been agreed upon at the beginning of the war, stood in the way of these domestic changes. Parliamentary discussion of them was, however, precipitated by the Chancellor himself, who, seeking perhaps to calm waters troubled by news of the Russian Revolution, declared before the Prussian Diet on March 14 that there must be reforms. Nevertheless he was forced by Junker opposition to retract this decision a few days later. Ledebour,

who openly advocates a German Republic, declared that "the Reichstag must have the right to a voice in the conclusion of alliances, peace, treaties, and declarations of war. The Imperial Chancellor must be dismissed when the Reichstag demands it." On March 30 a resolution was passed by a vote of 227 to 33, appointing a committee on Constitutional reform. On April 7, the day after America's declaration of war, the Kaiser published his "Easter note" in favor of reform and especially of reform of the Prussian Diet; not to take effect however "until the time of the homecoming of our warriors when they themselves are able to join in the counsel and the voting on the progress of the new order." The Reichstag adjourned without having secured anything more than this.¹

¹ The relation of political reform in Germany to peace has been made a close one by President Wilson's reply to the Pope, in which the possibility of peace is made to depend on the effectual democratization of the German Government.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIALISTS AND THE WAR

I.

THE Socialist view of the causes of war is one which must be recognized as tending to bring the working-people of the warring countries closer together, by giving them a sense of their common interests; while at the same time accentuating in each country the line of cleavage between economic classes.

Socialist View of the Causes of War. This "accepted Socialist view as it has gradually evolved from 1866, when the subject was first discussed in the Congress of the old International in Geneva, until 1907, when the International Congress at Stuttgart formulated the most complete and authoritative Socialist expression on war and militarism," is tersely stated by Morris Hillquit:

"The Socialist diagnosis of the causes of modern wars may thus be summed up in one sentence: The basic cause is capitalism; the contributory causes are imperialism, militarism, social unrest, international grudges, and pseudo-patriotism."

Formerly this view might have seemed doctrinaire in its aloofness from nationalistic sentiments; now, with the official sanction of revolutionary Russia, it has become a matter of practical moment,

since it may profoundly affect the ultimate peace-settlement.

The problem of war has been one of the chief concerns of Socialist thought, and a definite program of action had been worked out, with respect both to preventing it so far as that might be possible, and, in case such efforts proved fruitless, to bringing about a satisfactory peace.

Duty of Socialists in Regard to War. The latest International Socialist Congress held at Copenhagen in 1910, in "reiterating the oft-repeated duty of Socialist representatives in parliaments to combat militarism with all the means at their command and to refuse the means for armaments," specified, in terms that are in themselves a peace program, what it required of Socialist representatives. They must constantly strive toward:

- (1) compulsory arbitration of all international disputes;
- (2) ultimate complete disarmament — and, as a first step, limitation of naval armaments and abrogation of privateering, by a general treaty;
- (3) abolition of secret diplomacy, and publication of all international agreements;
- (4) guaranty of all nations against military attack or suppression by force.

2.

In general this program was pushed to the full extent of Socialist powers. It had, however, been feared for some time that the spirit of internationalism was waning in the most powerful and highly organized of all the Socialist national groups, that



Photo by Paul Thompson

ALBERT THOMAS

Leader of the Socialists in the French Chamber
of Deputies



the same way as the other two.

the same way as the other two.

the same way as the other two.

the same way as the other two.

the same way as the other two.

of Germany. The Socialist members of the Reichstag had been drawn into the nationalistic current of thought. Their action in voting credits, when the war broke out, shattered the International for the time being.

Socialist Efforts to End the War. Nevertheless since that time Socialists have been doing what they could toward carrying out the other part of their program, that of bringing about a satisfactory peace. Within a month or so of the beginning of the war, both the Swiss and American Socialist parties endeavored to convene a special Socialist International Peace Congress, but without success.

Dutch-Scandinavian Socialists. In January, 1915, however, the Dutch and the three Scandinavian Socialist parties held a conference at Copenhagen. The invitation to this conference stated the following objects: "To influence the opinion of the peoples in neutral countries in such a way that it shall be exerted in favor of a settlement which will guarantee a lasting peace, and, further, to strive for a united effort to secure:

- (1) that no changes of frontiers shall take place at the end of the war by which the right of self government by the nations shall be lessened;
- (2) the restriction of military armaments;
- (3) the establishment of a responsible International Arbitration Court.

"The parliamentary groups of the Socialist parties which take part in the Conference will be asked to lay addresses before the governments of their respective countries urging that they should take steps to bring about the finish of the war, perhaps

through the joint action of all governments of neutral states."

Troelstra, the veteran Dutch Socialist who attended, had been in favor, at a meeting held in Holland on January 2, of two additional points:

- (1) Abolition of the right of capture at sea;
- (2) The opening of all colonies to all the powers.

As finally adopted, the manifesto was amplified by further demands for parliamentary control of foreign policies and no secret diplomacy. It also protested in regard to Belgium.

The London Conference. In February, 1915, the London Conference of Representatives of Socialist and Labor parties in Great Britain, France, Russia,¹ and Belgium, met under the presidency of Keir Hardie. They adopted resolutions declaring that inasmuch as a victory for German imperialism would be the destruction of liberty and democracy in Europe, they were inflexibly determined to fight till victory was achieved. They demanded for Belgium liberation and compensation, for the Polish problem the solution desired by the Polish people, and for populations annexed against their will, from Alsace to the Balkans, that they shall be allowed freely to dispose of themselves. They ascribed the war to "the policy of colonial dependencies and aggressive imperialism," and declared against defense developing into conquest. At the close of the war the working class, they held, must unite in the International to suppress secret diplomacy, end the interests of armament-makers, etc., and establish an

¹ An instance of the international spirit was afforded by the refusal of the delegates from one of the two Russian Socialist parties to vote on the ground that the Socialists of Germany and Austria should have been invited to participate.

international authority to compel peace and maintain compulsory arbitration.

British Socialist Efforts Toward Peace. The British Socialist Party, meeting soon after in conference, held that only "a democratic federation of the states of Europe will put an end to the present ruinous form of militarism and imperialism," and declared against the cry for "a fight to a finish" and in favor of "an immediate peace on such terms as will prevent the repetition of a similar war."

The Independent Labor Party at its annual meeting at Norwich, April 5, 1915, also declared for an immediate peace. Ramsay MacDonald declared that the war ought not to be carried further than the political point when the forces of democracy in Germany were liberated and prepared themselves to crush their own militarism, and thus place European peace on a firm foundation.

Vienna Conference of Socialists. The Socialists of Germany and Austria-Hungary at a meeting in Vienna the same month (April 12-13), adopted a resolution in favor of peace based on international arbitration, the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, democratic parliamentary control of treaties, and international agreement to move toward ultimate disarmament.

This is practically identical with the program of the (British) Union of Democratic Control, adopted in the autumn of 1914; and, with the addition of the "open door" demand, it is identical with the "minimum program" of the international Central Organization for Durable Peace formed in Holland in April, 1915.

American Socialist Peace Program. A more extended peace program was resolved on by the So-

cialist Party of America in May, 1915. This embodies four of the five articles of the "minimum program," with more or less amplification. The chief points (re-arranged as to sequence) follow:

- I. No transfer of territory except by vote of its people: political independence to be given, on the demand of the inhabitants, to countries under foreign rule.
- II. Abolition of secret diplomacy and democratic control of foreign policies.
- III. "International Federation, the United States of the World."
 - (a) An international Congress with legislative and administrative powers over international affairs and with permanent committees, in place of present secret diplomacy.
 - (b) Special commissions to consider international disputes as they may arise, the decisions of such commissions to be enforced without resort to arms; each commission to go out of existence when the special problem that called it into being is solved.
- IV. Disarmament.
 - (a) Universal disarmament as speedily as possible.
 - (b) Abolition of manufacture of arms and munitions of war for private profit, and prohibition of exportation of arms, war equipment and supplies from one country to another.
 - (c) No increase in existing armaments under any circumstances.
 - (d) No appropriations for military or naval purposes.
- V. The "Open Door" plank is missing, but in its place is a demand for
 - (a) International ownership and control of strategic waterways such as the Dardanelles, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Suez, Panama and Kiel canals.
 - (b) Neutralization of the seas.

Terms of German Socialists. These programs should be compared with the terms officially advocated by German Socialists as reported in the *New York Times* of August 26, 1915. These terms were the outcome of a conference of members of the Party Committee of the Socialist Party of Germany with the Socialist members of the Reichstag — where the Socialists hold 111 seats out of 397, being the largest single party — and are thus the views of responsible legislators.

I. Annexations are opposed.

Germany's opponents must not be permitted to acquire any German territory.— Austria and Turkey should not be weakened.— Annexations by Germany of foreign territory would violate the rights of peoples to self-government, and weaken the internal strength and harmony of the German nation.

II. Economic clauses.

Tariff barriers should be removed.— “Most favored nation” clauses should be introduced into peace terms with all belligerents.— Freedom of the seas, the abolition of the right of capture and internationalization of straits of importance to the world's commerce should be secured as far as possible.

III. An international court should be established, to which all future conflicts should be submitted.— Peace must be permanent and lead nations to closer relations.

South German Social-Democrats. Proposals of South German Social-Democrats were both more radical and more detailed. They proposed:

I. The *status quo ante*, or a plébiscite in disputed territories — in which are included by name the fol-

lowing German holdings, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig, Trentino; and on the other side, Finland and the Baltic provinces. Poland is also specified, but it is not clear what territory is meant, whether Russian Poland only, or also Galicia and the Polish parts of Prussia.

- II. For internationalization they specify the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and the Kiel canal.
- III. No indemnities.
- IV. Confederacy of all European States; with further details regarding international parliaments, police, and law courts for minor international offenses. Alliance of all against aggression.
- V. People's army for defense only, limitation of armaments, and, finally, demands for democracy at home.

3.

Zimmerwald Conference. In September, 1915, a much more important step was registered in a Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald in Switzerland at which *representatives from both sides* met.¹ This was repeated at the Kienthal, or second Zimmerwald, conference the following April.² The men who braved public opinion to meet their "enemies" were of course members of the more radical group

¹ The Zimmerwald conference was not the first occasion at which delegates from both sides came together during the war. A meeting of Socialist women was held at Berne in April, 1915; and later in the same month the International Conference of Women was held at The Hague where English, Belgians, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and neutrals met under the presidency of Jane Addams. The Hague meeting resulted in the formation of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, with headquarters at Amsterdam.

² Held April 24-30; forty delegates attended, including Italians, Swiss, Russians, and Germans, among them the editor of *Vorwärts*.

beginning to make itself heard within the belligerent countries; men who, like Liebknecht, refused to forsake the international point of view even in war-time.

The "Zimmerwald position" is not so much international as regardless of political nationalism.

"All Socialist parties are to wage revolutionary war against the Government of their country, to refuse all war-credits and war supplies, and, with the battle-cry of 'Down with the War!' to demand 'immediate peace without annexations.'" Socialists should not, however, be indifferent to political any more than to economic oppression. On the contrary they are urged to "defend themselves by class-warfare against all forms of national oppression, to oppose all exploitation of the weaker nations, and to demand the safeguarding of national minorities and the autonomy of all peoples upon the broadest democratic basis." They challenge the idea that international organization on the basis of capitalism holds out any hope.¹

The Zimmerwald manifesto was signed among others by Ledebour of the German Reichstag, the French Socialist Bourderon, and the Russian Lenin, who has been so conspicuous a figure in the Russian Revolution.

Socialist Split in Germany. The highly disciplined Social-Democratic Party of Germany, whose political watchword had been unity, finally in April, 1916, split into two groups on the war and peace issue. The more conservative, with the larger number of Socialist party members in the Reichstag but probably fewer in the party membership, under the lead of Philip Scheidemann became known as the "Majority" or "Patriotic" Socialists. The "Mi-

¹ See Eduard Bernstein's article of August 19, reprinted in *New Europe*, September 20, 1917.

nority" or "Independent" Socialists not only had hosts of supporters but for some time controlled *Vorwärts*, with its immense circulation and prestige. It included men like Haase, Ledebour, and Eduard Bernstein.¹

In the United States. In the United States the split came later, but was well marked at the Socialist Party Emergency Convention at St. Louis, April 7-14, 1917. The American Socialists then found themselves forming into two distinct groups. Their views were expressed in a majority and minority report on the war; but in this case the majority were the radicals, and their report with its uncompromising condemnation of America's entry into the war was adopted by a referendum vote of 21,639 to 2,752.

This action led to the resignation from the party of some of its most prominent members, including William English Walling, Graham Phelps Stokes, Charles Edward Russell, J. G. Ghent, John Spargo, and Upton Sinclair, mostly, it is interesting to notice, not of the working class. The Party was thus left in the hands of the radicals.

The radical position seems to be taken by the official Socialist Party not only in the United States but in Norway, Sweden, Holland and Italy. It also dominates the two English Socialist Parties but not the English Labor Party. Among French Socialists the radicals are a minority, but an important minority controlling the Paris organization and about 45 per cent. of the party.

¹ See Bernstein's account of the split under date of April 30, 1916, in the *New Republic*, September 23, 1916.



[Courtesy of L'Asino]

SEARCHING FOR PEACE

If the German people want peace, they have only to
straighten their backs.

24

International Socialist Bureau. With the outbreak of the war the International Socialist Bureau, established at Brussels, with the Belgian Camille Huysmans as Secretary, ceased for a time to function. It was later, however, transferred to The Hague, where it was under the direction of the Dutch Socialists. In August, 1916, the Executive Committee began to lay plans for a more representative international conference of socialists than had yet convened. In January, 1917, the Executive Committee of the Socialist party of America made an urgent appeal to the Bureau for such a Conference. Danes, Norwegians and others also urged it.

Invitation to Stockholm. The place finally decided on was Stockholm, and invitations were sent, not only to all the Socialist parties represented in the International Bureau, but to all the minority parties formed since the war.

The conference encountered extreme difficulties. It was originally scheduled for May 15, but the American delegates asked a postponement. By April 26 the Dutch delegates, including Troelstra, President of the International Socialist Bureau, began to arrive. The Belgian, Camille Huysmans, secretary of the Bureau, who as a belligerent could not cross German territory, went by sea as a steward in a freighter, and arrived May 2. Stauning, a Socialist member of the Cabinet of Denmark, Troelstra, Hjalmar Branting, the Swedish Socialist leader (whose pro-Ally sympathies are outspoken), were kept busy denouncing as lies the newspaper charges that the meeting was instigated by Germany.

In Russia, the conference had official backing. As early as March 29, an editorial in the Bulletin

of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates had proposed such a conference. "Let the representatives of the working classes work out the terms of peace. . . . We shall not trust irresponsible diplomats and rulers with the question of peace."

Russian Appeal for Conference. On May 9 in Petrograd the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates voted to appeal to the peoples of the world to call a peace conference. They also decided to send a delegate to Stockholm to confer with the Socialist delegates there, to send delegates to neutral and allied countries to further the peace movement and to urge Socialists in all countries to demand that their governments give free passage to delegates.

Gorky's paper said the Russians would go to such an international conference whether the British and French went or not and Skobeleff, Minister of Labor under Kerensky, said that for the sake of restoring the International and stopping the war he was willing to meet not only Scheidemann but "the devil and his grandmother."

All the while there was constant newspaper talk of "German peace manœuvres." The Borgbjerg, Grimm and Hoffman episodes raised a cloud of suspicion which the ever-repeated Russian disclaimers of any idea of a separate peace could not easily allay.¹

The "Branting Conversations." The conference was declared opened on May 13. There was no regular assembly, but the representatives of belligerent countries gave their views to members of

¹ The interpretation put upon the Stockholm Conference by the pro-Ally, pro-war Socialists in the United States, is given pp. 79-80.

the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, particularly, apparently, to Branting. There was thus a very important exchange of ideas, and Scheidemann especially seems to have gone home with a conviction that the irresponsible character of the German Government and the consequent lack of confidence in it, was a prime obstacle to peace. Huysmans' view was that peace depended largely on the ability of "our German comrades" to force their government to come out clearly for no annexation. He explained that "when we say 'peace without indemnities' we consider it understood that Belgium must be reestablished and that its material losses must be made good. We do not look upon that as indemnity." Branting said that this view was shared by all who participated in the conference.

These "conversations" seemed so successful a beginning, that the Russian Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates issued a formal call¹ to all Socialist parties and the chief labor organizations of the world to meet at Stockholm between June 28 and July 8; later the date was changed to August 15.

Meanwhile the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee issued a questionnaire² addressed to the different national Socialist groups.

The German Socialist Majority, in their reply, accepted the Russian peace-formula, and explained the sense in which they understood it:

German Majority Views. No annexations implies an independent Belgium and return of colonies.

Indemnities [evidently understood to mean war contributions] are repudiated. Reparation of damages should be

¹ This will be found on p. 168.

² See p. 170.

not by one side. International financial assistance can be provided where needed.

The right of nations to dispose of themselves applies not only to Belgium but to Finland and the Poland of the Congress of Vienna [*sc.* Russian Poland].

For settlement of the Serbian and Balkan questions reference is made to the statement of the Austrian Socialists (given below).

Sympathy is expressed with the desire for freedom from domination of Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thibet, Corea.

The case of Alsace-Lorraine is argued at length from the German point of view, concluding in favor of more freedom within the German Empire.

There is an outspoken pronouncement in favor of freedom, within the state, of national minorities, with specific reference to Danish, French, and Polish speaking inhabitants of Germany.

There are moderate provisions in regard to international arbitration, military service, methods of warfare and safeguards of commerce during war.

The memorandum comes out for the "open door," free trade, free travel, democratic control of treaties.

"The main problem, however, for international Socialism is to bring about peace as soon as possible."¹

"Minority" Memorandum. The German Minority memorandum, which also stood for peace on the Russian formula, is briefer and more radical.²

Serbia must be reëstablished as an independent self-governing state. The idea of a republican Balkan Federation is favored.

The Poles of Prussia and Austria have the same right to national independence as those of Russia.

Alsace-Lorraine should decide its own destiny.

Belgium not only should have complete political and eco-

¹ The document will be found in full, p. 172.

² See p. 182.

conomic independence but "in fulfillment of the German Government's promise at the beginning of the war, the Belgian nation has to be compensated for the damage caused by the war, especially for the economic values that have been taken away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with the various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we therefore reject."

The whole colonial régime is condemned. "The possession of any colony without its own self-administration is nothing but the possession of an unfree people and like slavery is incompatible with our principles."

The importance of a common Socialist peace program is admitted but it means nothing unless Socialists by refusing to vote appropriations and by the sharpest measures force their governments to accept it and to declare themselves ready to enter into a peace conference on the basis of this program.

To refuse this policy would be to forfeit the right to be considered an organ of international Socialism.

Austrian Socialist Views. The Austrian Socialists naturally are especially concerned with the very difficult question of nationalities.

They assert that in many parts of Europe the intermingling of the population is such that a disentangling of nationalities by a territorial delimitation is absolutely impossible. They argue that a system of small states would not be advantageous and declare for autonomy of the national groups of Austria within the framework of the monarchy. These groups include the Bohemians, Poles of Galicia, Ruthenians and South Slavs.

They oppose the annexation of Belgium.

They want Serbia to receive not only her political independence but access to the sea by union with Montenegro, and are quite ready to see the Balkan states federate.

They are for the independence of Finland and of the Poles of Russian Poland and they hope the future will bring voluntary agreements between the latter and Germany and Austria which shall permanently settle the Polish question.

They favor free trade, the "open door," internationalization of water routes, and international railroads to be built and administered in common for lines of world importance. They urge the continuation of the work of The Hague, a reform of military international law, gradual abolition of standing armies in favor of popular militias for defense only, and nationalization of munitions industries.

The peace treaty should contain clauses for international agreement on labor protection.

A Socialist Conference should certainly be called and all should take part.¹

Hungarian Socialist Views. The Hungarian Socialist views proved for the most part to be in key with those of the radical German minority. With regard to the Balkan question, however, they found a solution in far-reaching democratic reforms rather than in territorial readjustment. They stated with great emphasis the view that "the people of all the belligerent States are peacefully-minded and that their Governments in all countries are responsible for the war; and that not accidental circumstances, but the constantly operating forces of national and social oppression and exploitation led to the war. Imperialism, high protective tariff, oppression of nationalities, the lack of democracy, the want of real parliamentary control even in the countries governed on parliamentary principles, the domination of the financial oligarchy in France, Czardom in Russia, the feudal nationalistic oligarchy of Hungary, Junkers and large-scale indus-

¹ See p. 186.

try in Prussia-Germany (Preussen Deutschland), the lack of a parliamentary system of government in the German Empire, are in their opinion some of the real causes of the war. The glorious Russian revolution has removed one of these causes of war and the Hungarian Delegation expresses its belief that the International will do much happier work for peace if the various national sections, instead of fruitlessly debating the question of blame, come forward each in its own country, against the organized war-producing forces — against the nationalism of France, against the Junker and bureaucratic rule of Prussia-Germany and against the national and social servitude of the masses in Hungary.

The Hungarian Delegation pledges itself to fight in this spirit for the complete democratization of Hungary and expresses the wish that the French comrades should now with their whole strength take up the fight against chauvinistic ideology, the German Social-Democracy the fight for equal suffrage and a parliamentary system of government in the Empire. The Delegation expresses this wish, not as assuming to meddle with the internal affairs of other countries, or brother-parties, or associations, but because consideration of the condition of the world and peace possibilities convinces them that democracy is a demand of political internationalism and the prerequisite of a speedy and lasting peace.¹

The Italian Socialists re-stated the Zimmerwald principles, and urged parliamentary control of foreign policy.²

British Views. In June Mr. Julius West of the Fabian Society and Mr. Thompson, editor of the *Clarion*, were in Stockholm, and submitted a pre-

¹ The rest of the document will be found on p. 190.

² See p. 201.

liminary statement of the moderate British Socialist position.

This favors the full constitution of an independent Belgium, the evacuation of the occupied parts of Northern France, and indemnification by the invader for all damage done during the course of the war, the constitution of a reunited, independent Poland, and the establishment of perfect equality for all nationalities in Austria-Hungary, whose democratization will be one of the principal conditions of a lasting peace.

The British Socialist and Labor Parties, they stated, attach great importance both to the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the war, and to the organization of a supreme authority over all nations for the prevention of any future wars, for which the Fabian Society has elaborated a plan.¹ They further reported that the British Socialist and Labor Parties oppose a trade war after the war.²

British National Council of Workmen and Soldiers. The radical position in England was represented by a new organization, growing out of a convention held at Leeds on June 3. The meeting included representatives of the British Socialist Party, the Independent Labor Party, Trade Unions and other labor organizations, women's organizations, the Union for Democratic Control, coöperative societies, the National Council for Civil Liberties, etc., and was presided over by Robert Smillie, president of the powerful Miners' Federation. The convention was understood to represent between four and five million constituents. It organized a

¹ This will be found in full, p. 276. For further discussion, see *International Government: Two Reports* by L. S. Woolf prepared for the Fabian Research Department, with an Introduction by Bernard Shaw. Brentano's, 1916.

² See *London Times*, June 21, 1917.

British National Council of Workmen and Soldiers to work for "an immediate democratic peace."

It passed, with two dissenting voices, a resolution favoring the Russian formula and calling upon the British government to announce its agreement with the declared foreign policy and war aims of the democratic government of Russia. Philip Snowden, M. P., who moved the resolution, "contended that it was useless and absurd to accept the formula 'no annexation' and at the same time to contemplate the retention of 400,000 square miles of territory held by Germany before the war, even on the conditions laid down by Mr. Asquith that this was not militarism, but part of the fulfillment of the divine mission laid on the British people to relieve the oppressed wherever they might be found. He counseled the democracy to see that the statesmen of this country did not accept the formula 'no annexation' before obtaining from them definite statements as to what they meant by it. It would be a delusion and a mockery so long as those statesmen stood by the terms and conditions of the Allied Note to President Wilson. That Note must be repudiated. As understood by the Russian democracy, 'no annexation' did not mean there should be no change of territorial boundaries after the war. If a permanent peace was to be established there would have to be a readjustment of territory."

A Radical Program. An outgrowth of this movement, so little known in this country, was the draft of a remarkable program of social reorganization.¹

The part of this program relating to foreign affairs is as follows:

The Workers organized against war.

(A) Communications between workers to be maintained in war as in peace.

¹ Reprinted from the English *Herald* in the N. Y. *Call* of August 18, 1917.

(B) Negotiations to be instituted at once to end the present war on the following basis:

"The right of all people to decide their own destiny.

"No indemnities, but each belligerent to restore the damage he has done, or to compound such reparation by concessions to be agreed by negotiation.

"Equal access by all peoples to the trade and raw materials of the world.

"The government of non-European races in Africa to be regarded as an international trust, with no exclusive advantages to the sovereign state; such populations not to be trained for war or subject to conscription or servile labor.

"All secret treaties or treaties not ratified by the people to be void."

(C) Disarmament by international agreement.¹

Australian Socialists. From the other side of the world the Labor Socialists of Australia chimed in. The Australian Labor Conference on June 11 submitted, among other things, the following terms:

The right of small nations, including Ireland, to independence.

Evacuation of invaded districts; plébiscite for disputed cases.

Restoration of devastated territories by using armies and navies under international control, and not under military supervision, to do the work at the expense of the invaders.

Colonies and dependencies, captured in the war — where an amicable arrangement is not reached by the peace conference — to be placed provisionally under international control.

Specifically they opposed annexation of the captured German possessions in the Pacific.

Freedom of the seas on the lines laid down by President Wilson in May, 1916.

¹. See p. 219.

They demanded initiation of immediate negotiations for an international peace conference with adequate representation of working class organizations, inclusion of women delegates, and separate representation of British self-governing dominions and Ireland.

And as a first premise they assert "that only by an organized system of production for use under democratic control can a recurrence of such calamities be permanently avoided."¹

* ¹ See p. 208 for a more complete report. For views of Bohemian, Belgian, and Finnish Socialists see respectively pp. 194, 196, and 206.

For the further developments in regard to the Stockholm Conference, see pp. 79-80 and 102-110.

CHAPTER V

VIEWS OF RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES

I.

THE significance of the Russian Revolution cannot, of course, as yet be measured. But its immediate importance for the world seems to consist, not so much in the origination of new political ideas, as in putting the force of national purpose behind certain ideas already wide-spread but hitherto without power to realize themselves. The Russian statement of what terms she would fight for, and what she would not, and her demand that the Allies restate their terms, had to be taken into account.

Debate in British Parliament. The question of what the British attitude should be toward the Russian peace-formula was raised in Parliament on May 16 by Philip Snowden. He introduced a resolution welcoming the declaration of the new democratic Government of Russia,¹ and calling on His

¹ The declaration referred to was the Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Russia, issued April 9, and brought to the notice of the Allied Governments in a note of May 1. The Proclamation is as follows:

"The Government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny.



Photo by Paul Thompson

ALEXANDER KERENSKY

During the first of May manifestations, addressing the crowd on the Field of Mars, with his arm in a sling.

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Majesty's Government "to issue a similar declaration for British democracy and to join with the Allies in restating the Allied terms in conformity with the Russian declaration."

If Great Britain, he said, was to continue to be allied with Russia it must set itself in line with her policy. This debate was to ascertain whether the British Government regarded the treaties made with the old imperialistic order in Russia as still binding. The real motive of the Russian Revolution was objection to continuing the war for imperialistic ambitions. He believed Russia expressed the desire of democracies in all countries. Scheidemann had declared that if France and Great Britain supported the Russian declaration and the German Chancellor refused, "there would be a revolution in Germany." The Allied note of January, he declared, was imperialism naked and unashamed.

Mr. Lees-Smith, seconding the motion, pointed out that with Russia abandoning the claim to Constantinople the next move for peace lay with Great Britain who held the key of the situation in her hands in the conquered German

"The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or to humiliate any one. In the name of the higher principles of equity it has removed the chains which weighed upon the Polish people. But the Russian nation will not allow its fatherland to come out of the great struggle humiliated or weakened of its vital forces. These principles will constitute the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which will carry out unflinchingly the popular will and safeguard the rights of our fatherland while observing the engagements entered into with our allies."

This was interpreted in the light of current explanations as meaning "no annexations and no indemnities." It was restated by the coalition Provisional Government of Russia on May 19 as "The reestablishment of a general peace which shall not tend either toward dominion over other nations, the seizure of their national possessions, or violent usurpation of their territories—a peace without annexation or indemnities, and based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs."

colonies. If she insisted on their retention she could not ask her Allies to modify their demands. He thought a rearrangement of colonial possessions could be made which would satisfy the special desire of South Africa and Australia and at the same time satisfy all the Great Powers concerned.

Lord Robert Cecil, speaking on behalf of the Government, objected to the idea of returning the German Colonies, and dwelt on the ill treatment of the natives by the former masters. Moreover, the Government could not pledge itself to a non-annexation policy in regard to Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and Italia Irredenta. Referring to Turkish cruelty in Arabia, Armenia and Syria, he said: "The most imperialistic annexation would be of benefit to the people who suffered such crimes as that. . . . What about Belgium, Serbia, Northern France and the destruction of peaceful merchant ships? Was there to be no reparation?"

2.

President Wilson's Note to Russia. It was hoped in Russia that President Wilson's note to Petrograd would mark substantial progress toward the adoption of the Russian terms by the Allies. This note, however, cabled on May 26 and made public on June 10, seemed clearly to range him, not perhaps against the Russian peace formula as such, but apparently against the Russian point of view.

Those in authority in Germany, he says, "in desperate desire to escape the inevitable ultimate defeat" are using German Socialists ("groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just or fair or even tolerant") to promote propaganda in Europe and

America. This could hardly be agreeable to a Russia which was sponsoring the Stockholm Conference and which had every opportunity to know the facts of the case.

The Governments of "Mittel Europa" had been linked together, the note maintains, in a net of intrigue directed against the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of this intrigue must be broken and adequate measures taken to prevent its ever being repaired. The war issued from the *status quo ante*—"the power of the Imperial German Government within the empire and its widespread domination and influence outside that empire." The German Government is making use of cat's-paws to secure the restoration of the *status quo ante*. That status must be so altered as to prevent any such hideous thing happening again. "The day has come to conquer or submit."

America seeks no material profit or aggrandizement. She is fighting for general liberation. The ruling classes in Germany have of late begun to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only for the sake of preserving their own power in Germany and "their private projects of power from Berlin to Bagdad and beyond."

"The free peoples must draw together in some common covenant combining their force to secure international peace and justice."

Perhaps the most significant passage in the President's note is this reshaping of the Russian terms: "No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples."

It was meanwhile becoming increasingly clear that Russia rejected the offer of a separate peace, made by von Bethmann-Hollweg on May 15, and repeated by the Austrian Emperor on May 31. On June 16, Grimm was expelled, for trying to effect a separate peace, by a vote of 640 to 121 in the General Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of All Russia. And after the collapse of the great military effort of the summer, the conviction in Russia became profound that, as Minister Tseretelli declared before the Moscow Congress, "If the sad necessity ever comes to conclude a separate peace, it will be concluded over the corpse of the Revolution."

3.

Great Britain to Russia. Both Great Britain and France replied on June 11 to the Russian note of May first, forwarding the Proclamation of April 9. The British Government heartily concurred in the sentiment of Free Russia as expressed in that Proclamation. They heartily rejoice that free Russia has announced her intention of liberating Poland, "not only Russian Poland but that within the domination of the Germanic Empires." They heartily join in "acceptance and approval of the principles laid down by President Wilson in his historic message to the American Congress." They "believe that broadly speaking the agreements which they have from time to time made with their Allies are conformable to these standards," but if desired they are quite ready to "examine, and, if need be, to revise, these agreements."

French Reply. The French Government, likewise, was glad to feel itself "in full community of ideas" with the Russian Government and people. "For herself she intends that her faithful and loyal provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which were

snatched from her in the past by violence, shall be liberated and shall return to her." The promise to reconsider war-aims is less specific than the British, but the French Government is willing to "examine and settle" the conditions on which a final settlement may be hoped for.

Allied Interpretation of Russia's Peace Terms. The nature of the Allied interpretation of the Russian peace-formula thus assented to, is revealed more fully in contemporary speeches. The French Premier, Ribot, as has been caustically said,¹ "in a tactful speech on May 22 contrived to accept the Russian formula of 'peace without annexation or indemnities' and in the same breath to demand the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the payment of indemnities to France, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and curiously enough to Roumania," and on June 11 "declared that France could not consent to a plébiscite in Alsace-Lorraine regarding the future of those provinces." Lloyd George, speaking at Dundee on June 30, also "found President Wilson's formula elastic enough to include the wresting of Mesopotamia and Palestine from Turkey." And "Italy explained that President Wilson's principles would permit her to annex Trentino, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia and the Albanian port of Avlona; Rumania to annex Transylvania, . . . Serbia to annex Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Entente powers to partition the Ottoman Empire among themselves." ²

4.

Russian Comment on President Wilson's Note. To President Wilson's Note to Russia, the official

¹ Sait and Moon, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*

bulletin of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates replied on June 15: "Mr. Wilson is mistaken if he thinks that such ideas can find reception in the hearts of a revolutionary people. The Russian revolutionary democracy knows very well that the road to the passionately awaited universal peace lies only through a united struggle of the laboring classes with the imperialists of the world. It is quite easy to understand what feelings will be called forth by the strange pretense of describing the ever-growing spirit of brotherhood and peace in the international Socialist, as also a German intrigue. The French and English notes will undoubtedly not call forth enthusiasm among the revolutionary democracy."¹

A still more pointed retort was made at the same time in the organ of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, which after quoting two English newspapers to the effect that the declaration of the Provisional Government and the pronouncements of the Revolutionary leaders show that the Russian peace formula coincides with British and French war aims, said:

"You are deceiving yourselves, gentlemen, or, rather you are vainly striving to delude your fellow-countrymen concerning the real policy of the Russian Revolution. The Revolution will not sacrifice a single soldier to help you repair 'historic injustices' committed against you. What

¹ The Congress of Delegates from the Front affirmed on May 30 the principle of "Peace without annexation or indemnities, on the basis of the right of all nations to dispose of themselves." The Congress of Peasants declared, June 8, that "the peasants aspire to an equitable peace without humiliating annexation or indemnity and with the right of each nation to dispose of itself. International relations and treaties should be submitted to the control of the peoples interested. Disputes should be settled by an international tribunal, and not by force. The Congress approves the union of workers, and appeals to the peasants of all countries to force their Governments to renounce annexations and indemnities."

about the historic injustices committed by yourselves and your violent oppression of Ireland, India, Egypt, and innumerable peoples inhabiting all the continents of the world? If you are so anxious for 'justice' that you are prepared in its name to send millions of people to the grave, then, gentlemen, begin with yourselves."

Labor and Socialist Objection to Stockholm Conference. It was not solely among these opposed to radical policies in general that the Stockholm Conference plan was questioned.

President Wilson had not been without labor and Socialist support in his attitude toward it.¹ France

¹ William English Walling, Charles Edward Russell and other American Socialists issued a statement from Washington, D. C., May 8, opposing the Stockholm Conference. "Why," they ask, "does the Kaiser encourage a conference that will be controlled not by his friend, Scheidemann, but by the German minority, which is fearlessly anti-Kaiser and even republican in home affairs? For the very simple reason that the two factions are in substantial accord on foreign affairs and have an identical peace program, namely, 'no annexation, no indemnities,' this being the plausible but deceptive title which the Kaiser has chosen for his next effort to impose a German peace on mankind. Now what will the Kaiser mean if he labels his new program 'no annexations, no indemnities'?" Of course his chief aim will be to bring about either a separate peace or a civil war in Russia and paralyze any anti-German tendencies in Holland or Scandinavia. But the new formula must be made to mean something. What would it mean? A return to the conditions existing before the war, it is evident, would mean that all Europe would be helpless when confronted by the new Central Empire Germany has established. The German Socialists, like the Kaiser, even demand that the peace treaty shall restore the previous economic conditions, forbidding all defensive economic union on the part of other nations. Germany's colonies would also be restored, and England's self-governed colonies would everywhere be threatened except in Canada. Russia would be in Germany's military and economic power, and Japan, though such a course may be far from her present aims, would then be mightily tempted."

Mr. Gompers also cabled Tcheidse early in May protesting against the "pro-Kaiser Socialist interpretation" of the no-annexation formula, "namely that all the oppressed non-German peoples shall be compelled to remain under the domination of Prussia and

sent M. Albert Thomas; Great Britain, Mr. Henderson; Belgium, M. Vandervelde, to dispel the distrust of the Russian Socialists and to uphold joint action between Russia and her Allies.¹ These three gentlemen wrote to the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, expressing surprise that they had called an international conference to consider peace before the conclusion of the negotiations between the Russian and the British, French and Belgian delegations.

To this came the reply that the Revolution was not only against Czardom but against the war, *the blame for which falls upon international imperialism.*

The Revolution showed the way out — a union of the working classes everywhere to defeat attempts, on the part of Imperialism, to prolong the war in the interests of the wealthy and to prevent peace on the Russian terms.

"The [Stockholm] conference can be the turning point . . . only if the members of the conference are imbued with these ideas. The idea of the necessity of a previous agreement among socialists of the Allied countries is futile, for the conference can succeed only if the Socialists consider themselves representatives not of the two belligerent parties but of a single movement of the working classes toward the common aim of a general peace."

Meaning of "no annexations, no indemnities."
The Russian reply also contained a very important explanation of what was meant by the "no annexations, no indemnities" formula.

her lackeys, Austria and Turkey." He disclaimed "all punitive and improper indemnities" and urged that only by compelling the abdication of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs can the German people bring the war to an early end.

See also, Villehardouin, "Stockholm, a French View" in *New Europe*, Sept. 15, 1917. For the opposite view see Arnold Bennett's article, p. 213.

"Having recognized the right of the nations to dispose of their destiny, the members of the conference will come to an understanding without difficulty regarding the future of Alsace-Lorraine and other regions. Moreover, the working classes, relieved of the mutual distrust with which the Imperialists have envenomed them, will agree regarding the means of granting compensation and the amount of such compensation to the country devastated by war, like Belgium, Poland, Galicia, and Serbia. But it goes without saying that such compensation must have nothing in common with the contribution which is imposed on the conquered country."

James Duncan, labor member of the American Mission to Russia, was quoted in a dispatch of July 2 as saying that the Minister of Labor, Skobeleff, had made it clear to him "that Russian democracy means nothing by this phrase which we cannot heartily subscribe to. . . . Before this phrase was defined, it seemed to me that Germany was to emerge from the war with impunity and without making reparation for the damage she had done. But the Russian deputies do not mean this at all. They believe that Germany should be compelled to restore and make full reparation for Belgium, and they are not opposed to the principle of indemnities. The word 'contribution' refers exclusively to a kind of war-levy forced by Germany upon Brussels. There is no important difference between the aims of the Russian democracy and our own. We both agree upon the conditions upon which peace can be determined."

Vandervelde, writing in *Le Temps* (May 28), said: "Socialists of every country accept this [Russian] formula so far as it shuts out annexations against the will of their populations, and penalties

imposed by the victor on the vanquished. But we loudly claimed for Belgium complete reparation for damage caused, and we proclaim that the liberation of territories like the Trentino and Alsace-Lorraine are no annexations but *disannexations*.”¹

When Vandervelde addressed the General Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of All Russia, Tcheidse replied: “You know our platform, which must be the basis of Peace. The sooner the war will be concluded, the sooner will the sufferings of Belgium end. Comrade Vandervelde, I ask you to remember and to tell your Belgian Comrades, that the liberation is not in a continuation of the war; not in the crushing of the Central Powers do the Russian Socialists see the freeing of Belgium, the freeing of the world from militarism and from the possibility of future wars, but in an immediate conclusion of the war on the only just and practical basis — the Socialists' terms of peace.”²

¹ Cf. p. 196.

² N. Y. Call, August 20.

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUGGLE IN GERMANY: THE REICHSTAG RESOLUTION

I.

HERR SCHEIDEMANN, the leader of the Socialist Majority in the Reichstag, apparently carried home with him from Stockholm a new sense of how Germany was regarded abroad, and of the degree to which the character of the German government stood in the way of peace.

Lloyd-George's Glasgow Speech. The lesson was emphasized by Mr. Lloyd-George in his Glasgow speech of June 29, in which he dwelt significantly on this point.

"No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government under which they choose to live. That is a matter entirely for themselves, but it is right we should say we could enter into negotiations with a free government in Germany with a different attitude of mind . . . with more confidence than we could with a government whom we knew to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism. And the Allied governments would, in my judgment, be acting wisely if they drew the distinction in their general attitude in a discussion of the terms of peace. The fatal error committed by Prussia in 1870 — the error which undoubtedly proves her bad faith at that time — was that when she entered the war she was fighting against a restless military empire, dominated largely by mili-

tary ideals, with military traditions behind them. When that empire fell it would have been wisdom of Germany to recognize the change immediately. Democratic France was a more sure guarantee for the case of Germany than the fortress of Metz, or the walled ramparts of Strasburg. If Prussia had taken that view, history would have taken a different course. It would have acted on the generous spirit of the great people who dwell in France, it would have reacted on the spirit and policy of Germany herself. Europe would have reaped a harvest of peace and good-will among men instead of garnering, as she does now, a whirlwind of hate, rage and human savagery. I trust the Allied Governments will take that as an element in their whole discussion of the terms and prospects of peace."

All this — the contagious spirit of Russian liberty, the enlightenment gained at Stockholm, the encouraging implications of the Glasgow speech — served to strengthen those in Germany who were striving for democratization. The Russian offensive of July, putting an end to the hopes of a separate Russian peace, and the knowledge of the vigor with which the United States was entering the war, also had the same effect.¹

New German Demand for Reform and Peace. The internal struggle in Germany centered around the effort to secure a Chancellor and Ministry representative of the Reichstag. On the last day of June, the same day as Lloyd-George's Glasgow speech, a call, signed by well-known and conservative leaders, by Rohrbach, Delbrück, von Harnack,

¹ The internal political considerations behind von Bethmann-Hollweg's attitude at the time of his non-committal speech of May 15, and when he resigned, a month later, the office of Chancellor, which he had held since July, 1909, are interestingly analyzed in an article, "Germany at the Cross-Roads," in *New Europe* of July 26, and in the *New York Times' Current History* for August, 1917.

Troeltsch, demanded that the Government should proceed with reform of the Prussian Diet suffrage.

The Government was willing to favor certain reforms, but not what was demanded. Meanwhile it was intended to call the Reichstag together July 5 for three days, or less, solely to vote certain appropriations. "The Majority Socialist press began to hint openly that they were not inclined to vote the credits on this occasion, unless they received from the Chancellor a public endorsement of their peace formula, 'without annexations and indemnities,' and also the assurance of immediate political reform." The Liberals were expected also to be ready to force through a form of parliamentary government (responsibility of the ministry to parliament).

It became known that at a joint session on July 6 of the main Committee of the Reichstag (which is practically equivalent to the Reichstag in secret session), Erzberger, a Bavarian Catholic and a powerful leader of the Catholic Center party, was deserting the Pan-Germans, advocating peace without annexation or indemnities, and criticizing the submarine policy and the diplomacy that brought the United States into the war. It appeared also that he had the support of his party and very probably of a majority of the House.

Reichstag Resolution of July 13. The Reichstag, when it met, refused to vote the credits till the political situation cleared. On July 13, with the support of a "bloc" including such incongruous elements as the Socialists, the Catholic Center and the "Liberals," the following peace resolution was introduced:

"As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war, the German people stand upon the assurance

of the speech from the throne — 'We are driven by no lust of conquest.'

"Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic and financial usurpations¹ are incompatible with such a peace.

"The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international judicial organizations. So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken, and fight until the rights of Germany and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

"The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the Fatherland; in the heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people."

2.

Fall of von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor was believed to have advocated an open declaration for "no annexation, no indemnities," as well as steps toward Parliamentary government. But in spite of the supposed support of the Kaiser, and owing apparently to the opposition of the Crown Prince, who together with Hindenburg and Luden-

¹ In the version current in England this word is translated "violations." The German original is not accessible.



Photograph by Underwood and Underwood
MATTHIAS ERZBERGER (Left) and KARL
HELFFERICH (Right)

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dorff had been called into council by the Emperor on July 14, the Chancellor fell.

Both the person and the manner of appointment of von Bethmann-Hollweg's successor, Dr. Michaelis, meant that the military party were strong enough to flout the Reichstag and its aspirations. The concession of appointing members of parliament to ministerial positions was also so handled as to be insignificant. All this of course tended to make the Resolution little more than a pious wish, until the Reichstag could make its will prevail in the conduct of affairs.

Michaelis' Speech. The new Chancellor's speech on July 19 was very disappointing to those who hoped for a decided forward step toward peace.

"Germany," he said, "did not desire the war in order to make violent conquests, and therefore will not continue the war a day longer merely for the sake of such conquests, if it could obtain an honorable peace." But, "no parley is possible with the enemy demanding the cession of German soil."

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There must be no economic war after the war—"we must, as expressed in your resolution, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockade and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive alliance against us."

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dorff had been called into council by the Emperor on July 14, the Chancellor fell.

Both the person and the manner of appointment of von Bethmann-Hollweg's successor, Dr. Michaelis, meant that the military party were strong enough to flout the Reichstag and its aspirations. The concession of appointing members of parliament to ministerial positions was also so handled as to be insignificant. All this of course tended to make the Resolution little more than a pious wish, until the Reichstag could make its will prevail in the conduct of affairs.

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and caused grave dissatisfaction to the German supporters of the Resolution.

"If our enemies abandon their lust for conquest and aims of subjugation and wish to enter into negotiations, we shall listen honestly and readily to what they have to say to us." We have stretched out our hands once and cannot ourselves offer peace again.

"The Germans wish to conclude peace as combatants who have successfully accomplished their purpose [*i. e.* self-defense] and proved themselves invincible."¹

"What we long to attain is a new and splendid Germany, not a Germany which wishes, as our enemies believe, to terrorize the world with her armed might; no, the morally purified, God-fearing, loyal, peaceful and mighty Germany which we all love. For this Germany we shall fight and endure. For this Germany, we and our brothers out there will bleed and die. For this Germany we shall fight our way through, despite all force."

After the Chancellor's speech, the Peace Resolution, introduced six days before, was passed, 212 to 126 (17 abstaining).² In moving the Resolution, Deputy Fehrenbach, of the Center, said, among other things: "This Resolution should be considered merely as an honest expression of the readiness of an overwhelming majority of the German people for a peace of reconciliation without annexation and compensation. One must despair of humanity, if the people in enemy countries did not recognize the note of honesty in this Resolution. If the enemy

¹ It has been remarked that the claim not to be conquerable marks a certain advance over the claim to be conquerors.

² The London *Times* of August 4 gives the vote as follows: "The 126 votes given against the resolution were those of 43 German-Conservatives, 13 members of the German Party, one Extreme Conservative, five Centre, 42 National Liberals and 22 Minority Socialists."

should scorn again this manifestation for peace, then, of course, the slaughter must continue until the Entente group tire of sacrificing their nations."

"Majority" Views. Scheidemann, of the Majority Socialists, said: "We oppose the submarine war, as we regard it as doing more harm than good. We, no more than our enemies, are able to bring the war to a conclusion by military means, though in spite of three years of war we stand unbroken, far in the enemies' land, and in defense are invincible."

"The resolution under discussion represents what has long been the common view of the people. I wish other people would understand that we are not aiming at the acquisition of foreign property, and that we are ready for a righteous peace, secured by international legal guarantees. If the enemy is unwilling to accept such a peace we shall continue to fight. If a similar resolution were brought forward in the House of Commons and answered by the British Prime Minister in this same way, then the peace negotiations could begin to-morrow. The Chancellor's remarks regarding democracy did not satisfy me. He must free us from the three-class franchise. Prussian electoral reform must come this autumn. We demand the deliverance of the Press from the censorship and the liberation of political offenders, and we vote for the War Credit in the spirit of the Resolution."

"Minority" Views. Haase, of the Minority Socialists, stated as an "urgent preliminary condition of peace" that it was "necessary to effect the complete democratization of the Constitution and Administration of the Empire and its several states, and this must end in the creation of a social Republic."

Other remarks by Haase, setting forth the point of view of the Minority Socialists, are given in the *London Times* of July 27, as taken from an "obviously censored" account in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*: "Our monarchical institutions have not stood the test and must be set aside. . . . The people has awakened from its war-intoxication . . . The origin of the war is really quite different from the superficial account of it which was given by the new Imperial Chancellor, and it is quite impossible for anybody to wipe away the policy of conquest which has been pursued for years. The Russian Council of Workmen and Soldiers will not let itself be deceived by the Reichstag Resolution. All [German] attempts hitherto to reach peace have been mistaken, and the memorandum of the Socialist Majority at Stockholm was not calculated to promote peace: it has been rejected everywhere. The majority in the Reichstag, including the Majority Socialists, cannot put themselves into the way of thinking of foreign countries, and so they meet with nothing but failures. Our [Minority Socialist] way alone leads to the goal, because we represent the joint interests of the international proletariat. We reject the War Credits because we have no confidence in the Government."

Czernin, Esterhazy and Tisza expressed the acquiescence of Austria-Hungary in the German Chancellor's statement.

3.

The Michaelis speech brought a crop of rejoinders.

Lloyd-George, in a speech on Belgian Independence Day (July 21), saw in Michaelis' words "a sham independence for Belgium, a sham democracy for Germany, a sham peace for Europe." It is the speech of a man waiting on the military issue, and, if Germany is victorious, means "annexation all around and autocracy more firmly." He saw in the

phrases about making safe the frontiers a threat of annexation to secure strategic boundaries. He repeated the gist of his Glasgow speech of June 29. "What manner of government the Germans choose to rule over them is entirely a matter for the German people themselves, but as to what manner of government we can trust to make peace, that is our business. Democracy is in itself a guarantee of peace, but if it cannot be got in Germany, then we must secure other guarantees as a substitute."

German Discontent with Michaelis' Speech. The *Berliner Morgen Post* is quoted in the London *Times* of July 27, as saying: "How stands the German Government towards Belgium? What is the meaning of the Chancellor's words about Germany's frontiers, which must be for all time assured? One must concede that precisely here, as formerly in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speeches, many constructions are possible and the English Prime Minister can appeal to the contradictory constructions of this sentence to be found in the German Press. The advocates among us of far-reaching frontier rectifications, like the majority which supported the peace resolution, have approved the speech in the Reichstag. How should a foreigner be able to form a clear conception of the views of the Imperial Government? The English Prime Minister, therefore, demands a clear word about Belgium, reëstablished fully in its former independence. We believe that is what the Reichstag Majority desired to say in its declaration, on the basis of which the Chancellor took his stand. Against this certainly stands the interpretation formerly frequently given in irresponsible quarters to the idea of frontier security, and therefore the

passage in which the securing of frontiers was spoken of as perhaps unhappily worded. It appears to us that we should be a good bit nearer to peace, if for once there were clearness in regard to the Belgian question."

Professor Lammasch was more pungent in his comment. "The German Chancellor," he wrote, "by his conditional '*as I interpret it*' withered the Reichstag's peace resolution before it could come to fruit." Delbrück too in his *Preussische Jahrbuch* attacked Michaelis. "Why," Delbrück asked, "if he really accepts the Reichstag Resolution as the basis of his policy does he not answer Asquith's challenge as to Germany's readiness to evacuate and restore Belgium? The truth is," says Professor Delbrück, "that Dr. Michaelis does not enjoy the confidence of the Reichstag . . . Neither the German nation nor the world knows what the Chancellor's policy is. The Reichstag's Resolution would have had a different effect if it was not believed abroad that the Reichstag is powerless and that the Chancellor is double-tongued."

Czernin, on the contrary, in an interview on July 28, thought the speech, taken, as it should be, in conjunction with the Resolution, entirely clear. It was a solemn declaration that Germany desired no forced conquest. The imposition of further suffering is useless, since the Central Powers cannot be crushed and do not wish to crush. To desire an honorable peace "seems to me only a sign of common sense and morality, which revolt against the idea of prolonging a war, the continuation of which is already absurd."

A touch of humor was added to the discussion by Sir Edward Carson's rejoinder, making it a first condition of treating with the Germans, that they shall withdraw their troops *behind the Rhine*. This



Photo by Press Illustrating Service

COUNT VON CZERNIN
Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary



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was received in Germany as a claim for the most excessive annexations of pure German territory. The *New Statesman* (London), of July 28, explained it as mere insular ignorance of the map of Europe:

"Sir Edward Carson was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, of which learned institution he has now indeed been Parliamentary representative for some seventeen years. Doubtless he early acquired that disdain for geography which most universities inculcate. There ought, however, to be a limit to the published and advertised ignorance of statesmen, and Sir Edward Carson passed it when he advised the German armies to retire behind the Rhine, as a preliminary to negotiations for peace. If he was not under the impression that the Rhine constituted the German frontier, what impression was he under? Did he imagine that the United States as one of the belligerents would agree, by way of exemplifying the great principle for which we are fighting, to the forcible transfer of the Rhine province and the Bavarian Palatinate from a defeated Germany to a victorious France? Perhaps he was making one of his grim jokes. But we have enough of grim jokes at the moment."

4.

British Discussion of Reichstag Resolution. If the Chancellor's speech brought disappointment to those desiring peace, the passage of the Reichstag Resolution brought cheer. In the British Parliament the evening of July 26 was devoted to debate on a resolution¹ brought in by Ramsay MacDonald,

¹ The resolution itself covered three points:

(1) That "this country has stood throughout" for principles embodied in the Reichstag statement that, "putting aside the thought of acquisition of territory by force, the Reichstag is striving for a peace of understanding and lasting reconciliation of nations, that with such a peace political, economic and financial usurpation are incompatible and that the Reichstag repudiates all plans which

in support of the Reichstag Resolution. MacDonald, Trevelyan, Snowden, Ponsonby, Outhwaite, Lees-Smith, Buxton, spoke in favor, Asquith, Bonar Law and two labor members against it. The resolution was lost by a vote of 148 to 21, but it brought out some interesting indications of changing opinion.¹

Asquith laid stress on the powerlessness of the Reichstag and belittled the importance of the Resolution. He was glad a conference of the Allies to consider peace terms was to be held in the early autumn in Paris, "I understand at the invitation of the Russian Government." With Russia no longer an autocracy, and the accession of America, to suppose that the Allies will fight for imperialist and annexationist aims is a nightmare. This means the Allies do not aim at "selfish schemes of territorial aggrandizement," it means they do not aim at "the destruction or even at the permanent mutilation and crippling of the German and Austrian peoples." But neither will they be satisfied with the precarious *status quo ante bellum*, leaving countries like Belgium, Serbia, Greece, at the mercy of dynastic intrigue under menace of military coercion.

The best hope of peace, he said, is open avowal and disavowal of objects sought, and "I for my part welcome the fullest use of all the opportunities which present themselves for the interchange of views between the representatives of the great democracies."

aim at the economic isolation and tying down of nations after the war;"

(2) An appeal "to the Government in conjunction with the Allies to restate their peace terms accordingly:"

(3) The Allies should accept the Russian proposal that the forthcoming allied conference on war-aims shall comprise representatives of the peoples and not solely spokesmen of the Governments.

¹ As Asquith made the vote a test of "whether there is any halting in our determination or any doubt of our ability" to achieve our great ends, the vote was not on the merits of the question involved in the resolution.

Bonar Law asked why Germany had never stated her aims in any definite shape. "*Ours may have gone too far*, but at all events we had the courage to state them before the world." The phrase here italicized is an important admission from Mr. Bonar Law.

Cavendish-Bentinck, Unionist, thought a restatement of Allied war-aims would do good, and ascribed the move of opinion in Germany toward peace as largely due to Lloyd-George's Glasgow speech.

Brigadier-General Page Croft, Unionist, said that it was the duty of Allied diplomacy to make it clear to Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria that we were prepared to consider the question of where we stood in relation to them in a different light.

Mr. Snowden said that with regard to the general question of compensation outside of Belgium, he thought that the proposal which had been made by the Russians was, perhaps, the best way of dealing with the matter, and that was that a general fund to which each of the belligerents should contribute should be created, and distributed by some international commission in proportion to the amount of damage which had been ascertained, and that each of the belligerent nations should contribute to the fund in proportion to its ascertained responsibility for that damage.

Mr. Lees-Smith asked if the principle of no annexation applied to the German colonies and said, "It would be a disgrace if this country, which entered the war with justice on its lips, should come out of it with a million square miles added to its empire. Nothing had done so much to consolidate the German people and strengthen German militarism as the announcement of a commercial boycott and economic war, and if the Government persisted in their policy it was heading straight for another war. No nation would ever submit to being subject to a commercial boycott. If it was desirable to establish democracy in Germany, it must depend largely on the terms of peace, and it must be a peace that would show to the German people that militarism was not necessary for their security or legitimate rights."

Four days later there was another Parliamentary debate on war aims which led Mr. Balfour to make a long and much commented on speech. The gist of it was the impossibility of telling beforehand in detail what settlements could be made. He spoke, however, emphatically of the demand for the return to France of Alsace-Lorraine. His tone with respect to Germany was moderate, almost conciliatory. He dwelt on the importance of Germany's conversion from autocracy and militarism.

5.

American Discussion of Reichstag Resolution.
The speech of Michaelis and the Reichstag Resolution raised in the United States Senate the question of what the American aims specifically are.

On July 26, Senator Borah, disclaiming the idea that this was any time to discuss peace, said, "I am not so sure but that the time has come when the American people should have presented to them more definitely and specifically the terms and conditions upon which we are fighting the war, and the terms and conditions upon which we would cease to fight it. I believe there ought to be laid before the American people a more specific program as to what we propose to attain, as to what we propose to accomplish, and as to the terms and conditions upon which the war, so far as America is concerned, can end and upon those terms and conditions only . . .

"A few weeks ago Russia made a declaration in favor of peace based upon no indemnities and no annexations. It found no response from any one of her allies. In my humble judgment the United States could have not taken a more important and effective step than to have endorsed that proposition which Russia at that time put out to the world. It is my opinion that if the United States had taken the bold stand at that time in favor of that same principle, Russia

would be 100 per cent. in better condition as a fighting force to-day than she is; but the impression has gone abroad that certain influences prevented the United States from defining its position, waiting upon other powers which were directing the course of the war."

Resolution Proposed by the American Union Against Militarism. The American Union Against Militarism, on July 28, asked Senator Borah and Senator Stone to introduce the following resolution:

"WHEREAS, The democratic government of Russia has declared in favor of an early general peace on a basis of no forcible annexations and no punitive indemnities; and

"WHEREAS, The German Reichstag on July 19th by a vote of 214 to 116 declared in favor of a peace without forced acquisitions of territory and without political, economic and financial violations; and

"WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States has made no declaration of the terms on which this country would be willing to enter into peace negotiations; therefore

"BE IT RESOLVED, That the Congress of the United States hereby declares its sympathy with democratic Russia's attitude toward the war, and its willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the Russian formula as a basis, recognizing, however, that independent Belgium will be entitled to special restitution from Germany owing to the circumstances under which she was forced into the war, and recommending that the disposition of certain much disputed border lands should be determined by plébiscite under the supervision of an impartial international commission, on the principle of the right of the population to control its own destiny.

"THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES welcomes the German Reichstag Peace Resolution as an attempt on the part of the German people to express their desire for a peace of reconciliation without annexation and without indemnity.

"THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES calls upon the Parliaments of England, France, Italy and our other allies which, since the entrance into the war of the two

great republics, Russia and America, have given no indication of the terms on which they would make peace, to adopt resolutions expressing their willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the Russian formula as a basis."

The La Follette Resolution. On the 11th of August Senator La Follette introduced a resolution on the subject of peace-terms. It refers to the Russian formula, and to various statements of both belligerents in general conformity to it; and, on the other hand, to statements bearing a contrary significance. It complains that the American people are in ignorance of the secret agreements among the Allies as to what each is expected to receive in the way of territories, indemnities or commercial privileges, and that Americans demand and have a right to know for what they are fighting. The resolution proceeds with two significant clauses, declaring —

"That this Government will not contribute to the efforts of any belligerent for the purpose of prolonging the war to annex new territory, either in Europe or outside of Europe, nor to enforce the payment of indemnities to recover the expenses of the war; but the Congress does hereby declare in favor of the creation of a common fund, to be provided by all the belligerent nations, to assist in the restoration of the portions of territory in any of the countries most seriously devastated by the war and for the establishment of an international commission to decide the allotment of the common fund"; and

"That there should be a public restatement of the allied peace terms, based on a disavowal of any advantages, either in the way of indemnities, territorial acquisitions, commercial privileges or economic prerogatives by means of which one nation shall strengthen its power abroad at the expense of an-

other nation, as wholly incompatible with the establishment of a durable peace in the world.”¹

In response Senator King brought in a resolution proposing to commit the country to fight until “the German Government shall have acknowledged and expiated its crimes,” etc.

Both resolutions were shelved.

6.

Why Germans do not Rebel. While the Reichstag Resolution thus found a certain measure of sympathetic interest abroad, the hope of some radical change in the internal balance of power in Germany was constantly disappointed. As to the difficulties of making a revolution in war-time, *Vorwärts* said pointedly: “It is all very well for the Allies to talk of the German people rebelling against their Government; but if they did, the Entente armies would be in Cologne in a week.”

Scheidemann reviewed this situation in a speech to Berlin Socialists on July 26. Speaking of Russia he said: “The disorderly retreat condemns the masses of Russian soldiers to frightful sufferings, and the Socialist Government of Russia lays the blame for this tremendous misfortune upon another Socialist body, the Maximalists. Think if such a misfortune were to befall the German Army and the Government were able to blame for it the Socialist Party in Germany! Here you have the key to the understanding of our attitude. If anything similar were to happen with us, it would mean the downfall of Germany, and at the same time the down-

¹ It is interesting to notice, as pointed out in the *New York Evening Post* of August 29, how closely the La Follette resolution foreshadows the position taken by President Wilson in his reply to the Pope. “The fact is,” says the *Post*, “that President Wilson has adopted for his own almost all the terms of peace laid down in the much abused resolution” of Senator La Follette.

fall of the German democracy . . . Our Russian comrades will now perhaps understand why we did not follow their advice and copy their revolution. They will now perhaps realize that we did not wish to prepare for the German people the fate which the Russian people now have to endure. We must reach democracy by other paths, and we are already upon them. I do not doubt for a moment that we shall have equal suffrage in Prussia and the Parliamentary system after the war. But it is a misfortune that we have not got them already. If the war does not soon come to a conclusion, a thorough-going democratization will come about even while it lasts. Convulsions like those in Russia we ought to and shall be spared, if the will universally prevails to do the necessary thing at the right moment. At this moment we are in a stage of transition.”¹

Signs of German Political Advance. In a minor way there were definite steps to be recorded in the direction of democratization—the appointment of a Reichstag committee to propose constitutional amendments, the appointment of seven members each from the Reichstag and the Bundesrat to be consulted on peace-terms, the Kaiser’s manifestos (of April 7 and July 11) favoring reform and promising that the next election for the Prussian diet shall be on the basis of equal suffrage. Most encouraging of all, however, is the new tone among the representatives of the people. If they have not yet the power, they apparently have the will and the purpose to secure the power and use it.

¹ London *Times*, Aug. 31.

CHAPTER VII

CONFERENCES

I.

Allied Balkan Conference. On July 25 an Allied Conference met in Paris to consider future military action in the Balkans. The United States was invited to participate, but refused, on the ground that the conference dealt with European campaign problems. The proceedings were secret. The event, however, had an unofficial sequel in talk of a permanent Latin alliance, including not only France and Italy, but Roumania and perhaps Spain, to "co-operate with the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic block of nations."

The Balkan Conference also led to a debate on August 17 in the House of Commons, in which Balfour made a lengthy speech, partly in defense of the traditional methods of secret diplomacy. This was caustically commented on by the *Manchester Guardian*, which after referring to recent revelations, remarked: "British diplomacy persists, however, in claiming for itself a monopoly of all power in the region of foreign affairs and a complete immunity from investigation and criticism. That, of course, is not surprising. What does surprise is that Parliament and the nation have not yet been fired by a long succession of revelations of incompetence to shatter a system as inefficient as it is fatal to self-government." (*Manchester Guardian*, weekly edition, August 25.)

The more general Inter-Allied Conference for that reconsideration of war aims, which had been promised to Russia, has been continually postponed.

2.

Stockholm Again. The Socialist project of an international conference at Stockholm, the first phase of which has already been described,¹ had an eventful history which the broken newspaper accounts and the censorship make it hard to follow fully.

The conference at Stockholm to which the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee invited their comrades realized itself only in the shape of informal "conversations" between neutral Socialists (and especially Branting) and representatives of both sides. The Russian Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates issued an invitation to the Socialists and Labor Parties of the world to attend another international conference to be held at Stockholm on or about August 15, which should supersede "the Branting conversations."

The Question of Passports. The fact that this invitation had official Russian backing and that it was accepted by the organized Socialists of France (on May 28),² of Italy (on June 6), and of Great Britain (on August 10), made the question of whether or not to issue passports to delegates an embarrassing one to Governments.³ The first de-

¹ See pp. 61-71, 79-80.

² Also by the Confédération Générale de Travail on August 21.

³ The Belgian Labor Party declined to attend, sending this explanation to Russia: "It must be clearly understood that we do not refuse to meet the Germans; we refuse to be associated with the upholders of the imperialism of Wilhelm and Karl. We see no objection to concerted action with those even in the Central Empires who are opposing the policy of aggression and conquest,

cision was that of the United States, where the Department of State refused to allow the Socialist delegates, Hillquit, Berger and Lee, to go. Curiously enough, however, a passport was granted to James Eads How, organizer and representative of the International Brotherhood Welfare Association, a union of migratory workers, or so-called "hoboes." Another representative of this organization attended, traveling via the Pacific. The fact that this extreme wing of the labor movement in America was the only one represented at Stockholm was thus the direct result of the attitude of the Government and of the American Federation of Labor.

France and Great Britain. On June 1 the French Government followed the American lead and announced that French socialists would not be allowed to go to or through Stockholm while the conference was being held.

On June 8 the question of passports to members of the Independent Labor Party came up in the British Parliament, and Sir Robert Cecil announced that the Government would grant passports good only for Petrograd; the delegates, however, might confer en route — but only with friends, not with enemies or "aliens."

The Sailors' and Firemen's Union unexpectedly took a hand and refused (June 10) to serve on any ship carrying the delegates, thus preventing the sailing of Ramsay MacDonald and his companions. The union took the ground that there should be "no peace manoeuvres until Germany had made the fullest restitution for the wholesale massacre of Allied sailors at sea."

and who are really pursuing the same object as ourselves. We should not refuse even to meet the majority Socialists if, abandoning their present mistakes, they came out openly and energetically against their Emperors."

Meanwhile labor men and Socialists from the Allied countries were conferring in Russia,¹ and Russian delegates were sent out to the Allied countries to persuade their comrades of the wisdom of the Stockholm plan. Mr. Henderson wrote from Petrograd advising acceptance of the invitation, and returned to England, accompanied by four Russian delegates, to urge it. After consultation with members of the British Labor Party,² he decided to attend. There was some question however, at that date, whether the Labor Party would accept the invitation.

In France the question of representation at Stockholm caused a ministerial crisis early in August. On August 12 the Permanent Administrative Committee of the French Socialist Party announced that delegates would be sent to Stockholm; on the 14th the Government refused passports.

The Henderson Incident. In England too there were ministerial difficulties over the matter. It had been expected that the Labor Party would decline the invitation, which would make it unnecessary for the Prime Minister to refuse a passport to his colleague, Mr. Henderson.

These expectations proved to be incorrect. A

¹ See pp. 79-82.

² The British Labor Party is affiliated with the International Socialist Bureau. It has for some years been committed to Socialism by vote of its annual Congress and it is practically the regular socialist party of Great Britain. Its membership includes not only Socialist organizations like the Independent Labor Party (60,000 members), the Fabian Society (strong not in numbers, which it has never sought, but in influence) and the less important British Socialist Party (membership 20,000): it also includes, as a very important part of its membership, trade unions and co-operative societies whose constituents are not all socialists. It has thirty-seven members in Parliament.



Photo by Paul Thompson

ARTHUR HENDERSON

1918

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Conference of the Labor Party was held August 10. Under the leadership of Henderson the conference of 600 delegates, casting votes proportioned to their constituency, voted 1,046,000 to 550,000 to accept the invitation. This was, however, on condition that the Conference be consultative, not mandatory.

Russia's Attitude Toward Stockholm. Lloyd-George thereupon indignantly accused Henderson of bad faith, and of suppressing the information that the "attitude of the Russian Government toward Stockholm was very different from what had been supposed." It was widely represented in the press that there has been a recent and material change in Russian opinion.

These allegations brought out from Kerensky himself, under date of August 16, the following statement as to the Stockholm Conference:

"I think it is of great importance, although personally I think it would have been of greater importance if it had taken place while we were advancing instead of in the present condition. But I am not opposed to it, no. I have insisted again and again that any opposition offered to it by the Allied Governments, any difficulties put in way of delegates, is simply playing into German hands."

Meanwhile, Henderson had resigned from the cabinet and a few days later (August 13) it was announced that passports to Stockholm would be refused. The following day the Executive of the Labor Party passed a vote of confidence in Henderson, appointed eight delegates to Stockholm, noting with regret the Government's position as to issuing passports and directing that representation be made to the Government on the subject. This position was sustained by a narrow margin at the adjourned meeting of the Labor Conference on August 21.

Mr. Gompers Refuses. In the United States Mr. Gompers had refused on August 3, on behalf of the American Federation of Labor, to take part in the Stockholm conference; and on August 6 the Department of State definitively refused to alter its position as to passports.¹

The original refusal on the part of America appears to have been the deciding factor in the attitude of the Allied Governments toward the Stockholm plan.

Branting on the Refusal of Passports. Hjalmar Branting, the Swedish Socialist leader, well known for his strong pro-Ally leanings, commented on the situation: "If the Allied governments, with the exception of Russia, should maintain their decisions to refuse passports, their attitude probably will lead to a rupture between the governments concerned and the Socialistic parties of their countries, which have decided to be represented at the conference. There may be serious consequences of such a policy — how serious it is impossible to foretell. . . .

"The idea of a peace promoted by the action of the international workers cannot be suppressed by a refusal of passports . . .

"The refusal of passports is certainly a great political blunder. This step will place the Entente countries in an unfavorable position, as the whole world is longing for peace. It shows that they fear the peace discussions, which the Central Powers' governments are not seeking to prevent.

"The idea upon which the Stockholm conference is based will not be given up because of the opposition of governments who believe themselves able to hold out against international sentiment."

This is also the position taken in a statement by delegates from Russia, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and by

¹ On August 17 Japan also refused passports to Socialist delegates.

the Belgian, Camille Huysmans, Secretary of the International Bureau.¹

The question now was as to how far Socialist elements would or could press the issue on their respective governments.

3.

London Conference of Inter-Allied Socialists. On August 28 and 29, the long planned second Inter-Allied Socialist Conference was held in London.²

It had two objects, to consider the proposed Stockholm meeting and to consider drafts of peace-terms submitted by various Socialist parties of the Allied countries. The Russians at first held aloof, but on the ground that the conference was consultative only they finally took part.

On neither of the two aims did the conference reach any unanimity. This in Henderson's opinion, "rendered it inevitable that the whole question should be reconsidered. An international conference with such divergent views as were manifested at the Inter-Allied Conference between different sections of one nation and among the different allied nations would not only be harmful but it might be disastrous. We can have no conference at all until

¹ See p. 211.

² This had been arranged for at the time of the "Branting conversations" at Stockholm in the spring. On receiving the Russian invitation to a Stockholm conference later in the summer, the plan was suspended. The Russians had objected to it from the first, "because such a conference would only mean the sanction of the breach artificially created by the war between such parties and organizations, and also because only an international conference, uniting in one common effort all the Socialist parties and Labor organizations, may lead to peace." After conference with the Russian delegates who came to England with Henderson, the plan was resumed.

a common ground for agreement is reached among the workers of the allied countries."

Nevertheless, a declaration signed by the Belgian, British, French, Greek, and Italian representatives was published on September 2 by *Humanité*, the Socialist organ:

More than ever after three years of war, the Socialists believe that the victory of German imperialism would spell the elimination of democracy and liberty from the world. . . . The Allied nations must at the same time pursue vigorously their military efforts and show clearly what are their peace conditions. The Socialists find the best guarantee of a stable and just peace in the principles affirmed by the Russian revolutionists; with certain exceptions, namely, that peace without contributions must not exclude just reparation for damages and peace without annexation must not exclude dis-annexation of territories conquered by force.

The right of peoples to govern themselves can only be brought about by a society of nations founded upon international law and strong enough to resist all Governments which might attempt to violate that law.

The Socialists desire Belgium to be restored and indemnified for the violation of her neutrality; they want Serbia and Roumania reëstablished in independence and economic life and the Polish question settled in conformity with a Polish plebiscite and with the complete restoration of Poland in its original independence in view. They desire the same principles applied to all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, including Trieste and the Trentino, so that each shall be nationally reunited with the country to which its inhabitants desire to belong.

The Socialists feel it an essential duty to oppose every effort to transform a war of right and defense into one of conquests which might bring about new conflicts.

A just and durable peace is not possible, according to their profound conviction, until all the peoples enjoy democratic institutions which shall guarantee them against dynastic am-

bitions and the political and economic designs of hegemonies, castes, and ruling classes.

The Socialists are convinced that the peoples of Germany and Austria cannot achieve their desired peace until they have discarded their present irresponsible Governments for democratic régimes, which shall include the downfall of militarism.

The declaration concludes with the statement that this must be the last of all wars, but adds the reminder that this can be achieved only if the Socialists of all parties work for the creation of a pacific Federation of the United States of Europe and the World, which shall assure the liberty of the peoples and the unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations.

Of the peace-programs prepared for consideration at the conference, one of the most interesting and important was that of the British Labor Party, which considered each point of the settlement in detail. It will be found on p. 221.

The British Socialist Party presented a statement setting forth that there is common responsibility for the war, and that reparation must be from a common fund contributed by all the belligerents; demanding the return of conquered territory, including the German colonies; and calling on the working people to intervene and end the war.

4.

Blackpool Trade Union Congress. Five days after the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference, the British Trade Union Congress met at Blackpool. It was of the opinion "that a conference held now could not be successful, and that an attempt should be made to secure a general agreement among the working classes of the allied nations as a fundamental condition of the convening of such a body. The

congress should protest against the British Government's refusal of passports to delegates to Stockholm, and demand that if an international conference should be held no obstacle should be placed in the way of the attendance of delegates." ¹

A delegate, John Hill, president of the Boilermakers' and Shipbuilders' Union, urged the delegates to agree on the principal object of the war. It was unnecessary, he said, to drag Belgium into the debate, as they were all agreed that there must be an evacuation of that country and absolute independence and full reparation for it. Belgium, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Trentino, he said, were all assured of a full measure of justice in the agreed object of all the allied powers, which was the destruction of German militarism by the substitution of a German democracy. Asked if this could be accomplished by the military method, he said:

"By this method it is estimated the nations have killed about 9,000,000 men who should have been the creators of a new world. The total killed and wounded of all countries in the war is greater than the total white population of the British Empire."

Free Masons on Peace Terms. An international conference, of another kind, which also occupied itself with the question of peace terms was held in Paris on August 19 by the Masons of Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal, Serbia and some of the European neutrals. The Grand Lodges of Great Britain were not represented, because they refrain from all political questions, both national and international.

The terms favored by the Masons were stated by the *Temps* as follows: "First, the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France; second, the reconstitution by reunion of the three fragments of Poland — Russian, Prussian and Austrian — into an independent nation; third, the independence of

¹ For the earlier history of the Stockholm Conference see pp. 61-71, and 79-80. See also p. 213.

Bohemia; fourth, the liberation and unification of all nationalities to-day oppressed by the political and administrative organization of the Hapsburg empire in its various dominions, which declared themselves in favor of such a course by plebiscite." The Italian Masons urged a fuller recognition of Italian aspirations, but were not sustained. There was considerable bitterness in the Italian press over this lack of consideration of Italy's claims.

5.

The People's Council. In America too there were popular conferences, discussing peace. The constituent assembly of the People's Council for Democracy and Terms of Peace met in Chicago during the first days of September in the midst of considerable political excitement. While an inventive press was telling of speeches denouncing the President, the Conference was passing a resolution on terms of peace,¹ in effect an endorsement of President Wilson's reply to the Pope, which had then just appeared.

The People's Council believes that "the more clearly it is demonstrated in this country that the American people desire a peace without conquest, without tribute, without imperialistic aggrandizement, the sooner will the reactionary rulers of Germany be compelled to yield to the powerful and growing movement in Germany in favor of such a peace." (Report of Committee on Peace Terms.)

They are not alone in advocating this belief, which is a constant thesis for instance of the editorials of the *New Republic*.

A Conference of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, held under the lead of Mr.

¹ See p. 231.

Gompers at Minneapolis on September 6, proclaimed the loyalty of American labor and its enthusiasm for the war.¹

The Non-partisan League, the expression of political and economic democracy in the Northwest, meeting on September 19, occupied itself among other matters with the war. It urged the American Government to insist that the Allies should in common with itself "make immediate public declaration of terms of peace . . . in harmony with and supporting the new democracy of Russia." It demanded "the abolition of secret diplomacy." "The ugly incitings of an economic system based upon exploitation" and "rival groups of monopolists playing a deadly game for commercial supremacy" are accused of being contributory causes of the war. Other paragraphs deal with domestic problems connected with a state of war and with economic after-the-war reforms.²

¹ See p. 235.

² For the document as a whole, see p. 237.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POPE'S NOTE

I.

ON August 1, Pope Benedict XV addressed a note (not made public in the United States till the sixteenth) "To the rulers of the Belligerent Peoples."

The note begins by defining the position of the Pope during the war — his impartiality, his good will to all — and speaks of his endeavors to "bring the peoples and their rulers to more moderate resolutions, to the serene deliberation" of a just and lasting peace, not all of which endeavors have been made public.

He invites the belligerents to agree on the following points:

The Pope's Proposals. (1) "The fundamental point"—the substitution of moral for military force. The Pope proposes decrease of armaments, and compulsory arbitration, with sanctions or penalties to be agreed on.

(2) "Community of the Seas."

(3) Mutual forgiveness as regards damages and payment for cost of war, except in certain special cases to be considered on the basis of justice.

(4) Restitution of occupied territory, as a necessary preliminary of agreement: specifically, complete evacuation of Belgium with guarantee of full po-

litical, military and economic independence, evacuation of French territory, and restitution of German colonies.

(5) Territorial questions between Italy and Austria, and Germany and France, to be examined in a conciliatory spirit, regard being had to aspirations of the peoples and general human welfare. So too of Armenia, the Balkan States, and the territories making part of the ancient Kingdom of Poland.

The whole document is permeated with the sense of the pity, waste and horror of the war "which more and more appears a useless massacre." It appeals to the motive of sympathy. It emphasizes the responsibility of rulers, the immeasurable gain of a durable peace with disarmament.

2.

Discussion of the Papal Note. The public discussion which followed dealt partly with the substance of the proposals in the note, partly with its source, and the religious politics involved.

The note was of course said to be correlated with the peace efforts of the Catholic Center in Germany and especially Erzberger's "peace drive," and with the desire for peace in Austria, supposed to be the land nearest the Pope's heart. Some even asserted the most direct collaboration between the Central Powers and the Vatican. There were also the suspicions of certain anti-religious and non-Catholic groups. As for the Socialist and radical forces, they desired that peace should be brought about by popular forces; they neither wished that prestige should accrue to the church nor that an ecclesiastically conservative tone should be borne by the peace settle-



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POPE BENEDICT XV



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ment. On the other hand, many Catholics found their Church loyalty running more or less counter to their national prepossessions and purposes. Care seems to have been taken not openly to mobilize the Catholic body as such in favor of the Pope's proposals.

The question was also raised as to what political motives might underlie the Pope's note. Attention was called to various Catholic utterances in this connection which seemed to show that "there is a Vatican diplomacy eager to take all the opportunities offered by the present situation in order to resolve in its own interest some problems in connection with the Temporal Papacy and the Roman Church."¹

Thus was cited an article by Monsignor Benigni, a modernist churchman, in the *Nuova Antologia*, in favor of the Pope's being represented at the Peace Conference. It may be remembered that the Pope was excluded from The Hague Congresses, through the absolute refusal of Italy to consent to his presence, on the ground that only States should be invited to participate. Again, an article by the English Cardinal Gasquet, in the *Dublin Review*, remarks upon the failure of international conventions, Hague and other, to safeguard peace and small peoples, and the failure of Socialist internationalism to prevent war, and concludes that the only road to peace is a sacred league among Christian nations supported by the authority of the Pope, "the only authority recognized by all."

On the Catholic side it was pointed out (in *America*, the leading Catholic journal of New York) that "radicalism is advancing by leaps and bounds, strengthened by the very passions that war arouses. The safety of constitutional government is in the balance. Which way shall the scales be tilted? The wrong way, if the war is prolonged without due necessity. The truculence of labor here, the insistence

¹ For this and what follows see an article by Dr. George La Piana in the *Forum* of February, 1917.

of anarchists and Socialists abroad, bear with them a serious lesson."

Explanations. Certain questions as to the content of the note were met by a dispatch authorized by the Papal Secretary. It is denied that the appeal was suggested by, or is in the particular interest of, any one of the belligerents. Belgium is specifically named as the exceptional case with regard to indemnities for war injury.

Further, "the Holy Father said nothing about democracy and the democratization of any existing government, because history teaches us that a form of government imposed by arms does not and can not live, and also out of respect for the free-will of the people themselves, who, having the right of universal suffrage, may choose whatever form of government they please. For the rest, democracy will receive such an impulse from the war, that wisdom must prevent it deteriorating into any excessive forms, such as anarchism."

Another semi-official statement from Rome, August 17, says, "the Vatican considers the reproach of a part of the press that the Holy See has not condemned violations of law, such as atrocities committed, is unjust; since Pope Benedict, faithful to his principle of impartiality, had in his note the intention of acting as peacemaker, and not as judge, and also because he lacks the necessary powers to do so.

"No peacemaker would have the faintest chance of success if he began by trying to prove which side is right and which is wrong. The Pontiff went as far as possible to make understood what his feelings are without risking the failure of his proposal on the rocks of Austro-German ill-feeling. Besides, the

Papal proposals were in solemn condemnation of those responsible for the war methods adopted and the barbarities committed."

Still another explanation was given orally by the Pope himself when on August 22 he received separately the Belgian and British Ministers accredited to the Vatican. To their inquiry as to what he meant by freedom of the seas he replied that he intended the same meaning as that of President Wilson in his message.

On August 21, Cardinal Gasparri puzzled the newspaper correspondents by asserting that the five chief belligerents have subscribed to four fundamental principles upon which peace must be based. These were stated to be "The principle of nationalities, freedom of the seas, disavowal of war for conquest, and a league of nations to insure permanent peace."

Right vs. Might. It is to be noted that the Pope designates as the fundamental point in his Note the substitution of moral for material force. In Germany this seems to have met in certain quarters with hearty agreement. "The deciding question," says the *Tageblatt*, "is what shall be our attitude to what the Pope calls the basic idea for peace negotiations. That basic idea is that right shall take the place of might and that an understanding for simultaneous disarmament shall be reached and an international court of arbitration established. We agree with the Pope on this basic idea without reserve."

On the other hand Count Reventlow, the "mad dog of Germany," whose significance is much overrated by our press, holds "that the moral law exists for Germans only so far as it applies to the German Empire and nation. The Germans cannot consent

to a reduction in armaments, which alone have made possible the existence of the Empire and the possibility of its moral activities." He adds that Germany cannot bear its own burdens, and therefore cannot renounce indemnities. He also says that guarantees for Belgium's independence cannot be found.

3.

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope. In his reply to the Pope, President Wilson was generally considered to be the spokesman of the Allies.

His Note of August 27 at once altered the status of the question of peace negotiations. On the side of the Allies the conviction was profound that the German Government could not be trusted. This lack of confidence, not only in Germany's pledged word but in her intention to deal fairly in any sense with foreign nations, had made them unwilling to take at their face value her various offers, and blocked the way to negotiations for a settlement.

The President's policy pointed a way. He stated, as the essential objection to the "status quo ante" as a basis for enduring peace, the wish to free the world from the menace, not of the German nation, but of a "vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government" upon whose word of honor it had been found impossible to rely. "We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. . . . We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the

Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon, and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace."

The Note also repudiates "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues" as "inexpedient and in the end futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace."

4.

This implicit but unmistakable promise that the United States would be ready to enter into peace negotiations with Germany when the German people could guarantee their Government's good faith, was understood to be a direct reference to the establishment of a Parliamentary Government in Germany. It met with almost unanimous approval in America from all parties, including those who believed that the only hope for German democratization lay in an Allied victory.¹

The question was raised whether such an outside demand for domestic reforms might not actually have the effect of hindering and delaying them by arousing chauvinistic opposition. In this connection, as perhaps showing the growth of a desire in Germany to understand the outside point of view, Dr. Dernberg's comment in the Berlin *Tageblatt* is interesting:

"I have no reason to break a lance for President Wilson, nevertheless I must remind my readers that a foreign potentate forms his judgment of a Government primarily upon

¹ Cf., as an example of Socialist approval, Max Eastman's editorial supplement to the *Masses*, October, 1917. Cf., too, the resolution of the Committee on Peace Terms of the People's Council (*infra*, p. 231).

the experience he has had of that Government's diplomacy. Anybody who has carefully followed the course of German diplomacy in regard to America for a considerable time previous to February 1, 1917, knows that President Wilson has right good grounds for complaint, since this German diplomacy was by no means unambiguous."

The Russian embassy in Washington made a statement on the President's reply, August 30, characterizing it as in the Russian view "an act of highest political wisdom" which "closely corresponds to the principles and aims of the Russian people," and as designed "to facilitate for the German people their entrance in the path of democratic revival."

That the President's policy was not merely acceptable *ex post facto* but had long been substantially agreed on with England, is suggested in a very interesting London dispatch by Lincoln Colcord under date of August 19 (eight days before the appearance of the Note). The President's reply, it was believed, would be in substance, "a set of extremely liberal ideas on the question of making peace which Balfour carried back with him from his American mission." These were based on "a common feeling in British and American liberal circles that the democracies of the world had not been entirely faithful to their purposes in the two important particulars, namely, in appealing to German liberalism with some joint statement of reassurance as to the aims of the Allies and in supporting the new Russian Republic and holding its full confidence on the same score." At the same time there was the obvious difficulty of stating concrete terms which would satisfy the aspirations of all the Allies without being open to the charge of imperialism and offending alike Russians and German liberals. "As a result of all this, it is understood that the suggestion was advanced that a simple statement to the effect that the allied democracies . . . would be willing at any time, with certain obvious guarantees, to discuss peace with a democratized Germany,



[Courtesy of the N. Y. *Evening Post*]

THE MESSENGER



would, if put out as an official joint declaration of policy, have the desired effect.”¹

This point of view was tersely expressed by Balfour in the famous phrase in his speech of July 30, “until Germany is either powerless or free,” foreshadowing the position taken by President Wilson.

Two semi-official statements in the press, September 4 and 5, served to make clear the nature of the “guarantees” demanded by the President of the German people. In the first, it was denied that the Administration had meant that the abolition of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the monarchical form of government were necessary to meet its conditions. In the second, it was stated that the “governmental reforms necessary in Germany before the United States will treat with that country include radical electoral progress, without which it was believed that the desired democratization of Germany would not take place,” and “a ministry responsible to the Reichstag.”

5.

The President's reply met with a considerable amount of sympathy among the German Socialists. Scheidemann regards as “absolutely right” the idea that peace in order to be durable ought to be guaranteed not only by the Government but by the people. However, he points out, war offers the worst opportunity for the development of democratic institutions. Peace will give them a chance to make quicker progress. For at least a generation peace will be automatically guaranteed by exhaustion. During this time, democracy and Socialism will so

¹ Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, August 21, 1917.

advance that this should prove the last war among civilized nations.

German Reply to the Pope. The German and Austrian replies to the Pope, appearing on September 22, were a disappointment to those who had hoped for some concrete statement of terms, and at least a definite and complete renunciation of Belgium. They indicate, however, a certain change of attitude. There is no talk of victory and no assertion that the Allies provoked the war, which is now ascribed to "a disastrous concatenation of events."

The "leading idea of the peace appeal, . . . that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right" is greeted with special sympathy by the Imperial Government. It agrees that "the new spirit, that in the future should prevail in international relations, should first find hopeful expression" in measures toward limitation of armaments as well as community of the seas. The task of deciding "international differences of opinion" by peaceful means, especially by arbitration, would then come up naturally.

Much stress is laid on the advantages of economic reciprocity and free competition. "Germany, owing to her geographical situation and economic requirements has to rely on peaceful intercourse with her neighbors and with distant countries. No people therefore has more reason than the German people to wish that instead of universal hatred and battle, a conciliatory fraternal spirit should prevail between nations. If the nations are guided by this spirit it will be recognized, to their advantage, that the important thing is to lay more stress upon that which unites them in their relations." The nations will then settle still undecided points of conflict in such a way as to create for every nation satisfactory conditions of existence, whereafter "a repetition of this world catastrophe would appear impossible."

In another passage the Note says that Germany has been seeking free development at home, and, abroad, "unhindered competition with nations enjoying equal rights and equal esteem. The free play of forces in the world, in peaceable wrestling with one another, would lead to the highest perfection of the noblest human possessions."

It is particularly to be noted that the reply takes occasion to speak of "measures which the Government has taken *in closest contact with representatives of the German people*, for discussing and answering the questions raised." This proves "how earnestly it desires, in accordance with His Holiness's desires and *the peace resolution of the Reichstag on July 19*, to find a practical basis for a just and lasting peace." (Our italics.)

Austrian Reply to the Pope. The reply of the Austrian Emperor is distinguished by its Catholic tone, by its more pronounced expression of desire for peace and by distinctly less ambiguous statements in the passages referring to disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. Agreeing with the Pope, and also the German note, it regards these ideas as the first to be realized, and holds that "it can then not be difficult to find a satisfactory solution of the other questions which still remain to be settled . . . in a spirit of justice, and of a reasonable consideration of the conditions necessary to existence, on both sides."¹

6.

At this point the development of any approach to peace would seem to depend on the internal evolution

¹ The note seems far more self-consistent in its tone than the German. In the latter, one is tempted to believe that one can almost detect the note of Kühlmann, the note of the Emperor, the note of the Reichstag committee, the note of a Dernburg or Ballin,

of Germany. Those in present control of her destinies appear to be determined to secure a peace conference which they can enter with free hands. They appear to make it a *sine qua non* to be free to bargain, with all their military and territorial advantages available as pawns with which to procure their own aims. Nevertheless, and in spite of the way in which territorial questions like Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine and the Colonies loom in the foreground, the prime requisite of Germany is freedom from economic discrimination after the war. Everything else would appear to be in reality secondary.

This prime peace-requisite of Germany is confronted by the prime requisite of the Allies — an administration of German affairs which they feel they can trust; and as a necessary pre-condition, Germany's willingness to renounce the spoils of military aggression.

and the dead hand of the Conservative, making the reply as a whole ineffective.

CHAPTER IX

THE SETTLEMENT: PARTIES, ISSUES AND METHODS

I.

IN the nine months covered by this survey, the peace aims of the various belligerents, and the forces behind these aims, have shifted again and again. Three chief points of view seem to have been represented in the councils of the nations.

The Imperialists. There is first the point of view of the imperialists, militarists, Junkers, expansionists, annexationists — statesmen of the old predatory type. They are inclined to regard all alien territory as possible and legitimate booty. Men of this way of thinking are most powerful, most cynical, and, we believe, proportionately most numerous, in Prussia, but no country is without them.

The Liberals. There is secondly the point of view of those who may be called the Liberals — such men as President Wilson, Dr. Eliot, Balfour, Delbrück, Milyukov. They think in terms of States, of national commerce, of national honor. But beyond national States they envisage with more or less vigorous belief a State of States, a politically organized world.

The Social-Radicals. There is thirdly the point of view of the social radicals who constitute a force not easily to be measured or appraised, but suddenly

made important by the Russian Revolution. Those of them who are Socialists are strongly organized in all European countries as political parties in good standing. Before the war they were internationally organized, and since the spring of 1917 the International has once more commenced to assert itself. In Germany the Socialists have been regarded as rather successfully "tamed." But in Russia a sufficiently "untamed" variety is now in power. In both Germany and Russia they desire peace, though with very different minds. But both favor internationally organized working-class pressure as a means of bringing peace about.

It may be roughly said that those in control in Germany represent the first point of view, in England and France the second, in revolutionary Russia the third. The coming in of the United States, in which public opinion is pretty solidly of the second type, enormously increased the impact of this set of ideas, to which President Wilson's intellect and eloquence give a finely tempered edge.

Their Instruments: (1) *A Military Settlement.* The first group desire a settlement by military means and by military men based on strategic considerations. It is their idea, as was said to me in pre-revolutionary Russia, that "peace terms are not to be settled, do not deceive yourself as to that, by cabinets or parliaments or any civilians, but by generals in the field."

(2) *Politico-Economic Pressure.* The second group, when circumstances permit them to use their appropriate instruments, look rather to economic and political means of pressure. The blockade has meant more than "drives"; the Paris Conference on the one side, and the fear of the economic menace

of a Mittel-Europa organized for commercial aggression on the other, have caused more dismay than armies. President Wilson appears to rest the hopes of the Allies for an early peace in a change of political equilibrium in Germany.

(3) *Working-class Solidarity*. And the third, the social-radical group, interpreting the war as due to causes acting on both sides — causes, such as colonial expansion, for which the nationalism of the Liberals bears a full share of responsibility — hopes for a peace to be achieved by neither military nor commercial pressure, but through the most complete working-class internationalism.

All of these points of view are represented in each country, but it is difficult to say to what extent they are held by the populations, since no government has undertaken to find out definitely what the silent masses who bear the bulk of the suffering really want in regard to the settlement of the war. No one knows how many are ready to go on fighting for imperialistic ends; how many believe that they must "conquer or submit," as President Wilson said to Russia; how many desire a peace now on the Russian terms.

Each of these groups finds it hard to understand the other points of view. The Junker-Jingo group honestly thinks, as Napoleon did, that the Liberal is a hypocrite or a shop-keeper and dollar-chaser. So the Liberal thinks the Junker a brute beast, a "mad dog." Both regard the third man as little better than an anarchist, to be kept as quiet as possible. The social-radical, also, may misread as pure hypocrisy the "bourgeois ideology" which sees the war — as Mr. Bonar Law put it in the parliamentary debate of July 27 — as "a struggle between right and wrong to decide whether moral force or wickedness is to rule the world."

Or he may feel that a genuine but misguided passion of moral feeling, putting behind the determination to "fight to a finish" more driving force even than lust for power or wealth or glory, is perhaps the most serious obstacle in the way of the solution in which he sees the hope of the world.

The Church and Other Forces. Suddenly upon a scene occupied by these three great figures — the soldier, the statesman, the revolutionary worker — the priest entered, the oldest International in Europe invited the wayward sons of men to serene deliberation.¹ Here was a new peacemaker.

These are so far the characters occupying the stage in this stupendous play. And behind the scenes? There is talk of an international gathering of bankers assembling in Switzerland. Is High Finance also reassembling its internationalism? How far are current suspicions, and cynical interpretations of events in terms of commercial juggling, justified? Is "Wall Street" — widely believed to have played an important part in bringing the United States into the war, and for its own purposes — going to take part, too, in bringing war to an end when the time comes? If, as many believe, the fear of menacing social unrest spurred Italy and Russia into war to stave off internal troubles, will the same fear in one or another country induce conservative leaders to call the war off? These questions can be asked but not answered.

¹ Cf., the remark of the pan-German *Deutsche Zeitung*: "We are permitted to behold the three great international powers, Rome, Social Democracy, and Judaism, working in complete unison to bring to shame the German victory for which hundreds of thousands have bled and died."

The Issues. But, if such are the forces, what are the issues? What must the settlement decide, what are the proposals now before the world?

Such proposals are not generally to be found in their most complete or candid form in state papers nor in political speeches, but in the freer and more disinterested programs of organizations and individual students.¹ A formula that will serve as a slogan is however capable of great political service.

"A Fight to a Finish." The formula that is above all others simple and, from a certain point of view, safe, is the military slogan, "a fight to a finish." From the point of view of those who utter this phrase, any consideration of possible peace-settlements is likely to be regarded as seditious "peace talk," or at least as a withdrawal of attention from the one proper concern of all patriotic citizens — to wit, fighting.

This feeling towards the consideration of terms draws strength not only from the instinct of pugnacity, and from the danger to the partnership of stating too clearly what for instance Turkey or Bulgaria or Japan or Italy may hope for; it has an added intensity in proportion as victory is conceived as the vindication of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked.

"Guarantees." The large phrases of the earlier statements as to war-aims were in great part merely decorous generalizations meant to cover the diverse and necessarily more or less conflicting de-

¹ Some of these are given in Part II: among the most interesting are those of President Jordan, the British Union of Democratic Control, the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party and the two German Socialist Parties.

sires of the partners on both sides. The spokesmen of the belligerents had either to set down an alarming catalogue of aspirations, overlapping and incompatible, or to substitute some reputable generalization. Of these phrases the "guarantee of national security," or, at once more generous and more sonorous, "guarantee that such a war shall not recur," was most useful; for while it might suggest a friendly and all inclusive league of nations for mutual insurance, it might also mean "rectified" frontiers, one-sided disarmament and economic crippling of the enemy.

The President's request for a statement of terms served to reveal the wide-reaching character of the purposes of the Allies; but even that program of dismemberment and rectification of historical losses was incomplete — Japan's share was not indicated, nor the fate of the German colonies, nor the war after the war. And Germany's corresponding program was known only by inference or rumor.

The Russian Formula. Revolutionary Russia then came forward with the proposal which amounted to settlement on the basis of the *status quo ante* except in so far as the principle of the right of self-disposal for every nationality left the door open for readjustments.

Demand for a Responsible Government in Germany. The Allies have not as yet definitely accepted the Russian formula; but the President, speaking apparently for the Allies as well, narrowed the demands on Germany, in his reply to the Pope, to more practicable dimensions. He made a new and more definite interpretation of the demand which lay behind the talk of "crushing Prussian militarism," "making sure that such a catastrophe

should never occur again," etc., by interpreting this demand to mean, specifically, that the Allies must have adequate evidence that the faith of the German people is behind their government in its peace terms. And with this demand the President coupled a disavowal of the most menacing points in the extremer program of the Allies, and thus once more put the question up to the Central Powers.

They responded, in their replies to the Pope, by accepting certain general principles; but, as before, they practically refused to discuss concrete issues outside of a peace conference.

Preliminary Basis of a Settlement. Nevertheless, the situation has been considerably simplified. And if the desire for a negotiated peace, stimulated from Rome and Petrograd, eventually becomes powerful enough to effect a settlement, it would appear to be one which it is now possible to envisage in some at least of its main aspects.

Such a settlement would, doubtless, deal with only a part of the questions to be finally decided. The first agreement, on the basis of which the war would end, could clear up only the chief questions at issue: the more detailed arrangements, and some of the ultimate problems, would doubtless be left to a later Conference. This is made the more probable by the danger of possible detail difficulties among partners — difficulties less dangerous when all parties (including the enemy) are no longer under arms.

For Later Settlement. In regard to that Society of Nations which has been President Wilson's especial interest, all seem to be of one mind as to leaving to a later stage of proceedings all the details — all in fact except the merest general principles. In these almost every Government is ready to express

some degree of platonic interest, hardly more. England, and especially unofficial England, has more confidence in the idea than the Continent.¹

Disarmament, the freedom of the seas, and the revision and extension of international law, fall largely in the same category of questions that require the temper and leisure of a later congress to work out, even if general bases are agreed on in the first act of settlement.

With regard to the most obvious question, that of territorial adjustment, much of this matter too will probably have to be left over for settlement by conference. This seems to be the general view as regards the details of the Balkan problem.

For Immediate Decision. On the other hand, certain territorial questions stand in the very front rank of those that must be settled before peace is possible.

Belgian Independence. The evacuation of Belgium and complete restoration of her independence stand easily first among such questions. This is true not only because the sympathies and the sense of justice of Liberals everywhere, even in the Central Powers, are deeply engaged on Belgium's behalf; not only because the Allies have pledged their honor to secure her restoration; but because it has become the well understood symbol of defeat for the power of military aggression and the philosophy that justifies it.

On the German side opinion has been divided. The Bund Neues Vaterland, led by Schücking, has

¹ For official statements touching on the subject see the appendix to Goldsmith's *A League to Enforce Peace*, Macmillan, 1917; and, more recent, *A Reference Book for Speakers*, League to Enforce Peace, 70 Fifth Ave., N. Y. C

insisted that annexation would be a bad thing even on the grounds of Germany's own interests. The Socialists of both the majority and the minority groups oppose annexation on principle.¹

Unfortunately recent developments seem to show that in Germany these enlightened views have not yet prevailed. The idea of entering the peace conference unpledged, with Belgium as an object of barter by which to secure the return of the German colonies, or the cession of the Belgian Congo, or what not, is held even by many of those who realize that Belgium should or must be given up. Certain elements still apparently hope for a permanent and more or less complete "control." The nature of this control is perhaps indicated by the terms reported on September 27 "to have been outlined by von Kühlmann to the Pope, as the condition on which Germany was willing to evacuate Belgium." These terms included Germany's "right to develop her economic enterprises freely in Belgium, especially in Antwerp" (whatever that might turn out to mean); a guarantee on the part of Belgium that any such menace as that which threatened Germany in 1914 would be excluded in future; and the administrative separation of Flanders and the Walloon district, instituted by Germany.

To the Allies, however, any compromise on the subject of Belgium is inadmissible. The question does not stand on the same basis as that of other occupied territory. They do not consider it a subject for debate or bargain. They stand pledged. It seems hard to make Germany realize that—

¹ For the opposition to annexation on the part of Dr. Quidde and Eduard Bernstein see Bourne *Towards an Enduring Peace*, p. 316 and p. 320.

short of securing overwhelming victory — she cannot get peace without meeting their views on this point at least.

Evacuation of France. Next to the question of Belgium is that of the evacuation of the occupied portion of Northern France. This too is a *sine qua non* to the Allies. But here also Pan-Germanists have put forward proposals to hold on to certain districts valuable for their coal and iron, and Germany's official spokesmen prefer not to commit themselves.

The Balkan Allies. Next among territorial considerations come the questions of Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania. The honor of the Allies is pledged to their reconstitution; the details of territorial adjustment fall, however, into the vexed category of the Balkan problem.

3.

Next to the question of occupied territories — that is, occupied during this war — come perhaps certain questions of “unredeemed” or oppressed nationalities, questions which are in another aspect also territorial questions.

Alsace-Lorraine. This case is a special and difficult one. Perhaps on no single other point is there so absolute a deadlock of opposing views as in the French and German attitude — even in some degree in radical circles — on this point.¹

The wrong done by Germany in the forcible annexation of 1871 is unquestionable. But the historical test of justice is complicated by the fact that the land, originally German, was first taken by

¹ Cf. pp. 176, 183, 190, 225, 240, 263, 266.



[Courtesy of *Le Rire*]

ALSACE LORRAINE

A French view of a plebiscite with Alsace-Lorraine
bound and gagged by German militarism

40

France as part of the spoils of the Thirty Years' War. The test of language is in this case no test of nationality or national feeling, to which it bears no fixed relation.¹ The creation of an independent buffer state has been proposed and some good observers believe that this is what the majority of the inhabitants would themselves prefer if it could be made consistent with their trade necessities. The obvious democratic solution would appear to be decision by means of a plebiscite, but this too has its serious practical difficulties. For instance, the exodus of French inhabitants and the artificially stimulated immigration of German settlers during the German era make the French distrust this plan as likely to be unfair, even were they not opposed to it on other grounds. These detail difficulties, however, are of the type amenable to judicial or arbitral arrangement. It has been suggested for this, and other similar cases, that while the conditions of a fair consultation of the people are being worked out the territory might be put under the interim guardianship of a League of Nations. This assumes the possibility of the immediate creation of some form of such a League.

An important factor in the situation is the emotional intensity of the French determination to recover these "lost provinces." But no one as yet knows how far the official

¹ Dr. Jordan says: "It is to be noted that of over two millions of people in Alsace-Lorraine . . . only about one-sixth are of French origin or even speak a French dialect as a mother tongue. Yet only the humblest peasants are without knowledge of French, which language is spoken by preference by all the educated classes. . . . Bilingual the provinces are to-day and for the most part bilingual they have been for generations. Really they are trilingual, for the German and French dialects of their peasants diverge widely from the speech of Berlin or Paris. *Alsace-Lorraine, A Study in Conquest: 1913* (p. 35 and 38).

spokesmen of France really voice the wishes of the French people in this matter: how many, that is to say, would wish to prolong the war (and for what length of time) to secure re-annexation without condition, rather than a plebiscite; or to secure a plebiscite, rather than the *status quo* for the time being — with the hope of a peaceable readjustment in the course of time when passions have cooled.¹

The Polish Question. Poland, unlike Belgium, will have no voice at the Peace Conference, unlike Alsace-Lorraine no representative. Yet the war has definitively reopened the question of Polish independence, once thought eliminated from practical politics. Both sides have made large promises and President Wilson in his Senate address went out of his way to champion the cause of Poland. This was the only territorial question with which he dealt specifically.²

The practical arrangements for an independent and united Poland are, however, not without complexity. Poland, at her height, was a conquering kingdom, and held many non-Polish territories — as, for instance, Lithuania — which might or might not be willing now to cast in their fortunes with her. Must not the new Poland have an outlet to the sea?

¹ "It is easy to gather the arguments of public men and journalists, but not at all easy to obtain a clear idea of the feelings of the populace, since it is to the supposed interest of all sides to the controversy to misrepresent them, though often it is done in good faith. There is little doubt in my mind that the French peasant, whether living in Alsace-Lorraine or in any other part of France, has less political pride and more profound desire for permanent peace than the upper classes. He is more interested in the coal that keeps his family warm and the quality of the bread on which they have to live than he is in boundaries."—Norman Hapgood, in the *New York Evening Post*, Oct. 6.

² "I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland."

And what of the northwestern districts of Germany, where a strip of old German inhabitancy is interleaved between Polish populations? Some solution of these problems will have to be found at the peace settlement.

The question of oppressed nationalities, like every question of settlement, has been deeply affected by the Russian change of base. If revolutionary Russia persists, and is true to her principles, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine and other provinces may be either independent or freely federated in a new Russian state. But, apart from Poland, the peace settlement will probably not deal with them, so far as now appears.

Italian Aspirations. Italy regards the "unredeemed" Italians of the territory to the north of the Adriatic as standing in the front rank of "oppressed nationalities." But in addition to plans for their reunion with Italy, "national aspirations" of a very ambitious and far reaching character have been put forward. These included the proposal to make the Adriatic "an Italian lake" by securing possession — in addition to Trieste — of Istria, the main Dalmatian islands, the important Albanian port of Valona (Avlona) and other entirely un-Italian territory along the mainland.¹ In the Near East these aspirations sought not only a share of the islands including Rhodes but opportunity for exploitation and expansion in Asia Minor.

¹ A map published in London by Dr. Županić, on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee, which purports to show what the Allies had promised to Italy, indicates a cession not only of Trieste, of all Istria, and of territory back as far as Laibach itself, but also, in addition to the islands, of a considerable slice of Dalmatian mainland including the cities of Zara and Spalato, together with 4000 square kilometers of Albanian territory about Valona.

Such Jingo war-aims, involving subjugation of entirely alien populations, have been opposed in the Italian parliament and press and on June 30 Signor Barzillai, speaking in the Chamber, interpreted certain declarations by the Foreign Minister as a modification of Italy's war program, "bringing it more into line with the democratic principles of the Entente as emphasized and clarified by the Russian Revolution and by the adherence of America."¹ Baron Sonnino apparently did not dissent from this interpretation of his views.

The entrance of Greece into the Alliance made imperative some adjustment of conflicting ambitions of Italy and Greece and this was apparently effected at the Balkan Conference in Paris, July 26.

Italy is also supposed to have an understanding with Serbia in accordance with which Serbia would receive "a little window on the sea."

Roumania. The re-constitution of Roumania within her old boundaries has already been referred to. But, like Italy, she has not been able to bring within her "redeemed" territory all who belong with her on the basis of common language. But while there is no question of the reactionary and oppressive policies of Hungary toward her Roumanian subjects, the populations of the Hungarian districts where Roumanians dwell — Transylvania, the Bukovina and the Banat — are so racially intermingled, that Roumanian annexations would create new difficulties and — in view of Roumanian abuse of her Jewish population — probably new oppressions. It is therefore the less to be regretted if her

¹ See J. C. Powell, "Democratic Forces in Italy," *The New Europe*, August 9, 1917, p. 106. See also "Italy and the Corfu Pact," in *The New Statesman*, Oct. 13 and 20, 1917.

military débâcle has, on the received principles of statecraft, lessened the likelihood of her claims of annexation being allowed wide scope.

"Dismemberment" of Austria-Hungary. The Allies' January statement of terms to President Wilson required specifically the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks. Such "liberations" would be almost entirely at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and the passage was taken to indicate a deliberate intention to "dismember" the Dual Monarchy.¹

This policy is advocated by the distinguished Bohemian scholar and patriot, Professor Masaryk, who is quoted in a dispatch of May second to the New York *Evening Post*, as saying: "The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is just as essential to permanent peace in Europe as the destruction of military Prussianism. Bohemia, with the Slovaks, should become a separate independent state. The Italian elements in the monarchy should go to Italy, the Roumanian elements to Roumania, the Ruthenians to Russia, the Poles to Poland, and the South Slavs to Servia. There would remain the German-Austrians and the Magyars in separate states. This is the only possible way of crushing out the Mittel-Europa idea. If Poland and Bohemia are free, 'Central Europe' cannot exist."

Reform Without Dismemberment. This is one point of view. On the other side are those who hope for effective reform from within, breaking down, not only the German-Polish domination in Austria and the Magyar domination in Hungary, but Austria's reactionary clericalism and the corrupt and corrupting landed oligarchy of Hungary which clothe themselves in nationalistic forms.

President Wilson, in his reply to the Pope, spe-

¹ The realization of the expressed intention of the Allies would mulct Austria-Hungary of 54 per cent. of her territory.

cifically disclaimed the "dismemberment of empires." This appears to range the United States against any policy of attempting to resolve the Hapsburg monarchy into its constituent elements.

The Balkans. The Balkan situation is so complex that the attempt to effect a satisfactory adjustment will probably, in any event, have to be made the subject of a special conference. A peace treaty could presumably include agreement only on the most general principles.

Time alone can show whether those South-Slavs who desire a new federal state, made up of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, as projected in the Corfu Pact of July 20, 1917,¹ can realize their wish; what relation, in that case, such a state can hold to Austria-Hungary; and whether Bulgaria can secure fairer treatment for her "unredeemed" Bulgarians than she got under the treaty of Bucharest.

German Claims on Russia. The evacuation of Riga on August twenty-third has led to a flaring up in Germany of annexationist hopes with regard to Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces. The hardships of the Germans in the latter have been real enough, but they do not point, on the principle of nationality, to German annexation as the remedy. The German populations, influential as the property-holding class, are few in numbers.²

¹ See Stanoyevitch, "A New Phase of the Balkan Question," *Times Current History*, Oct., 1917, also *ibid.*, Sept. 431-2, and the *New Statesman*, *loc. cit.*

	Total population	Germans	Letts	Esths.	Others
Courland	674,000	56,000	534,000		84,000
Livonia	1,295,000	98,000	562,000	518,000	117,000
Esthonia	414,000	16,000		366,000	31,000
Total	2,383,000	170,000	1,096,000	884,000	232,000

Census of 1897. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, p. 303.

In considering these difficult questions of territorial readjustment it must be borne in mind that even if an intelligent and all powerful statesman could "remake this sorry scheme of things entire," so far as drawing boundaries is concerned, he could not by such means secure the rights of all nationalities.

Tolerance. In many places nationalities live intermingled, not only in the same provinces, but in the same villages. In such cases it is impossible to disentangle the nationalities and give separate independent existence to each. The only practicable solution includes a growth of tolerance which will make the conditions of life not only bearable but satisfying to national minorities: abandonment of the disastrous old ideal of "assimilation," complete freedom of speech and of worship, and — as demanded in President Wilson's Senate address, — secure opportunity for social and industrial development for all. Affairs now move in a vicious circle — suppression driving national minorities to agitate for political separation, and propaganda for political separation, especially if compelled into underground channels and conspiracy, creating the conviction that suppression is necessary. Cases like Provence and Brittany show how unnecessary it is to associate the cult of a differing speech and literature with separatist aspirations.¹

¹ On the subject of European problems of nationality the following books will be found useful:

Rose — "Nationality in Modern History."

Toynbee — "Nationality and the War."

Jordan — "Alsace-Lorraine: A Study in Conquest."

Dominian — "The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe."

Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, Zimmern and Greenwood — "The War and Democracy." Macmillan, 1915.

The Near East. The territorial questions of Western and Central Europe, only, have so far been touched on. But there are also the questions of the Near East — Constantinople, Palestine and Zionism, Syria and the latent French claims there, Armenia and the determination of humanity that the atrocities of the past shall be made impossible hereafter, and, still further afield, Bagdad and Mesopotamia — a whole world to be readjusted.

The Allies' terms of January tenth specified "the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks, the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire decidedly alien to western civilization." Arabia seems to be taking affairs into her own hands and securing independence for herself. It is questionable how much Germany will be ready to sacrifice to safeguard the possessions of her Turkish ally, whether as a matter of honor, or for the sake of that prestige which is such an important element of power in the East, or for commercial and imperialist ambitions.

International Proposals: The Straits. For dealing with these regions, various interesting proposals of international administration have been made. The British Union of Democratic Control, which, as representing the views of a small but distinguished group in parliament, has distinct political significance, offers the following plan:

"Russian democracy has repudiated the imperialistic policy of the Czar to annex Constantinople. The way is, therefore, open for a proposal to neutralize or internationalize the city and the straits. It is against the interest of the world that the great trading waterways of the world should be in the hands of single powers.

"The policy of international control over the Ottoman empire should be maintained and extended so as to provide full security for the Christian peoples and freedom of development for other races under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

"But no immediate settlement of the Turkish empire could be regarded as final. The arrangements would necessarily have to be revised from time to time by the League of Nations. The maximum of freedom for the various nationalities and freedom of trade between all the parts, and equality of economic opportunity for the nationals of all European powers should be the policy followed."

Mesopotamia. As to Mesopotamia, Lloyd George, in his Glasgow speech of June 29, contented himself with saying: "It is not and never has been Turkish. You have only to read the terrible reports to see what a wilderness the Turks have made of the Garden of Eden. What is to happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the peace committee, and there is one thing that will never happen to it. It will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turks. The same observation applies to Armenia." The memorandum on war aims of the British Labor Party condemns "handing back to the universally execrated rule of the Turkish Government any subject people once free therefrom," and proposes that Mesopotamia, Armenia and Arabia be placed under the government of a League of Nations with the administration in the hands of a commission.

Armenia. Norman Hapgood's foreign news letter in the *New York Evening Post* of July 21 speaks of the possibility of a collective protectorate for Armenia,¹ and again on October 6 makes the interesting statement:

¹ "The aspect of the Turkish situation on which I want to put emphasis to-day is the change in the position of Armenia growing

"A few of my readers may remember that many months ago I said that some of the best-informed British statesmen believed a better solution might be found by saving Turkey's face than by undertaking to extirpate her as an empire; and I went into the method by which a financial commission could rule Constantinople. Since then it has become not improbable that for the rest of Turkey also, including Arabia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Palestine, some kind of an international rule with nominal Turkish sovereignty may be the outcome."

5.

Colonies. Another question which comes under the head of territorial readjustments is that of the disposition of the captured German colonies. These come squarely within the Russians' ban on annexations. As Socialists they must condemn the whole colonial system, based as it is on the exploiter's attitude toward both inhabitants and natural resources.¹

out of the Russian revolution. In 1916 there was a written agreement made between Russia, France, and England in regard to the exact parts of Armenia that should come under their influence and later Italy was let into the understanding with compensation along the western coast of the Turkish Empire from Adalia to north of Smyrna. Then came the revolution in Russia. Through it England and France were led to go far in the direction of the principle of annexation. Armenia may well be under the protection of a group of Powers, rather than having its different parts controlled by separate Powers. There has been among diplomats a certain hostility to collective protectorates because of the failure of that plan in Egypt. There is, however, no analogy. In Egypt there was actual detailed administration, and each of the protecting Powers sent administrators. The result was failure and the turning over of the job to England."

¹ See for instance, p. 184 and 191, also the statement of the International Socialist Congress of London in 1896, quoted in Walling, *Socialists and the War*, pp. 41-2. See however, for a Russian view, p. 240.



RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE.



This is also one of the few points on which the Pope's note is quite specific. He proposes, on the one hand, restitution of the German colonies; and, on the other, evacuation of French territory, and entire independence in every respect for Belgium.

British Colonial Views. Neither the Allies' January statement of terms nor President Wilson's reply to the Pope deal with the question. The British position on the subject seems to have been that the wishes of British colonial populations — notably of the South Africans and Australians — were of dominant importance in the matter. Of special weight, therefore, are certain statements by their spokesman, Mr. Walter Long, British Secretary of State for the Colonies. In January he said: "Let no man think that these colonies will ever return to German rule. Our Oversea Empire will not tolerate any suggestion of the kind." In August, however, after the Imperial Conference, he was "struck by the determination of the dominion representatives not to dogmatize or lay down that this or that must be done." Colonial feeling "did not originate in any desire for increased territory, but for an end of the war which would bring ultimate peace to the world and security to the British Empire."

Treatment of the Natives. The importance of the interests of the natives themselves is also emphasized in England, notably by Lord Robert Cecil in Parliament, on May 16, and by Lloyd-George in his Glasgow address, where he said:

"As to the German colonies, that is a matter which must be settled by the great International Peace Congress. Let me point out that our critics talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Germans. When you come to settle who shall be the

future trustees of these uncivilized lands you must take into account the sentiments of the people themselves.

“Whether they are anxious to secure the return of their former masters, or whether they would rather trust their destinies to other and juster and — may I confidently say? — gentler hands than those who have the governing of them up to the present time, the wishes, the desires, and the interests of the people of these countries themselves must be the dominant factor in settling their future government. That is the principle upon which we are proceeding.”

On the other hand Sir Joseph Ward, Finance Minister of New Zealand, and Mr. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, both say that the Pacific colonies can never go back to Germany, and a Melbourne dispatch of August 16 states that the Senate has passed a resolution deprecating their return.

Japan's Claims. Japan also seems determined that the German colonies shall not be returned. She apparently wished her claims with regard to them stated in the answer to President Wilson's December peace note. France and Britain are said to have asked her to defer such a statement of her claims. She did so, but with specific reservation of her rights.

An interesting suggestion was made on behalf of India by Mr. Ghokale in the political “testament” which he left on his death, the proposal, namely, that East Africa should be reserved for Indian colonization and handed over to the government of India.

How long Germany would be willing to prolong the war in order to get back her colonies, can not of

course be told; but there is a powerful school of German publicists who lay stress on the importance, not of annexations in Belgium and France, but of colonial expansion.

Statements of this point of view were made by the Colonial Secretary, Solf, on June 7, by Delbrück in a recent issue of his *Preussische Jahrbuch*, and by Emil Zimmermann in an article of July 14,¹ in the extreme Pan-German tone. A frequent suggestion is that Belgium might be traded for colonies, the Belgian Congo perhaps. One rumor had it that von Kühlmann was going to propose in his reply to the Pope that Germany should pay down a certain sum in return for colonies — her old possessions or other territories as might be arranged — this sum to be used to restore Belgium, thus saving Germany's face while in substance conceding the demand for restitution.

Super-national Views: Australian Socialists. Most encouraging of all is the evidence of a growth of a super-national way of envisaging the whole problem. The Australian Labor Socialists oppose annexation of the captured German possessions in the Pacific on anti-capitalist grounds, and suggest that they should be neutralized and placed in the hands of an international court, which would prevent their being a military menace to any one.²

Even more thoroughgoing is the proposal of the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party for the transfer of all present colonies in tropical Africa, together with the nominally independent republic of Liberia, to the proposed League of Nations, and administration of them by an impartial commission under the League's authority.³

¹ See *The New Europe*, August 9, 1917.

² See page 209.

³ See page 227.

British C. W. S. Program. The program prepared for the British Council of Workmen and Soldiers adds that non-European races in Africa must not be trained for war nor subjected to conscription or servile labor and that their government must be regarded as a public trust.¹

U. D. C. Program. The program of the British Union of Democratic Control is as follows:

"Great Britain should repudiate definitely any claim to annex German colonies by right of conquest.

"As recently as 1885, by the general act of the conference of Berlin, an assignment of sovereign rights in Africa was made by the great powers. A shifting of the political frontiers in existence before the war has become inevitable. It may be that such territorial readjustments will involve political changes under which some part of the African territory hitherto administered by Germany may be transferred.

"The principle of no annexations, however, requires a frank recognition that in the interests of a lasting peace Germany is not less entitled than other great powers to organize and develop over-sea dependencies.

"The great zone of tropical Africa should be neutralized under an international guarantee, and absolute freedom of enterprise established there.

"A less exclusive trade policy enforced throughout Africa by international arrangement would greatly facilitate the adjustment of national territorial claims.

"Under a general rearrangement of territories, the Pacific islands might be dealt with, as well as Africa."²

Not Permanent Arrangements but Elasticity. It is important to remember in connection with the

¹ See p. 220. Similar plans have been put forward by Rear Admiral Chadwick, who proposes an International Board of Colonial Control, by H. G. Wells in *The World Set Free* and elsewhere, by Walter Lippmann in *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, editorially by the *New Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford, and by various continental writers.

² P. 272-3.

settlement of the war, and especially in connection with the question of territorial adjustments, that the development of Europe and the rest of the world will not end with the treaty that settles affairs after the war. *To desire durable peace is not to desire a permanent settlement.* What is immediately desirable is such an international arrangement as shall hereafter make readjustments more easily attainable. When Sweden and Norway separated — though not without difficulty, yet peacefully — a new era was foreshadowed, as we must hope. The only adequate system is one sufficiently elastic to permit necessary changes, and to make it possible for them to occur with a reasonable degree of ease. Otherwise there must be stagnation tempered by explosions.

6.

Indemnities. Next to territorial questions comes the question of indemnities. This is in fact a far more immediate question than most of those concerning territorial adjustments, many of which will doubtless have to await settlement in a later conference.

The word indemnity is unfortunately very ambiguous. Germany forced an enormous war "indemnity" from France at the close of the Franco-Prussian war. Only recently, it would seem, has she ceased to expect to cover the costs of the present war by a similar indemnity: Reventlow and others still insist upon it.¹

A "Peace that Pays" for France. In France,

¹ Cf., in a dispatch in the *N. Y. Times* of August 26, a statement by a Munich group advocating a "German peace" and protesting that Germany must secure an indemnity to avert "a period of grinding poverty and crushing taxation."

similar ideas have not been unrepresented. The Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, reporting a new income tax on May tenth, 1917, urged that "a peace that pays" must be effected, in order to throw upon the enemy the chief burden of the war costs. Besides reintegration of Alsace-Lorraine, "which will aid us in repairing many ruins," France should know to what extent the Central Powers can pay in money the indemnities that will be required of them. In case not enough can be paid in cash, France must secure, as guarantees of the annual payments due, the Sarre mines and financial control of customs, ports, forests, railroads, mines and other German national property. (*New York Times*, May 11, 1917.)

Payment for Injuries and Levies: But the only sort of indemnities which now come seriously into consideration are indemnities in quite a different sense, claims for payment for damage deliberately inflicted, and the still more unquestionable claims for repayment of financial levies and fines, forced, under military compulsion, from occupied cities and villages.

What Does "No Indemnities" Mean? The Russian formula of "no indemnities," and the papal formula of "entire and reciprocal condonation" (better translated "remission"), have both been modified by interpretation. The Pope expressly makes an exception of Belgium; the Russian word "*contribucia*" should perhaps rather be translated tribute or war levy. In this country it has commonly been given the form, as by the People's Council, of "no punitive indemnities."

President Wilson's View. President Wilson has said, in his reply to Russia: "No indemnities must

be insisted upon except those which constitute payment for manifest wrongs done;" and again in his reply to the Pope, "We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people — rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and those that are strong." At the same time he disavowed any "punitive damages."

Constructive plans. Various constructive proposals have been put forward, both by Socialist bodies¹ and by various private persons, looking toward international coöperation in the work of reconstruction. Some would make this a matter of mutual obligation, apportioned either on the basis of responsibility for damage done, or in proportion to economic capacity to contribute. Others would make it purely a matter of sympathy and voluntary assistance.

Mr. Cyrus Sulzberger, in a widely circulated proposal, also printed in the New York *Evening Post* for August 15, suggests that America make a free will offer to meet the need for compensation with a gift of ten billion dollars to be spent as decided by the peace conference.

The Australian Labor Socialists have made the original suggestion: "That prior to the disbandment of the combatant armies and navies they shall be utilized under international control for the restoration of the devastated territories, at the expense of the invaders, and not subject to military supervision."

In case the settlement should come to hang on the question of indemnities, a very real difficulty would

¹ Cf. pp. 173, 197, 209, 223, 273.

be presented by the widespread feeling in the Allied countries that any concession in regard to indemnities (and indemnities of a punitive character) is equivalent to compounding a felony. Like Belgian independence, it is made the symbol of justice, and is lifted out of the realm of practical politics to the moral realm where compromise is impossible. It is easy to forget the difference between abstract justice and an award made in the heat of conflict by one party in its own favor; ¹ it is easy to forget that the powerful and privileged determine policies and the poor and weak bear the heaviest burden of taxes to pay for their deeds.

7.

The "War After the War." Beyond the war itself has loomed the hideous shadow of a trade war after the war. Reference has been made to the Paris Economic Conference of April, 1916.² Many of the matters discussed at this meeting were of a merely technical or even of a constructive nature; but others, and those that the Conference has come to stand for, looked toward trade discrimination against the Central Powers after the war.³

Similarly the British Imperial War Conference of May, 1917, laid plans for a close economic union of that vast congeries of countries, resolving in fa-

¹ A Canadian author suggests the formula: "no punitive indemnities unless imposed by an international tribunal and paid, not to a single government, but into an international fund, to be administered by an international commission for the rehabilitation of devastated areas."

² See p. 18.

³ For the resolutions of the Conference, see *European Economic Alliances* published by the National Foreign Trade Council, India House, Hanover Square, N. Y. C.

vor of "making the empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries."

"*Mittel-Europa.*" On the side of the Central Powers similar conferences have been held, and the threat of the creation of a closed commercial system holding the core of the continent and stretching across the Dardanelles into the Near East — the "Mittel-Europa" plan of the Pan Germanists — has caused grave alarm.

On both sides the commercial weapon — submarine against blockade — and the fear of commercial injury after the war, have played an ever increasing part.

Economic Conditions After the War. But with the unprecedented scale of wastage, both by direct destruction and by diversion of labor and materials, the problem has altered in a way that has only gradually come to be widely realized. The crucial point after the war will be not to find a market for products but to get a chance as a purchaser at the inadequate supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. In case the Allies cold-shouldered Germany out of the territories that they control, not even a Mittel-Europa organized beyond her wildest dreams could compensate her. With the entry of the United States and more lately China into the war, and with the growing unfriendliness in South America, the seriousness of this menace to Germany is enormously increased.

"After three years of warfare and at least two years of strict blockade, the stock of raw materials at the disposal of the Central Powers has, by universal admission, run very low. Germany's first and most pressing need after the war, more pressing even than the importation of foodstuffs, is

seen to be the replenishing of those stocks, for without them she cannot 'reconstruct' her industries on a peace basis, or even revive the fertility of her exhausted soil. Moreover, without employment available for her industrial workers, she dare not demobilize her armies; for widespread 'unemployment,' after the pressure of the war has been withdrawn and the means for curbing public discussion can no longer be used with effect, would, as Dr. Dernburg has recently declared, lead to 'fatal misunderstandings.' 'Misunderstandings,' in war-time, can be ignored, or at least, suppressed. But when the soldiers come home, revolution may come with them.

"The Allies, in fact, controlling, as they do, so large a proportion of the natural resources of the world, have their finger on Germany's windpipe" . . . this "explains what the Chancellor means by the curious expression, 'economic blockade,' i.e., a blockade not maintained by naval force, but operating in time of peace. He is afraid of Germany finding herself in a position in which there is no physical obstacle to the import of supplies, but in which the supplies themselves are simply not purchasable in sufficient quantity, owing to their having been diverted elsewhere to meet the needs of the Allied and neutral governments and their peoples. For, as the Chancellor knows well, having served in the German Food-Controller's office, Germans are not the only people who will be famished for supplies after the war; and it is not likely, unless arrangements are specifically made to that end in the peace-treaty, that the Allies will allow Germany a share in any supplies which they control prior to satisfying the just claims of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, and the other peoples who have suffered and starved at Germany's hands." (*The New Europe*, August 9, 1917, pp. 100-101.) See also, *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 353-359.

Germany's situation. According to this interpretation, the great factor making Germany seek — as Dernburg urged upon a recent Conference of the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Economic Associations at Budapest — a "peace by agreement, free

from anger or menace," is this need to be admitted to get her share of supplies when the blockade ceases. The article in *The New Europe*, quoted above, concludes:

"The process of restocking and revictualing the belligerent and neutral countries is essentially one for coöperative rather than for competitive action. How Germany will be affected by it and what share she will have in its proceedings depends, not, as the Chancellor thinks, on how many square miles of conquered territory she will be willing to evacuate, but on the kind of Germany that confronts the Allies at the making of peace."

This is the position taken by President Wilson in his answer to the Pope — peace depends on the kind of Germany that seeks it. In his Senate address he laid down the general principle that "the free constant unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and development." And in his reply to the Papal Note he said that the American people believe that peace "should rest upon the rights of peoples . . . to a participation on fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world — the German people of course included, if they will accept equality and not seek domination." President Wilson states what Germany may expect if she ceases to make herself felt as a menace, and the Allies what in the contrary case she has to fear.

The Choice Before the World. It is becoming constantly clearer that the world of international commerce after the war, will, like everything else, have been metamorphosed. Apparently there will be, either an organized and very ugly rivalry of great trade alliances in cut-throat competition, or a

world-system of distribution constantly becoming more organic.

8.

How Make Peace. An attempt has been made to analyze the contrasting points of view of different groups, and to define the issues as they appear to be shaping themselves.

There remains a third question of very great importance, namely, the method of making peace.

The New Diplomacy. There is a rising demand that secret diplomacy shall come to an end. Acquaintance with the history of the fateful "twelve days," the revelations and suspicions of all sorts of backstair dealings controlling vast issues, the growing interest in and understanding of foreign affairs, the sharpened sense of diverging points of view as to what should be the objects sought in foreign policies — all contribute to swell the demand.

It finds especially forceful expression in Socialist criticisms. The Italian Socialists (see page 203) propose that foreign affairs should be taken out of the hands of the Executive and placed exclusively under parliamentary control. They hope in this way to put an end to secret agreements and diplomatic intrigue, together with the coercion now exercised on Parliament by diplomats who are enabled to act first and then seek ratification for the necessary consequences of their acts. Publicity will, they believe, "restore elementary honesty in international relations" and make it impossible for an "inspired press to corrupt popular opinion to the advantage of the great parasitical industrial and commercial interests."

Of especial significance is the demand that elected representatives of the people, men and women,



Photo by Paul Thompson

LORD ROBERT CECIL
British Minister of Blockade





should replace diplomats, or at the least sit with them, in the peace conference.

The preliminary step to be taken previous to the meeting of any peace conference between belligerents — whether that come soon, or many months or even years hence — is a conference between the partners themselves to work out their common problems.

Understandings between them already exist, of course, though except for occasional leakages their terms do not reach the public. Just what has been promised Italy or Roumania or Japan, Turkey or Bulgaria, and on what contingencies, is not known. We only know that by the Pact of London the Allies have bound themselves absolutely and publicly not to make peace separately.¹

As a result of Russia's demand upon the Allies that they reconsider these arrangements, it was agreed that they should hold a conference to consider war-aims with a view to a possible restatement.

Norman Angell's Proposal for an Inter-Allied Conference. For such a conference Mr. Norman Angell, in the *New Republic* for August 11, 1917, made most original and interesting suggestions.

He proposed that it should have for its object:

“To frame the international arrangements for mutual protection by which after the war the nations of the Alliance — and ultimately those of the world — are to be assured military security, national independence, and economic rights (access to raw materials and markets, equality of opportunity in undeveloped territory like Africa, Asia and South America, access to the sea for states that have insufficient, or no, ports, etc.), some plan for a League of Nations,

¹ Fear was felt in the United States, when our country entered the war, that we should assume the same obligation; but this evidently was not done.

such as that forecast by Mr. Wilson and approved by the other leading Allied statesmen."

As to its composition, he proposed that it "consist of two bodies, a smaller one composed, as in international Congresses of the past, of the delegates or nominees of the governments participating, and a larger body representing proportionately the component parties of the respective parliaments."

"The smaller body should act as the initiating and drafting committees, their proposals being subject to amendment, approval or rejection by the larger body before being finally ratified by the constituent states of the Congress."

But precedent even to an Inter-Allied Conference is the need for some "preparedness" on the part of each individual nation, some clear working out of its purposes. This work is now being organized, for the United States, by Colonel House.¹

Representation of all Groups. Mr. Angell's plan does not stop with the conference of Allies. The second part of his proposal is that this conference of the partners on one side be taken as the model for the inter-belligerent peace conference itself. As he points out, this plan "would make German Socialists and Liberals, not governmental delegates and Prussians, the predominant element of German representation at the peace settlement. And of course

¹ David Lawrence, in the *New York Evening Post*, September 11, 1917, writes: "There must be preparation for the many questions that will come up at the peace conference. America must thresh out for herself, for example, how far she is willing to go in a league to enforce peace, to what extent she is ready to disarm, and what her own . . . economic relations with Europe are to be after the war. . . . Preparedness for a peace which shall safeguard American interests, in accord with the tradition and desires of the American people, is no task to be suddenly begun when the moment for peace negotiations arises."

we should have enlisted German democratic support of the plan. We should, by this fact, have democratized Germany in her international relations. And it is those relations, of course, with which we are concerned.

"The principle would also, in the same way, give to Austrian representation not purely a governmental or Hapsburg character, but would ensure a fair representation of the subject nationalities of the Central Empires. The publicity given to their case would be a powerful plea in their fight for autonomy."

Moreover, as he points out, a body so composed would not be so hopelessly nationalistic in its cleavages, it would be a far better representative of the true interests involved. As he says:

"In a conference composed of delegates nominated by governments, each delegate is in the position of a lawyer representing his client. He will be sensitive to home criticism of a 'nationalist' kind, particularly if he is looking to a successful future in the political life of his country. But, under the system suggested, the chief responsibility for the character of terms finally agreed to by the conference would lie with the larger body. He would therefore feel covered, and take freer hand for a liberal give-and-take settlement. A body composed of 'British,' 'American,' 'French,' 'Italian' delegates would be a body which necessarily divided on the questions at issue on lines of national division. On such questions as Sea Law, the Open Door, Access to Raw Materials, Economic Rights of Way, Territorial Divisions, the British delegate would necessarily stand for 'British' conceptions as opposed to American or Italian, as the case might be. But a

body in which British conservatives would be advocating a solution opposed to that advocated by British radicals or socialists, but in agreement with that supported by French or American conservatives, and opposed by French or American radicals and socialists, would be a body in which the sharpness and rigidity of national divisions would be lessened and in which rival principles of settlement rather than rival national interests would be the predominant issue."

Such a body would be, Mr. Angell admits, cumbersome and slow moving. But "at the close of the war, a long period of 'provisional settlement' which can be modified, would probably be a good thing."

Giving the nations time to allow their angers and resentments to cool, and keeping arrangements from becoming fixed too early or too rigidly, would tend to make the settlement fairer and more stable.

President Eliot's Proposal. President Eliot has come forward with a different suggestion in a plan brought out in the *New York Times*, August 27, 1917, and further elaborated in that of October 7 (see p. 292).

The thing to be done, to his mind, is to secure "a frank and sincere conference of the belligerent nations without an armistice," a conference to confer, not a conference to decide, and purely preliminary.

His plan in fuller outline is: "to bring appointed conferees from all the belligerent nations into one room for the oral discussion of subjects previously agreed upon, the conferees being selected by the several Governments, but receiving no instructions either before or during the conference from the appointing powers, and having no power of

commission except to make a brief public report of their conclusions. The function of the several Governments would be limited to the appointment of the conferees and the granting of the necessary safe conducts. In order to keep the size of the conference moderate, each small State might be restricted to two conferees and each large State to four."

After giving a program of possible subjects of discussion, President Eliot concludes "it would certainly facilitate the proceedings of an international conference in the interest of durable international peace, if it could be understood beforehand that all the participating nations had come to the conclusion that war on the modern scale and with the new implements of destruction is not an available means, in the present state of the civilized world, of settling international disputes or of extending national influence and power."

These proposals, as to steps in working out the settlement are then:

- (1) On the part of each country to define her ideas of the world-order that she wants to help bring into being;
- (2) On the part of the Allies to clarify and organize the purposes of the Allies and America in further joint conferences, organized as suggested by Mr. Angell or otherwise;
- (3) To bring representatives of the belligerents into face-to-face conference, without power and without armistice as proposed by Dr. Eliot.

Unless such a joint conference included representatives of all groups, as suggested by Mr. Angell, there would doubtless be a determined effort on the part of those with the radical working-class point of view to bring together a conference at Stockholm or elsewhere in the interests of internationalism as they understand it.



PART TWO
DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES



I

SOCIALIST AND LABOR DOCUMENTS AND PEACE PROGRAMS

APPEAL TO THE SOCIALISTS OF THE WORLD ISSUED BY THE RUSSIAN COUNCIL OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DELE- GATES, MAY 15, 1917

[This appeal was issued two months after the abdication of the Czar. On May 1, the Russian Government had notified the Allied governments of Russia's renunciation of imperialistic aims. On May 9, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates voted to appeal to the peoples of the world to call a peace conference. This appeal accordingly followed.]

"The revolutionary democracy of Russia does not desire a separate peace which would loose the hands of the Austro-German alliance. It is well aware that such a peace would be a betrayal of the cause of democracy and of labor in all countries. This cause would by such an action be paralyzed in the face of a triumphant imperialism. It knows that such a peace may lead to the ruin of other countries and the triumph of the ideals of Chauvinism and revenge in Europe, which would leave the Continent in a state where it would inevitably prepare in the near future for a fresh and sanguinary collision.

"The Russian revolutionary democracy addresses itself in the first place to you, Socialists of the allied countries. You must not allow the voice of the Russian Provisional

Government to remain isolated from the union of the allied powers. You must force your Governments to proclaim resolutely the platform of peace without annexations or indemnities and the right of the people to settle their destinies.

"You will thus afford our revolutionary army, which desires peace between the peoples, the assurance that its bloody sacrifices will not be utilized in an evil manner. You will give it strength to carry out with all its revolutionary enthusiasm the military operations which fall to its lot. You will fortify its mind in the belief that in defending the liberty conquered by the revolution the army also is struggling in the interests of an international democracy.

"You will force the Governments of enemy countries to renounce forever their policy of usurpation, pillage, and violence, and openly to recognize their crimes, thus calling upon their heads the just anger of their peoples."

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[The above extract from the appeal is quoted from the *New York Times* of May 16. The following passage, addressed to the Socialists of Austria and Hungary, is from the *London Times* of the same date.]

"The democracy of Revolutionary Russia appeals to you, Socialists of Austria and Germany. You cannot allow the troops of your Governments to be the executioners of Russian liberty. You cannot allow your Governments, taking advantage of the joy evoked in the Russian Army by liberty and fraternity, to hurl your troops on the Western front, in the first place in order to crush France, then to dash on Russia, and finally to crush you, as well as the international proletariat, in the grip of Imperialism. The democracy of Revolutionary Russia appeals to the Socialists of neutral and belligerent countries not to allow the triumph of Imperialism. May the cause of peace proclaimed by the Russian Revolution be brought to a happy conclusion by the efforts of the international proletariat.

"So as to unite these efforts, the Council of Workmen's
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and Soldiers' Delegates in Petrograd has decided to take the initiative in convoking an international conference of all Socialist parties and groups in all countries. Whatever may have been the dissensions which have rent Socialism during the three years of the war, no section of the proletariat ought to renounce participation in the common struggle for peace begun by the Russian Revolution. We are convinced that we shall see representatives of all Socialist groups at the conference which we are convoking. The unanimous decision of the international proletariat will be the first victory of the workers over the international Imperialists.

“ ‘ Proletariat of all countries, unite! ’ ”

PETROGRAD APPEAL TO SOCIALISTS AND LABOR UNIONS OF THE WORLD

[The initiative in the plan for a peace conference was taken by the Petrograd Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. The following account of the action of the Petrograd Socialists is taken from the *London Times* of June 6.]

"On March 28 the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates published an appeal 'to the peoples of the world' in which it called the peoples of Europe to united and resolute action in favor of peace. The Council, in full accord with the whole of democracy, inscribed on its banner 'peace without annexations and without indemnities on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destinies.'

"The Russian democracy forced the first Provisional Government to accept its program, and, as the events of May 3 and 4 clearly showed, it did not tolerate any departure on the part of the Provisional Government from that program.

"The second Provisional Government, under pressure by the Council, put forward the same program as the foremost article of its Declaration. On May 9 the Executive Committee of the Council decided to take the initiative in summoning an international conference, and on May 15 the Council directed an appeal to the Socialists of all countries, calling them to the common struggle for peace.

"The Council is of opinion that a speedy termination of the war and restoration of international peace on the basis required by the general interests of labor as well as of mankind can only be achieved if the Socialist and Labor parties

and the trade unions of all countries, belligerent and neutral, will unite their efforts in a stubborn and energetic fight against this universal slaughter.

"The first important step in that direction is the summoning of an international conference, whose main object should be to arrive at an agreement between the representatives of the Socialist proletariat in regard to a termination of the ['party' 'truce'] with the imperialistic Governments and classes which render nugatory a real struggle for peace, as well as to find out ways and means to carry this endeavor into practical effect. An international agreement upon such a policy is the main preliminary condition for placing the struggle for peace on a broad international footing. This road is indicated to the proletariat by all its international treaties. At the same time the summoning of a conference is strongly dictated by the most vital interests of the proletariat and all peoples.

"All parties and organizations representing the working classes which share these views and opinions, and are prepared to unite their efforts to carry them into operation, are cordially invited by the Council to take part in the proposed conference. *The Council begs to express its conviction that the parties and organizations which accept this invitation will by so doing so accept the obligation to carry out unflinchingly all the decisions adopted by the conference.*

"The conference will be opened at Stockholm on a day between June 28 and July 8."

[A German translation of this call appeared in *Vorwärts* of June 5. As reproduced in the *Holland News*, June 20, the text (in German) is not quite so full as the above, the passage italicized being omitted.]

QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE DUTCH-SCANDI- NAVIAN SOCIALIST COMMITTEE

*Submitted to the Delegates of the National Sections of the
International, at Stockholm, May, 1917*

[The first attempted conference at Stockholm was called by the International Socialist Bureau. No regular assembly was held, but a series of "conversations" began May 13. In order to elicit the specific views of the different national Socialist groups, the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee, under the leadership of Branting, of Sweden, issued the following questionnaire.]

I. Terms of Peace

1. General principles of peace:
Right of peoples freely to dispose of themselves:
Autonomy of nationalities:
Annexations:
War Indemnities:
Restoration.
2. Application of these principles to concrete cases:
 1. Belgium, Serbia, other Balkan countries, Poland, Finland, Alsace-Lorraine, North Schleswig, Armenia:
 2. Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Czechs (Bohemians), Jews:
 3. Colonies.

II. Elementary Principles of International Relations

1. International Law (Völkerrecht); international law (international Ordnung), international boards of arbitration, obligatory delay for investigation in case of con-
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flirt, other means for the maintenance of peace, sanctions, means of compulsion.

2. Disarmament and freedom of the seas.
3. Means of satisfying justifiable needs of economic expansion without extension of territory (internationalization of international commercial routes, straits, canals, chief railroads, etc.).
4. Abolition of secret diplomacy.

III. Practical Realization of These Aims

1. How far should these questions be handled at the peace conference?
2. Shall committees be appointed to make preparatory studies for the solution of certain questions?

IV. Action of the International and of Democracy

1. Coöperation of Neutrals for peace;
2. Direct coöperation of parliaments;
3. Coöperation of Socialist Parties;
4. Measures to be taken through the International and during the preparation of the business and during the session of the official peace conferences, to bring continuous influence to bear.

V. General Socialist Conference

1. Readiness to take part in a general conference. (1) Unconditionally? (2) If not, on what conditions?
2. Report on the position of the Socialist party during the war; the question of responsibility.
3. Majority and minority.

[Translated from the *Holland News, Review of the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad*, June 20, 1917. 24 Raamweg, the Hague.]

MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN MAJORITY SOCIALISTS

[This reply to the questionnaire issued by the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee is one of the significant statements of peace-views elicited by the Stockholm conversations. It should be compared with the Minority statement which follows next in order.]

I

The German Socialist Democracy aspires to a peace based upon mutual understanding and demands guarantees for the freedom of political, economical and cultural development of its own nation. It also disapproves all violence against the vital interests of other peoples. Only such a peace can bring with it guarantees of durability. It alone will allow the nations to triumph over an atmosphere of hostility and to place all their strength in the service of social betterment and the progress of civilization.

Starting out from this general viewpoint we have given our assent to the project of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council of Petrograd in view of a peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of the right of peoples freely to dispose of themselves. Consequently our attitude toward the particular points of the questionnaire is as follows:

I. ANNEXATIONS

We are opposed to annexations of territory by force. As far as the modification of frontiers on the basis of a mutual understanding is concerned, the people interested, when they desire to remain in their old government,



Photo by Paul Thompson

PHILIP SCHEIDEMANN

Vice-President of the Reichstag and Leader of the
Majority Socialists

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must be assured regarding all judicial and economic possibilities connected with changing their residence. It is understood the rejection of all forced annexations also covers the restitution of invaded colonies.

II. WAR INDEMNITIES

The imposition of war indemnities has been rejected. It could not be realized otherwise than by totally crushing one of the belligerents. But each day of continued struggle increases so much the sum of sacrifices in wealth and blood for both sides that, merely for that motive, it would be inadmissible to retard peace for the sake of obtaining indemnities. Otherwise, the economic oppression of one nation by another would make a durable peace impossible.

III. RESTORATIONS

In so far as this question applies to political restoration, — that is, to the reestablishment of national independence — our answer is in the affirmative. On the contrary, we reject the idea of one-sided obligations to repair damages in territories affected by the war. These damages have resulted on all fronts from acts of hostile as well as friendly troops advancing or in retreat. Sometimes they were the immediate results of gun-fire, at other times they were measures taken for military safety.

It appears to us extremely difficult to determine the origin of each damage case and to examine military justification. An obligation binding on one side only to repair damages would be nothing less than a disguised form of war indemnity.

For states ruined by the war, which would be unable to reestablish by themselves their economic life, international financial assistance could be provided on the basis of mutual understanding.

Besides, we Socialists consider the destruction of private property only the least part of the damages produced. The greatest losses affecting humanity — the destruction of human

life — can be repaired by no amount of effort and future human happiness.

IV. THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO DISPOSE OF THEMSELVES

By the right of peoples to maintain or to modify their conditions, we mean political independence.

The first states to be considered are those which, like Belgium, Serbia and other Balkan states, have lost their independence in this war. We are in favor of the re-establishment of an independent Belgium. Belgium ought not to be a vassal state of Germany, of England or of France.

As regards Serbia and the Balkan states, we refer the matter to what has been said by our Austrian comrades.

A second group, in reference to which the question of the right of nations to dispose of themselves comes up, is formed by peoples who lost their independence long ago, but who consider themselves freed from foreign domination by the events of the war. This applies to Poland of the times of the Congress of Vienna, and to Finland. They cannot be denied the right to dispose of themselves.

Other allogeneous territories, in so far as there is no question of the independence of a state, ought to have guaranteed to them at least autonomy sufficient to cover the development of their own national life.

A third group is composed of peoples, formerly independent, of a higher civilization, which became the prey of imperialistic domination, but the political rights of which have undergone no changes during the present war. To this group belong Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thibet, Corea and other countries, which once were independent states.

The German Socialist Democracy feels the greatest sympathy with the efforts of all these peoples to recover

their national liberty, and would be pleased if the Socialists in the states which dominate those countries would raise their voices so that the oppressed nations might be freed from the yoke of foreign domination.

V. AUTONOMY OF NATIONALITIES

In regard to cultural autonomy of portions of populations speaking other languages than that of the larger state into which they were incorporated, the German Socialist Democracy, in accordance with the attitude it has hitherto held, insists on the greatest extension of that autonomy in the future.

The German Empire will have to consider the demands of our Danish, Polish and French fellow citizens in Schleswig on the north, in Poland and Eastern Prussia, as well as in Alsace-Lorraine.

We most rigorously condemn every attack made against the use of the mother tongue and all hindrances to the exercise of what constitutes the character and the particular national civilization of those nations.

The portions of allogeneous nations bordering on the territories of a state ought not to form obstacles to friendly relations, but rather serve as bridges for a mutual understanding between one people and another, one civilization and another. The introduction of truly democratic conceptions in all countries would make possible the realization of this aim.

Regarding the situation of the different nationalities in Austria-Hungary, we refer their case to the statements made by our Austrian comrades.

VI. ALSACE-LORRAINE

In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, which was counted in the questionnaire among the "nationalities," it must be said first of all that Alsace-Lorraine has never been an independent national state and that, besides, it could not be considered a particular nationality. According to its ethnographic

nature, that is, according to its race and language, the population of Alsace-Lorraine is nearly nine-tenths German. French as a mother tongue is spoken by no more than 11.4 per cent. of the population.

Besides, Alsace-Lorraine is not a territory which has changed hands during the war; it has remained, all except a very narrow band near the frontiers, under the dominion of the German state. It would be impossible, then, from this point of view to open the question of annexing Alsace-Lorraine to this or that state.

The territories of Alsace-Lorraine, which originally, both politically and ethnographically, belonged to Germany, had been wrested by France from the German Empire together with other territories. By the peace of Frankfurt, in 1871, they resumed their original status. Consequently, it is almost unjustified to speak of a historical right of France to these territories. To force the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine would amount to nothing less than the annexation on the part of France, an annexation of territory where a foreign language is spoken. The Socialist Democracy demands for Alsace-Lorraine the guarantee of a complete equality of rights as a confederate independent state in the German Empire and a free democratic constitution providing for its legislation and interior administration. The German Socialist Democracy made that statement at the Congress of Jena, in 1913, in a resolution presented by comrades from Alsace-Lorraine. This settlement of the question, granting to Alsace-Lorraine equality of rights in the confederation and extensive interior autonomy, was in accord with the views of our comrades of the French Socialist party before the war. Besides, it answers the wish expressed on several occasions and even recently manifested by the national representatives of Alsace-Lorraine, who are elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

The principle of peace without annexations, naturally, does not exclude friendly agreements on the question of modifying frontiers.

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Taking into account the vital legitimate interests of all peoples, the right of each people to political independence and to freedom of economic development cannot be permanently guaranteed unless the future treaty of peace contains a general outline of the rights of men. The work of years of peace will be required to build up, internationally, on common principles, political law, labor law, civil law and commercial law, aiming to create among the peoples a community of judicial and economic civilization.

I. PROVISION FOR THE RIGHTS OF MEN

The aim for a world peace guaranteed by judicial international institutions is considered the highest moral obligation according to the principles formulated on August 16, 1915, by the national council and a fraction of the German Socialist party.

In accordance with the resolutions of the international Socialists congress at Copenhagen, we particularly demand in the treaty of peace:

(a) The recognition of an international court of arbitration, to which all disputes between states shall be submitted;

(b) A superior judicial organization for each state, to be created for the prevention of the violation of contracts established by human law.

II. DISARMAMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

In the treaties of peace mention will have to be made of arrangements for the limitation of armaments on land and sea. The aim of these arrangements ought to be to create a popular armed force for the defense of territories against warlike aggressions and strong oppression. The period of service in each of these categories of armies ought to be reduced to a minimum.

The legitimate means of carrying on war ought to be

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limited by contract. The ammunition industry ought to be nationalized. The supplying of arms and munitions by neutral nations to belligerents ought to be forbidden internationally. The right of capture on the sea ought to be suppressed. The arming of commercial vessels ought to be forbidden. All straits which are important for world relations and all interoceanic canals ought to be under international control.

Efficacious guarantees must be made for the safety of world commerce during war. The nature of contraband ought to be internationally defined. All clothing and food materials ought to be banished from the lists of war contraband. Private property ought to be protected against the encroachments of belligerents. Postal relations between belligerents and neutrals, and between neutrals likewise ought to be guaranteed in times of war. The matter of blockade ought to be defined anew.

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS

In order that the fraternizing of peoples may not be hindered, it will be necessary in the treaties of peace to include clauses guaranteeing against a continued war in the form of an economic war.

The freedom of communication by land and sea ought to be reestablished in the treaties of peace.

The system of protective laws ought to be entirely done away with. The aim of all commercial politics ought to be based on the suppression of customs duties and commercial barriers.

In the colonies, the "open door" system, that is, the right of all peoples to economic activity, ought to be established.

The freedom of international circulation, the right of coalition, the protection of labor, workmen's insurance, the protection of working women and children and home work ought to be regulated according to the well-known program of the International Federation of Syndicates.

IV. THE SUPPRESSION OF SECRET DIPLOMACY

We demand that all treaties between states and all international agreements be submitted to the democratic control of national representatives.

3

THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF THESE AIMS

Commissions for the study of various problems would furnish valuable explanations in regard to national and economic questions. *The main problem, however, for international socialism is to bring about peace as soon as possible.* And peace, we are convinced, can be obtained by mutual agreement on the basis of "No annexations and no indemnities," even before the commissions begin their work.

4

THE ACTIVITY OF THE INTERNATIONALE

Neutral countries have been, without exception, more or less interested in the war. All have an interest in an early peace. Consequently, it is necessary to summon them to regulate economic, social and judicial questions of an international character.

The other questions concerning the collaboration of the Internationale during peace negotiations have already received a sufficient reply.

As far as the Socialist parties in belligerent countries are concerned, their influence on the governments, national representatives and official peace conference ought to become stronger every day.

5

ACTIVITIES OF SOCIALIST PARTIES FOR PEACE

We are coming now to the question of motives which led the German delegation to ask, on the 7th of June, that

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a report of each delegation of the work of its party, in view of a permanent peace, be added to the questionnaire.

The bureau of the Social Democratic party in Germany issued two pamphlets containing a collection of statements, manifestos and discourses delivered in the Reichstag, in which the attitude of the party in regard to war and war aims is explained.

In this collection of documents proof is furnished that the German Social Democratic party has worked from the first day of the war for an early peace, and that it knows no other conditions for a peace agreement than the fact that the adversaries are equally ready for such a peace.

But the German Social Democratic party is not satisfied, in its work for peace, with mere parliamentary discourses, manifestos and statements cited in the above-mentioned collection. It has held meetings for peace in all parts of the empire and obtained signatures to petitions in which the government was asked to declare its readiness for peace under the condition of renouncing all plans of conquest.

This work for peace has had a great measure of success. Unfortunately, the endeavors of the Social Democratic party of Germany to renew the ties of friendship with the Socialist parties in Germany and France have remained unsuccessful.

The work for peace can bring no favorable results unless it be undertaken simultaneously on both sides. This, we believe, could have been done and should have been done long ago, without necessitating either party's having to ask for something resembling the abandonment of the national cause.

We declare to all nations that we have no other obligation than that of defending our own nation and no mission to punish other peoples for the imaginary or real crimes of their governments. It is in this sense that the German Social Democratic party has not ceased to work.

GENERAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

We are ready to participate without reserve in a general Socialist conference for peace, because we believe the first duty of all Socialists is to act for peace. An explanation of the attitude of all Socialist parties would be simplified if all of them would prepare a collection of documents regarding their activities in favor of peace.

In regard to the explanation of responsibilities, from which we cannot escape, we believe such a statement would not facilitate the attainment of the aim of the conference. There is no need of discussing the past; what we ought to do is to come to an understanding in reference to the future, namely, in reference to the realization of a permanent peace in accordance with our principles and our ideals.

We have no objection to the participation of all minority Socialists at the general conference.

[From the *New York Tribune*, Aug. 12, 1917.]

MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN MINORITY SOCIALISTS

[In reply to the questionnaire of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. This memorandum was not allowed to circulate in Germany.]

In its peace views, as in its general policy, the German Independent Social Democratic party proceeds from the common interests of the international proletariat and the development of society. These interests demand immediate peace.

In the peace to be concluded we demand an international arrangement for general disarmament, as being the chief means of strengthening the debilitated states. General disarmament is the only way to break any militarist supremacy and to secure a lasting and peaceful understanding between the nations.

We demand the fullest freedom for international trade and intercourse, as well as an unlimited right of migration. We condemn any economic barriers or any economic struggle between states.

All disputes between states must be settled by compulsory international arbitration.

We demand international treaties to secure the workers against impoverishment, especially in regard to women and children.

Political rights for women we regard as a social necessity.

Equal rights should be granted for all the inhabitants of any country without regard to tongue, race or religion. This would also mean the securing to national minorities the right to develop their national life.



Photo by Press Illustrating Service

KARL LIEBKNECHT
Prior to his imprisonment

APR 19 1934

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National and social liberation cannot be achieved by the governments at war. It can only be done by democracy.

Democratic control of foreign policy will prevent aggressive measures. Secret treaties must be abolished, and all state treaties must be made dependent upon the assent of the parliaments.

Though not regarding state boundaries as inviolable, we condemn the war and its prolongation as a means of regulating boundaries. Regulation of frontiers must be conditional upon the assent of the populations concerned, and not an act of force.

With all firmness we object to the violation in any form of any nation.

From the beginning of the war we have consistently demanded peace without annexations or indemnities, based upon national self-government.

It is not our affair to draw up a program covering all the questions to be dealt with in the peace settlement, but in regard to the questions raised in the discussions now going on we declare the following:

The reestablishment of Serbia as a self-governing, independent state is our absolute demand.

The uniting of all Serbs in a single national state and its combination with the other Balkan States in a Republican Balkan Federation we regard as the best way of removing the Eastern question as a cause of war.

We understand the deep feeling of the Poles for national unity. To admit the right of Russian Poland to national independence but to deny that same right to Prussian and Austrian Poland is contradictory.

Just as with Serbia and Poland, so do we condemn the prolongation of the war as a means of settling the question of Alsace-Lorraine. The population of Alsace-Lorraine, which in 1871 was annexed against its will, will not obtain peace any earlier than it will itself obtain the opportunity through a direct and free vote to express its wish as to the state to which it shall belong. The German people would obtain by this mode of settlement an economic,

political, and moral gain that would be greater than any possible loss, even if the voting gave another result than it had anticipated.

The full independence and economic self-dependence (i.e., freedom from economic interference) of Belgium is inevitable. In fulfillment of the German government's promise at the beginning of the war, the Belgian nation has to be compensated for the damage caused by the war, and especially for the economic values that have been taken away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with the various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we therefore reject.

As opponents of any policy of conquest and foreign dominion, we reject, as we have always done, a policy of colonial conquest. The possession of any colony without its own self-administration is nothing else than the possession of an unfree people and, just as slavery, is incompatible with our principles.

Neither by the acquirement of colonies nor by a change of possessor is the population's right to self-determination respected. The possession of colonies, too, is not necessary for industrial development.

Only if the Internationale is erected, independent and powerful; if the proletariat everywhere lend it its full force through keeping control over governments and maintaining peace — only then will there come in the future a state of mutual confidence between the nations instead of an armaments contest.

The proletariat in every country must now do its all to bring the war to an end. To attain this aim the independence of the Socialist parties in relation to their imperial governments must be presupposed.

The drawing up of a common peace program is important, but this program has no worth if it is not supported by the energetic international action of the masses. Every government must be challenged to give its unconditional adhesion to the international peace program.

Credits are to be refused to any government that refuses this program or answers evasively or does not declare itself ready to enter upon peace conversations on the basis of this program. Such government must be fought in the sharpest manner.

To undertake and further such common peace action must be the first object of the planned International Peace Conference. A proletariat organization that will not join in this action would thereby forfeit the right henceforth to be regarded as an organization of international socialism.

[From the New York *Tribune*, Aug. 12, 1917.]

STATEMENT OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN SOCIALIST DELEGATES

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee Statement.]

In the opinion of the Austrian delegation imperialism is the universal cause of war, but national questions (questions of nationality) have frequently served as pretexts. Almost everywhere in central, western and south-eastern Europe the settlement of nations¹ is so intermingled that a delimitation of territories would be impossible and constitute a renewed occasion of wars. Even where the separation of nations was possible it would mean such small states (*Kleinstaaterei*) that the political and economic rise of these nations would be endangered. To break up already existing large political and economic units would profit only the bourgeoisie of the larger states who could easily play off the many small states against one another and dominate them. Therefore the Delegation accepts national autonomy on the basis of the Basle manifesto and is of the opinion that the attainment of this freedom must be the work of these nations themselves. In especial the Delegates declare

- (1) that they favor peace without annexations,
- (2) that they regard all bourgeois governments and controlling bourgeoisies as alike responsible for the war; and for this reason too they are for a speedy peace without indemnity. From this it follows that an answer to the question of responsibility for

¹ The word *nations* is used throughout, though what are commonly called *nationalities* are generally meant.

the war must be waived. As regards particular national questions the delegates have declared themselves against the annexation of Belgium, and for the political independence of the Serbian people as well as for a free access for Serbia to the sea by means of union with Montenegro. The Balkan states can arrange their political relations with one another by mutual agreement and themselves realize the old demand "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples" by a federation (Bündniss).

- (3) The South-Slav nations and the provinces of Austria-Hungary including Bosnia should remain within the framework of the monarchy. But the Delegates bind themselves always to further the efforts of these peoples towards autonomy.
- (4) The independence of Finland and Russian Poland should be assured, the Poles of Galicia and Prussia should receive their full autonomy within the framework of the two states, likewise full national autonomy is demanded for the Ruthenians of Austria. The Delegates look to the future and to voluntary agreements between restored Poland (*Kongress-Polen*, Poland of the Congress of Vienna) and the Central Powers for a lasting settlement of the Polish question.
- (5) In the face of certain claims that this war has to do with the freeing of the small nations of Austria the Delegation maintains that the Austrian state will retain the small nations.

The Delegates regard as an essential part of the peace treaty international economic questions. They demand the reestablishment of freedom of intercourse by land and by sea, the demolition of the system of high protective tariffs, the open door in all colonies with a common international administration of all sea routes and interoceanic canals and the creation of new world railroad routes shared and administered by all powers.

The Delegates protest against economic war as erected into a system by the Paris Conference of 1916 and are of the opinion that tariff unions are a step forward only when they aim at an extension of free trade. (Erweiterung des freien Verkehrs.) The peace proposal should contain general agreements in the direction of the demands of the international trade-union Congresses.

- (6) The war has destroyed all guarantees of hitherto existing laws of maritime warfare. The development of law which was begun in the 1856 Peace of Paris must be carried further. Here belong prohibition of privateering, and of arming of merchant vessels, abolition of the law of capture at sea, limitation of the scope of contraband, (from which must be excluded at least the raw materials for food and clothing), the return of the right of blockade to its old limits, prohibition of the declaration that a part of the open sea is a war zone, limitation of permissible means of warfare by sea and in the air.

The delegates further advocated the continuation of the work for peace of the two Hague Conferences; limitation, by agreement, of armament by land and sea, until standing armies are completely disarmed, the organization of a popular militia for defense only; as far as munitions are necessary the whole munitions industry should be nationalized.

Austrian Social Democracy is unconditionally for the calling of a Socialist congress and considers it the duty of all sections of international trade-unions to take part in it. The Delegates expect that all affiliated sections should enter into connection, and regard it as necessary that the national sections (of the Socialist party) should be represented by their minority as well as by their majority group. The Bohemian, Polish and [188]

Bosnian Delegations will state their point of view after consulting with the other sections which depend on theirs, and whose special problems they have to consider.

[Translated from the *Holland News*, Review of the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad. June 20, 1917.]

STATEMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST DELEGATES

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist-Committee.]

1. The Hungarian Social Democracy stands for an immediate peace, based upon the universal principles: No annexation, no war indemnities. It demands complete political restoration of all occupied states. The economic restoration of all ravaged territories is the task of those states in whose hands these ravaged territories remain, but with two exceptions:

- (a) Belgium, the complete restoration of which was agreed to by the German Government in the declaration of August, 1914. The Hungarian Delegation holds that the declarations of the German Chancellor in regard to the restoration of Belgium by Germany is still right in principle. But, if to secure this were to mean prolongation of the war, then the burden of restoring Belgium should be borne by all belligerent Powers according to their economic strength.
- (b) Since Serbia is too small and too weak for her own restoration, she should receive the collective help of all the belligerent Great Powers. The Delegation also demands for Serbia free assured access to the sea and a trade policy on the part of Austria-Hungary, such as to make good relations between the two countries possible.
- (c) In regard to Alsace-Lorraine the Delegation desires to see an agreement between the German and [190]

French Social-Democrats, and sees in this solution alone the guarantee of a lasting peace between peoples. The Serbian and Bulgarian Social-Democrats should, according to their opinion, follow the same course with regard to Macedonia.

- (d) In principle the Delegation is in favor of all Polish territories being united as an independent state bound to all her neighboring states by friendly relations and freedom of trade; they demand, however, as a minimum the independence of "Congress-Poland," in case this is the desire of the inhabitants, together with national freedom and assurance of the possibilities of development in those Polish territories remaining under another state.
- (e) The national questions of Austria-Hungary should not be solved by dismemberment of the empire, but through far-reaching democratic reforms, national autonomy, free cultural and economic development within the present state.
- (f) The principle "without annexation" implies also the return of occupied colonies. With regard to the colonies we stand for the principle of the "Open Door."

2. The Hungarian Social Democracy desires the future peace to be built upon the foundation of international law, of obligatory arbitration, disarmament by sea and by land. It recognizes the relation between disarmament on land and the restoration and assurance of freedom of the seas. It wishes, for safeguarding the freedom of the sea, a maritime police, subject to international principles, to oversee the internationalization of straits and channels and the chief international routes of commerce, such as the Dardanelles, Gibraltar and so on.

It considers it the duty of all Social Democratic Parties already to express opposition to attempts to carry on an economic war after the conclusion of peace and for this reason

desires an energetic fight against the resolution of the Paris Conference in June, 1916, and against the so-called "Mittel Europa" movement in the countries of the Central Powers.

The Hungarian Delegation hopes that the peace discussions of the belligerent powers and the peace work of the International may not be exclusively dominated by national and territorial questions. As representatives of the working classes they want to direct the attention of the International to the fact that there is not only national, but also social oppression, and wish to have questions of labor protection and social politics included in the peace discussions.

3. The Delegation stands for unconditional participation in the [Stockholm] Conference; it is opposed to the discussion in the Conference of the question of responsibility, because it considers discussion of these questions at this time to be without object and not serviceable to peace. But if the meeting of a genuine and completely international Conference depends upon the taking up of these questions, the Hungarian Delegation does not consider this sufficient reason for not taking part in the Conference.

The Delegation emphasizes, that according to its understanding, the people of all the belligerent states are peacefully-minded, that their Governments in all countries are responsible for the war, and that not accidental circumstances, but the constantly operating forces of national and social oppression and exploitation led to the war. Imperialism, high protective tariffs, national oppression, [oppression of nationalities] the lack of democracy, the want of real parliamentary control even in the countries governed on parliamentary principles, the domination of the financial oligarchy in France, Czardom in Russia, the feudal nationalistic oligarchy of Hungary, Junkers and large-scale industry in Prussia-Germany (Preussen Deutschland), the lack of a parliamentary system of government in the German Empire, are, in the opinion of the Delegation, some of the real causes of the war. The glorious Russian revolution has removed one of these causes of war and the Delegation expresses its belief that the International will do much happier work for

peace if the various national sections, instead of fruitless debate on the question of blame, come forward each in its own country, against the organic war producing forces — against the nationalism of France, against the domination of the Junkers and bureaucrats in Prussia-Germany and against the national and social servitude of the masses in Hungary.

The Hungarian Delegation pledges itself to fight in this spirit for the complete democratization of Hungary and expresses the wish that the French comrades should now with their whole strength take up the fight against the chauvinistic ideology [idealization of patriotism], the German Social Democracy the fight for equal suffrage and a parliamentary system of government in the Empire.

The Delegation expresses this wish, not as assuming to meddle with the internal affairs of other countries, or brother-parties, or associations, but because consideration of the condition of the world and the possibility of peace has convinced them that democracy is a requisite of international politics and the necessary condition of a speedy and lasting peace.

[Translated from the *Holland News*, June 20, 1917.]

STATEMENT OF THE BOHEMIAN CENTRALIST SOCIALIST PARTY

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee.]

The Socialist Party of Bohemia concurs in general in the views expressed by the German-Austrian delegation; it stands for a peace without annexations, without war-indemnities, without the humiliation of any people. It laments that the war has imposed heavy trials on various countries, and regards the restoration of their territories as not only an imperative duty according to every idea of morality and justice but also as necessary to the future of Europe. Belgium, Serbia and Roumania must arise again. Furthermore peace must give to every people opportunity for free development, national, economic and cultural. This right must not be curtailed, in particular as regards the Czech people. They demand the most complete autonomy and freedom and are moreover entitled to them. This policy will be best carried out through the democratization and remodelling of Austria according to the program as to nationalities drawn up by the Socialist Party. We will pursue the realization of this task in coöperation with other Socialist and proletarian organizations of our country.

From the first day of the world conflagration we held that it was the duty of the International to do everything possible to put an end to the slaughter. The calling of the Stockholm Conference brought us nearer to this goal. We expect from it not only the revival of the International but also the simultaneous spreading of the universal thought of

peace. The discussion of the questions the solutions of which must enter into the peace treaty will make it possible to set forth the efforts of the working class everywhere to establish definitely the general conditions of peace and to eliminate hindrances and misunderstandings, and it will be able to shorten the war which threatens to prolong itself still further, if the organized workers do *not* get into touch again (sich nicht wieder finden).

[Quoted in *The Holland News*, June 20, from *Vorwärts*, June 3, 1917. Translated.]

**MANIFESTO ADDRESSED TO THE DUTCH-
SCANDINAVIAN SOCIALIST COMMITTEE
BY MM. VANDERVELDE AND
DE BROUCKÈRE**

[Vandervelde and de Brouckère, as the delegates of Belgian Socialists, issued the following reply, July 5, to the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee at Stockholm.]

The war appears to us to be less a war between peoples than a struggle, probably decisive, between two political principles. It is in this sense that it has been justly called civil war within the society of nations. The Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States have had the effect of ranging on one side all the free nations, that is to say, those who have already effected their democratic revolution, and, on the other hand — almost entirely isolated — the last three semi-feudal, semi-absolute Powers — namely, the Empire of the German Emperor, that of the Sovereign of Austria-Hungary, and that of the Grand Turk.

In the deliberate execution of a long-cherished project, these Powers have let loose war on the most villainous pretexts and for the most wretched of causes. Imperialism has been able to carry out its plan, thanks to a popular passivity which would have been inconceivable in any other country. Attack and invasion have placed upon us the burden of the most crushing of tyrannies — the German military tyranny, whose object, as defined by Bismarck, is to leave a people only their eyes with which to weep.

Belgian Socialism has not for one moment believed that it ought to bow before external oppression when our villages were burnt, our women insulted, and our dearly acquired

liberties brutally oppressed. It has not admitted that it was "a simple *bourgeois* quarrel, which ought to leave the proletariat indifferent." If it had abandoned the struggle under the pretense that the soldiers of William II. were too numerous and his guns too powerful, it would have been dishonored in its own eyes. It has never reckoned cowardice amongst revolutionary virtues.

Defense against aggressive Imperialism implies for us something more than the mere repulse of the invader. The destruction of German Imperialism might have been the business of the Germans alone, if their Imperialism had stayed at home. But it crossed our frontiers, and we want to break the power of our tyrant. Our desire is as legitimate as that of the Russians, who have broken the power of their tyrant; and the fact that our tyrant is enthroned at Berlin is not sufficient reason for changing our opinion.

We cannot conceive any possible lasting peace if Hohenzollern and Hapsburg retain their powers. The greatest present danger is that of seeing free countries accept a precarious peace. We could not lend ourselves to this without betraying our deepest convictions as Socialists.

We adhere to the Petrograd formula of "no annexations and no indemnities." But "refusal of annexations" does not imply maintenance of the territorial *status quo*. If, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, Alsace-Lorraine were restored to France we should not consider it an "annexation" but a "disannexation." In the same way the unification of Poland and the completion of Italian and Serbian unity, as desired by the peoples concerned, would not be "annexation." Near Stavelot there are Walloon villages which appear to desire once more to become Belgian. The peace treaty might accept their aspirations. This, too, would apply to Luxemburg, with its 200,000 inhabitants, if it should consider that a return to Belgium, from whom it was separated in 1839, would be to its advantage.

While we repudiate the exaction of "indemnities" such as Bismarck in 1871 levied on France and such as Germany is continually imposing on occupied Belgium, we could not

recognize a peace that sanctioned the exactions of the invader. For Belgium this question is vital.

The Germans have by menaces, compulsion, and violence, exacted from our towns many millions of pounds in cash. Since the occupation they have levied monthly for the needs of the army a contribution of £2,000,000, and for some time past have raised the sum to £2,400,000. They have levied several hundred million pounds in foodstuffs, in kind, and in raw materials and machinery. In the interest of military operations they have done countless deeds of destruction, and, in many cases, simply in order to terrorize the population and to gain future economic advantage by suppressing an embarrassing competitor.

The Belgian nation will have to indemnify the victims of these acts of violence, and this charge upon it must be added to all those we have just enumerated. Would it not be the height of iniquity to make the victim bear this burden at the risk of seeing him succumb under the weight of peace? Does not justice demand reparation from those guilty of outrage in so far as the outrage may be reparable?

Ever since August 4, 1914, the German Chancellor acknowledged in the Reichstag that Germany was violating the rights of Belgium and owed her reparation. We are firmly convinced that the Russian democracy will not be less solicitous than was the representative of the Kaiser of the clear rights of an oppressed nation.

As for the "right of nations to dispose of their own destinies," it would be as tyrannous to keep by force in Austria-Hungary, populations like those of Bohemia, Transylvania, or Bosnia, which aspire to other national destinies, as it would be to attach Belgium by force to the German Empire. Indeed, we could hardly describe Germany as free, in this sense, so long as the semi-absolutism of the Hohenzollerns endures. We consider that a democratic constitution for Germany is not only a right to which the Germans are entitled, but that it is also a condition upon the fulfillment of which other nations are entitled to make their adhesion to a general peace depend. A treaty guaranteed only by an

Emperor who is accustomed to hold his word cheap would be merely another scrap of paper.

We do not, of course, refuse to meet the Germans; but what we decline is to associate ourselves with German Socialist supporters of the Imperialism of the Emperor William and of the Emperor Charles. We should not object to concerted action with those in the Central Empires who oppose a policy of aggression and of conquest, and who in effect pursue the same end as we ourselves. We should not decline to meet the German Majority Socialists if they renounced the error of their present ways, and took an open and manly part against their Emperors. But, pending such action on their part, we should regard a meeting with them as not only useless but dangerous to the international democratic cause — dangerous, since it would tend to accredit the illusion that a just and lasting peace is possible before aggressive imperialism has been destroyed; and because the maintenance of false hopes of an impending equitable solution relaxes effort and strengthens the current that is carrying the weak-willed towards a peace at any price.

This is why, following the example of the French and British representatives, we urged that admission to the proposed conference should be conditional upon frank adhesion to an anti-Imperialist program.

In a word, our attitude may be summed up as follows:—

(1) We urge that in every country Socialists, by a campaign among the masses, should cause their Governments to renounce every Imperialist war aim and to accept, in a more precise form, the Petrograd peace formula.

(2) We accept an exchange of views, such as is being conducted by the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee at Stockholm, provided that they are based on the principle laid down in the preceding paragraph. Exchanges of this kind may lead to great results.

(3) Finally, we believe that these preliminaries might lead to the elaboration of a program for a general conference that would be precise enough to leave no room for equivocation; to discourage any diplomatic manœuvres by

our adversaries; and to keep away such nominally Socialist groups as might not be prepared loyally to coöperate in the anti-Imperialist work to which the "Internationale" is called.

When these conditions have been fulfilled, the Belgian Socialists will be happy to take part in what will then be the general meeting of the true "Internationale."

[From the *London Times*, July 6, 1917.]

ITALIAN SOCIALISTS' PROCLAMATION

[Issued by three of the most important Socialist groups in Italy — the board of directors of the Italian Socialist Party, the Socialist Parliamentary Group, and the General Federation of Labor.]

Peace is inevitably coming, after the long, terrible struggle which, for more than three years, has been holding civilization back and sealed the fate of the political régimes that caused it. The hour is coming in which the whole responsibility will be laid before the high court of history. After the long and cruel devastation, a period of readjustment of social life is unavoidable, and the introduction of new social and political conditions is predicted. The feeling has spread beyond our own party, that it is absolutely necessary that the terrific experience we have had, will bring us at least the firm will to prevent the scourge from breaking out again in the near future. The magnificent advent of the Russian revolution, added to all these facts, show the Socialist parties in general — and specially for the Italian Socialist party — that, even in these troubled times, they should be faithful to the great principle of class struggle and international solidarity on the part of the proletariat; they should reaffirm and put forward such plans, out of their program, that are immediately needed, in view of the fact that peace is coming, and also to attend to such measures as are to be adopted immediately after war is ended.

Since peace is coming, the Italian Socialist party must reaffirm its immutable and basic principles in the matter of international policy; principles which were reasserted in the middle of the war — and in spite of it — at the historic convention of Zimmerwald.

That is why our party proclaims the necessity of a peace,

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not only without forcible annexation, but also respectful of autonomy for all, which leaves to each people the selection of its own grouping; which, together with international control of the channels and all other points of confluence of human races, and with the most absolute freedom of the seas, will suppress the most immediate causes of conflict in the future.

Taking into account, furthermore, that the existence of various kinds of militarism, protectionism, the lack of a stable organization for the rapprochement of nations — facts which, besides impoverishing the masses for the benefit of the privileged classes and artificially created parasites, help to a great extent to separate the peoples from each other — make the contrasts between countries more marked, and prevent reasonable adjustment of their differences. It is, therefore, necessary to take action as to the following points:

(a) The immediate and simultaneous disarmament of every state.

(b) The suppression of barriers created by customs house duties.

(c) The establishment of a Judicial Federation formed by all civilized countries.

Such aims, however, without which no durable, real, and just peace can be expected, will not be attained, or, if attained, will soon be misapplied and frustrated, if the proletariat — which is the only class truly and deeply interested in the suppression of all cause for armed conflicts between countries — have not the strength, ability, and will to make them effective and put them actually in force.

It is necessary, therefore, in the sphere of the internal political action of each state, and as a preliminary step for the complete emancipation of the laboring class, and for the end of all class domination and the realization of the Socialistic ideal, to adopt a series of institutional, politic, administrative, and economic reforms, which can be summed up in the following general program:

(1) Republican form of government, based on popular sovereignty made effective by the right of the elective cham-



[Courtesy of *L'Asino*]

THE SITUATION

Kaiserism and Militarism hang over the abyss,
depending on the ignorance of the peoples.



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ber to call its own sessions and control its own affairs. Abolition of the Senate. Universal suffrage, equal and direct, for every citizen, without sex discrimination. Election by *scrutin de liste*, on a large basis and with proportional representation. Right for the people of initiative, referendum, and veto. Unlimited freedom of reunion, organization, strike, and propaganda. Suppression of the political police.

(2) Foreign policy taken off the hands of the executive power and placed exclusively in the hands of the deliberating Parliament. This will automatically do away with diplomatic intrigue, with pressure brought on parliamentary vote under the illegitimate coercion of accomplished facts, and with the possibility and validity of underhand dealings and secret treaties between governments.

Publicity will restore the elementary honesty in international relations. It will also put an end to the possibility, for the press, placed at the service of the great parasitical industrial and commercial interests, to corrupt public opinion and the sentiment of the masses, by an inspired publicity.

(3) Development of regional and municipal autonomy. Decentralization of administrative power and control, which now hinder and corrupt parliamentary action. Reform of Bureaucracy — which has become a State within a State — so as to make it efficient, by the extension of elective principle to the higher offices, together with the fuller direct personal responsibility for the officials, and a simplified organization of executive departments, according to the industrial type. Free justice and judges elected.

(4) A labor policy intended to develop the potential forces and wealth of the country, to repair soon impoverishment and devastation caused by the war; to stop, without coercion, emigration — this hemorrhage which is the necessary effect of desperate misery — nationalization and judicial utilization of water power and natural wealth, giving preference in all grants to local organizations. Agricultural and industrial reforms, by compulsory association, with the support of the State, of owners' public entities, and labor organizations.

(5) An internal policy for the defense of the consumer, in accordance, whenever possible, with the control of products, and intended to make stable and to develop with a new spirit, and for ampler social purposes, such institutions as have arisen — although unsystematically, and in the interests of the bourgeoisie who initiated them under the necessity created by the war, against private speculators.

(6) Real recognition given to every workman of his right to a more dignified and human living. Consequently, establishment of a general system of insurance against unemployment, accident, illness, old age, etc. Change of charity into assistance and social prevision. Intense diffusion of compulsory school, popular and professional, until the age of eighteen, with all supplementary educational institutions. Promotion of coöperative agriculture and industry. A more strict labor inspection. Legislation on individual and collective labor contracts. Regulation of hours, giving a maximum of eight hours to adult male workers. Legal minimum wages in relation to the fundamental necessities of life. Equal privileges for men and women. An ampler recognition of the action and intervention of labor organization in everything belonging to the protection of labor and labor contracts.

(7) Solution of the agricultural problem according to the following lines:

In reference to the lands: Socialization of lands, by the organization of a vast collective domain the first nucleus of which will be formed by lands belonging to the Government, to charitable institutions, and uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands.

In reference to agriculture and agricultural production: Land to be given or granted only to people who directly cultivate it. Compulsory association of farmers. Technical control and direction of agricultural production, in order to obtain a maximum production at a minimum cost.

(8) A system of taxes founded mainly on the direct and progressive tax, with exact valuation. Reduction of interest of the public debt. Extension of State monopoly, both for

the use of industrial production in the benefit of the community, and for the control of the great transportation services, communications, and provisioning. Heavy taxes on legacies, and limitations of the rights of heirs. Compulsory national loans for works undertaken in the interest of peace, on the same basis as loans are made for the destructive purposes of war.

Enforcement of these measures, with the modifications and additions as may be suggested by the special conditions inherent to each country, cannot be attained except by conscious effort of the proletariat in each individual State, it is pointed out, but such effort will be favored and made more valuable by the international coöperation of the laboring class. The Italian Socialist party intends, as the main purpose of its action, to work for the prompt and efficient reorganization of the International, and to give it such strong organization as to avoid in the future the delusions that marked the last period of its life, and to promote the co-operation of the different nations for the direction and making of the new history of the world.

[New York *Evening Post*, July 17, 1917.]

STATEMENT OF THE FINNISH SOCIALIST DELEGATION

[In reply to the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist
Committee's Questionnaire.]

The representatives of the Finnish Party Committee and Finnish Social-Democratic Group in Parliament have presented their report in regard to how best to arrange the legal status of Finland. In their opinion this view is shared by the politically mature elements among the Finns. According to this view this question must be considered as of an international character and therefore to be treated of where international questions in general are to be considered, that is at the coming Peace Conference.

This claim is based upon the defenseless condition in which Finland would find herself if, in the future, a nationalistic or even perhaps an imperialistic tendency should get the upper hand in Russia. The gratitude which the Finns owe to the revolutionary elements in Russia, as those by which Finland also has been freed from Czardom and the reactionary elements of the Russian democracy, by no means releases the Finns from the duty of securing their own future upon the firmest basis. The position of Finland must be established upon a foundation which would guarantee to her full possibility of free development, and the Finnish people cherish the heartfelt hope that the Russian democracy will recognize this claim and be able to carry it into execution, so that the realization of the Finnish demand may meet with no hindrance from the side of Russia. The autonomous position of Finland has in the past in spite of all defects made possible a considerable cultural development of the country. The greatest of these defects lay in the fact that decisions in regard to Finnish affairs were made at Petrograd.

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It was thus the case that interests opposed to those of the Finns influence the decision of Finnish questions. This led from time to time to ruthless disregard of the interest of the Finnish people and must in any case be felt by the national consciousness as a humiliation. The striving of Finland for a greater degree of self direction was based on the whole historical development of Finland which had never been similar to that of Russia. The social constitution of Finland, her form of culture, language, etc., were also unlike those of the Russian people. Consequently the Finnish people strove for the attainment of the fullest possible independence. The bearets of the Russian revolution had written upon their banners, the freedom of the peoples. This fact had strengthened in the people of Finland the conviction that the time had now arrived to realize the wish of the people of Finland for full independence, which was regarded as the only sure way to promote the national claims of the Finns and to avoid the conflicts which might spring from a permanent union with Russia. The Socialists of Finland base themselves entirely upon the right of self-direction of all peoples laid down as a principle by International Social Democracy and they demand that the Finnish people also be allowed to decide their own status. They appeal to the Comrades of other countries and hope that the efforts of the Finnish proletariat for whom they have so often expressed their sympathy will now too receive their full support.

With regard to remaining political questions the Delegation, not having as yet received a mandate, confined itself to expressing its personal opinion. It will later make known either in writing or orally the position of the Party. The Social Democracy of Finland has of course declared itself in favor of a general conference.

[Quoted in the *Holland News*, June 20, 1917,
from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 27, 1917.
Translated.]

DECLARATION ON PEACE BY AUSTRALIAN LABOR SOCIALISTS, JUNE 11, 1917

[The Labor Socialists of Australia, in conference June 11, 1917, to discuss terms on which a lasting peace can be secured, made the following declaration, quoted in a dispatch from Sidney to the Milwaukee *Leader* by W. Francis Ahern.]

"That as the governments of Europe have failed utterly to preserve peace, or to bring the present war within a measurable distance of a conclusion, we contend that only by an organized system of production for use, under democratic control, can a recurrence of such calamities be permanently avoided.

"We rejoice over the revolution in Russia, and congratulate the people upon their efforts to abolish despotic power and class privileges.

"We therefore urge that immediate negotiations be initiated for an international conference, for the purpose of arranging equitable terms of peace, on which conference the working class organizations shall demand adequate representation, and the inclusion of women delegates, and we further urge that the British self-governing dominions shall be granted separate representation thereon.

"We submit that in framing the terms of a lasting peace, the following principles should be observed:

"The rights of small nations, including Ireland, to political independence.

"That the European countries invaded be immediately evacuated, and their future territorial integrity guaranteed — provided the ownership of disputed territories shall be determined by a plebiscite of the inhabitants under an international commission.

"That prior to the disbandment of the combatant armies and navies they shall be utilized under international control for the restoration of the devastated territories at the expense of the invaders, and not subject to military supervision.

"That where an amicable arrangement cannot be reached by the peace conference in regard to captured colonies and dependencies, such territories shall be placed provisionally under international control.

"That the freedom of the seas be secured on the lines laid down by President Wilson, May, 1916, where he advocated, 'A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations of the world.'

"The abolition of trading in armaments, and the prohibition of the private manufacture thereof.

"The abolition of conscription in all countries simultaneously.

"The control of foreign relations under a democratic system, based upon publicity, in lieu of the present methods of secret diplomacy.

"That the existing machinery for international arbitration be expanded to embrace a concert in Europe, ultimately merging into a worldwide parliament, as advocated by President Wilson, in a recent message to the American Congress.

"From the conference of the Labor Leagues and Trades Unions now considering it, the declaration will be dealt by the various Australian organizations throughout the world. It may be that these proposals will form the basis of the peace of the world in the future.

"Delegates opposed the annexation of the captured German possessions in the Pacific since Australia had enough to do to people the land she already held. Any islands captured in the Pacific would not benefit the workers of Australia who would be taxed to keep them going for the benefits of the capitalists. If they wanted to remove the German or any other menace from the Pacific they should neutralize the captured islands and place them in the hands of an international court and so prohibit any nation turning

them into neutral bases. Any burden placed on the enemy countries would have to be borne by fellow workers in those countries and labor in Australia should strenuously oppose that.

“When this war was over the workers would work to see to it that never again would capitalists plunge the world into a bloody war. Capitalists would be forced to remember that in any future war they might feel inclined to engage in they would have to do the fighting themselves.”

JOINT SOCIALIST STATEMENT ON THE REFUSAL OF PASSPORTS TO STOCKHOLM

[Following the lead of the United States, most of the Allied Governments refused to permit Socialist delegates to attend the Stockholm Conference called by the Russian Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates to meet in September. Delegates, from other countries, already assembled in Stockholm, joined in the following protest.]

"The Stockholm conference, called at the instance of the Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to discuss and formulate the basis of a democratic and durable peace between the masses of the peoples, has been postponed because the governments of Italy, France, England and the United States have refused passports to delegates. For this action the American government is largely responsible.

"At the entente conference in Paris, it was the Italian government, through Baron Sonnino, which headed the opposition to the Stockholm conference. France also voted no, though the favorable attitude of Petrograd was known. The Russian representative did not vote. England declared herself in favor of allowing Socialist and labor delegates to go to Stockholm.

"There remained only the American government, which practically cast the deciding vote. The American government voted no.

"We do not understand President Wilson's course of action. When, in the Senate in December, 1916, he addressed the peoples of the world, the Socialists and labor organizations of Europe supported him with all their strength.

"In all Wilson's public utterances it has been made perfectly plain that the main obstacle to American peace with Germany is the German political autocracy, and that America's object in the war is to secure the democratization of the German government.

"The Stockholm conference is the best and, perhaps, the only opportunity for the representatives of the entente peoples to make clear to the German masses the conditions upon which peace is possible. And yet President Wilson refuses to allow the delegates of American Socialist and Labor groups to come to Stockholm.

"The peoples of the world are sick of war, whatever policy their governments see fit publicly to adopt.

"In the invitation to the Stockholm conference and its acceptance by democratic political and economic elements in all the belligerent countries is to be seen the first action of the international masses, growing conscious of their power, awakening to the colossal error of unending war and determination that government shall be of, by and for the Social Democracy."

This statement is signed by Panin, delegate Russian Council of Workmen and Soldiers; Axelrod, delegate Russian Social Democratic party; Troelstra and Van Kol, Dutch Social Democratic party; Branting, Soederberg and Moeller, Swedish Social Democratic party; Vidnes, Norwegian Social Democratic party; Bjorgberg, Danish Social Democratic party; Huysmans, secretary International Socialist Bureau.

[Cablegram by John Reed to the *New York Call*, Sept. 9, 1917.]

ARNOLD BENNETT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

[The refusal of passports to Stockholm and the consequent failure of the plan for a conference, called forth this criticism from Arnold Bennett, the well-known British author and pro-war radical.]

Now that the idea of the Stockholm conference is, in the language of the reactionaries and their dupes, "decently buried," we may perhaps examine it with the detachment and the new vision with which one examines the dead. Three main objections have been raised to the conference. The first, and the most comprehensible, is based on a natural unwillingness to meet Germans except in physical combat. I understand and share this unwillingness. In spite of Lord Hugh Cecil and Dr. Lyttelton, I have not the slightest intention of loving the Germans, and, if I am to think kindly of them, I prefer to do so at a distance. Nevertheless, sentiment is sometimes a luxury, and luxuries may have to be abandoned in the days of danger. Representatives of the ruling classes of this country have already sacrificed sentiment to the welfare of prisoners. Real Englishmen have argued politely across a table in a room with real Germans while other real Englishmen and other real Germans were killing each other outside; and nobody was any the worse for the conference, whereas prisoners are going to be a great deal better for it. If such a deed can be done for the welfare of a few hundred thousand prisoners, surely it can be done for the welfare of the whole world.

Moreover, the initiators of the Stockholm conference did not propose to force anybody to go to Stockholm. People whose feelings were too strong for their reason were at per-

fect liberty to stay at home. As often happens, however, with people whose feelings are too strong for their reason, perfect liberty for themselves did not suffice for these persons; they wanted perfect liberty for themselves, with the addition of perfect coercion for others. They would not go to Stockholm, and they would not let anybody else go. The attitude of Belgian Socialists was, fortunately, better than this. That Belgians should object to meeting Germans was inevitable, and not unadmirable. Belgian Socialists made no outcry; with much dignity they left the affair absolutely alone. Frenchmen might well have been excused if they had done the same. But French Socialists put reason before sentiment, and did desire to attend the conference.

Truly, sentiment, noble as it may be, is very illogical. Headed by President Wilson, we are all busy telling the German people that they are under the thumb of a wicked and bloodthirsty autocracy, and that they must get a fresh government if they wanted to come to terms with us. Now, German Socialists have always been the enemy of the German government, except in the opening stages of the war, when they were doped. Assuredly, they are the enemy of the German government at the present moment. We have had a chance of meeting this enemy of the German government face to face — and we have refused it.

The second main objection to the conference is that attendance at the conference would prove that our will to win the war is weakening. I do not see how it would prove anything of the kind. Everybody in his senses must be aware that military considerations will put an end to the war, and no other. So long as any one of the principal nations remains convinced that in its army it possesses an instrument efficient to conquer, so long will the war continue, and it will go on until the conquest has been achieved. The war will stop either when the conquest has been achieved or when all the chief belligerents are convinced that conquest cannot be achieved. The aim of the Stockholm conference was not an armistice, but enlightenment, and its

effects would have been seen, not during the war, but at the close of the war. It was intended to supplement, not to take the place of the military arm.

And, assuming that our national will to win the war was, in fact, weakening, does anybody, even the war cabinet, suppose that the refusal of passports to Stockholm would give new strength to our resolution? Far from strengthening our resolution, it would weaken it still further. A few candid words about the British national spirit will be in place here. We have a pacifist party, very small, perhaps negligible, but not decreasing. We have a weary party, which was to be expected.

For some grow too soon weary, and some swerve
To other paths, setting before the Right
The diverse far-off image of Delight.

The weary party need not trouble us. Beyond these two trifling parties there is nothing in Britain that is not solid for the intense continuance of the war.

There is, however, a powerful and growing popular party which is anti-government. Anti-government must not be confused with anti-war. We have a war cabinet consisting of a Teuton, a self-glorifying traitor, a reactionary bureaucrat and the writer of Mr. Lloyd George's public letter to Mr. Henderson, with the addition of a labor representative who may or may not be kept in an outer office while the other four confabulate. The deeds and the misdeeds of this cabinet in 1917 have accorded with its personnel, and they have extremely antagonized the people of Britain. If the government chooses to confuse anti-war and anti-government, it only does so for its own purposes. The government owes its existence to-day to the fact that the national cause is a thoroughly righteous cause, and the mass of the nation is thoroughly determined on the triumph of the cause. To hint that the mass of the nation needs any stiffening from the oligarchy is ridiculous.

The third main objection to the conference is that it is

a pro-German device, and that even if it were not a pro-German device those clever Prussians would get the better of the simple-minded French, Italians and English, not to speak of the Russians. Well, if anybody is so ignorant of political individualities as to believe that the Swedish Socialist leader, Branting, would help a German device, or would not see through a German device, he must be left in his belief. Mr. Branting is the real originator of the idea of the conference.

As for the Prussians getting the better of us across a table — it is astonishing how the legend of Prussian superiority dies hard, how affectionately we cling to the legend. To my mind, the boot would be entirely on the other leg. There are at least two members of the British Socialist parties who would make mince meat of any Prussian in a contest of wits across a table. And I do not desire British participation in the conference because of my fear that the Germans would befool the Russians. I do not think they would. So far as national rivalries go, I desire participation in the conference because it presents an unsurpassed opportunity for pro-ally propaganda. German Socialists have already had one eye-opener at Stockholm. They would be absolutely staggered at a full conference. They would have such an experience as could not fail to react with enormous force against the German government. And, incidentally, the laborious work of the German censorship would be definitely undone in a few days or hours. The fanciful picture of the astute Prussian (so famous for his diplomatic finesse!) dominating a Socialist world-conference to his own ends strikes me as extraordinarily funny. I do not for an instant imagine that any member of the government takes the picture seriously.

In my opinion, the opposition to the Stockholm conference is due to reasons quite different from those which have been avowed by the authorities. The true importance of the Stockholm conference resides, not in its opportunities for dialectic and propaganda and persuasion, but in the fact that it would constitute an unprecedented and supreme

phenomenon of democracy taking care of itself, and taking care of the world, and of the future. And herein is the root of the opposition to the conference. Confining myself to the British opposition to the conference, I may point out that our ruling classes are strongly desirous of two things — an economic war after the war, and a terrific extension of the British empire in Africa. I may also point out that the British working classes are opposed to these two notions, and that, if the working classes had the settling of peace terms, the peace terms would be of such a nature as to render both notions impossible. But the Stockholm conference would have discussed peace terms! Here alone is sufficient explanation of the opposition to the holding of the conference.

But the origin of the opposition lies still deeper. It lies, not in any difference of opinion between the ruling classes and the masses of the nation about particular terms of peace, but in the fundamental objection of the ruling classes to the mass of the nation having any hand at all in the drafting of peace terms. The theory that international affairs ought to be and are the monopoly of an exclusive caste is still held by the exclusive caste. The Cecils, typical members of the caste, have recently voiced it, Lord Robert Cecil, with an honesty born of mediæval zeal, and Mr. Balfour, with an honesty born of the most profound and candid cynicism. Mr. Balfour, an extremely dangerous enemy of democracy, can stand up before the representatives of the people and calmly sneer at their pretensions to guide the ship of state, and so low are the representatives of the people fallen that not one per cent. of them dares to make an effective protest.

It is natural that in such an anti-democratic atmosphere as now prevails any comprehensive scheme for the participation of the people in the molding of peace terms should be scotched by the representatives of privilege and the foes of popular freedom. The representatives of privilege generally have made a dreadful mess of diplomacy as a whole. To give one recent instance. The war would have been over by this time, but for the privileged diplomatic system

and the utterly rotten ignorance and stupidity of its chosen pets, as exemplified at Constantinople before the war and in the first three months of the war. On the other hand, the Labor party has demonstrated its aptness for the work to which labor aspires by producing the most constructive and most statesmanlike draft terms of peace yet published by anybody. But such considerations will have no weight whatever with the privileged caste. The privileged caste will not argue, because it cannot; it simply will deny; it simply will block; it simply will delude; it simply will stick to what it has got — until it is forced to let go.

The future time which we vaguely describe as "after the war" will be a relatively bad or a relatively good time, according as democracy does or does not take a hand, and a strong hand, in the shaping of it. The privileged caste was unchallenged a hundred years ago, and the years following the great triumph of Waterloo were years of reaction and misery throughout Europe. And to-day, if the privileged caste is unchallenged when the fighting ceases, the present war, too, will be followed by Europe [an era?] of reaction and misery throughout Europe. This is why a meeting of world's representatives of uncompromising democracy is so desirable. Few even among democrats realize what would be the moral effect of such a conference. It would be tremendous. The challenge to vested interests would be almost shattering. The impulse towards internationalism, which means the end of war, would be irresistible. The League of Nations would be in being.

The power of democracy as an international force is growing. To see how fast it is growing you have only to contrast the interest aroused by the allied conference of labor parties held in London a short time ago with the complete indifference which greeted the allied conference of labor parties held in London thirty months ago. Democracy has received a check. But I imagine that it will recover. The idea of the Stockholm conference is not dead, far less buried.

A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR THE BRITISH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WORKMEN AND SOLDIERS

This organization was created by a Conference held at Leeds on June 3, 1917, with 1,150 delegates, supposed to represent between four and five million constituents — trade unionists, socialists, coöperators and others. It voted to send the following cablegram to the Russian Workmen's and Soldiers' Council:

"The largest and greatest convention of labor, Socialist, and democratic bodies held in Great Britain during this generation has to-day endorsed Russia's declaration of foreign policy and war aims, and has pledged itself to work through a newly constituted Workmen's and Soldiers' Council for an immediate democratic peace. The Convention received your telegram of congratulation with gratitude and enthusiasm."

[For an account of the proceedings see the *Manchester Guardian*, June 4, 1917.]

PROPOSALS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Workers Organized Against War

(a) Communications between workers to be maintained in war as in peace.

(b) Negotiations to be instituted at once to end the present war on the following basis:

The right of all people to decide their own destiny. No indemnities, but each belligerent to restore the damage he has done, or to compound such reparation by concessions to be agreed by negotiation.

Equal access by all peoples to the trade and raw materials of the world.


The government of non-European races in Africa to be regarded as an international trust, with no exclusive advantages to the sovereign state; such populations not to be trained for war or subject to conscription or servile labor.

All secret treaties, or treaties not ratified by the people, to be void.

Disarmament by International Agreement

If democracy is to be reality in the future, the competition for preponderant military power, which necessarily militarizes all the nations taking part in it, must be brought to an end. But the attempt on the part of one nation to create over vast areas of the world special reserves for its own trade and industry or to block therein the access of other nations to necessary raw materials, will be certain, sooner or later, to be resisted by military means. These conflicts, though the workers as a whole never benefit from them, are the main source of modern wars. The price of peace is equality of economic opportunity for all nations big and little. If the arming of the black millions of Africa for the purpose of fighting the white man's quarrels is permitted, a new danger as well as a new horror will be added to civilization. If a people is not fit to share the privileges of the British Empire in the shape of self-government it should not be asked to share its burdens by fighting its wars. Forced fighting, like forced labor, is in such cases, whatever it may be elsewhere, undisguised slavery. The only certain cure for war is disarmament. If the nations are not loaded they will not explode.

[Printed in the *London Herald*.]



[Courtesy of *L'Asino*]

THE PEACE TREE

Peace springs from the decay of feudalism, imperialism, autocracy, militarism and nationalism.



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BRITISH LABOR PARTY DRAFT OF A PROGRAM FOR LONDON INTER-ALLIED SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

[This program was prepared by the Executive Committee of the Labor Party, for consideration by the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London, Aug. 28-29, 1917.]

I.—THE WAR

The Conference, in the name of the Socialist and Labor Parties of the nations now allied against the Governments of the Central European Powers, ratifies and reaffirms the declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labor Parties of allied nations on February 14, 1915.¹

II.—THE PEACE

The war, which has become almost world-wide, bringing misery and desolation to nearly all nations, has now lasted for more than three years. It has already been the occasion of one great social revolution in the destruction of Tzardom in Russia, on which the Conference most heartily congratulates the Russian people. It has united, in the defense of democracy, the old World and the New; and the Conference warmly welcomes the assistance to the cause of human freedom, in council no less than on the battlefield, that is now being afforded by the American people. So far as the Socialist and Labor Parties of the Allied nations are concerned, it is against the ruthless imperialism of autocratic governments that the struggle is being waged. The Conference now, as on February 14, 1915, asks the people of the several nations, and particularly their Socialist and La-

¹ For these resolutions, see Walling, "The Socialists and the War," pp. 424-5.

bor comrades in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whether it is not possible for the united action of the working classes of the world to bring this monstrous conflict to a summary conclusion conformably to the principles of the International.

III.—THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION

The Conference cordially welcomes the declaration of the Russian Government, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, that the only satisfactory basis of peace lies in the formula of "no annexations and no indemnities; leaving to each people the freedom to settle its own destinies." The Conference repeats its determination to resist any attempt to transform this war into a war of conquest, whether what is sought to be forcibly acquired is territory or wealth. The only readjustments of national boundaries or national citizenship of which the Conference can approve are those that may be arrived at by common agreement for the purpose of setting the several peoples free to settle their own destinies, or of removing some plain cause or excuse for another war. The Conference equally protests against any perpetuation of the war in the expectation of any Government being able to inflict on any nation whatever the crushing burden of an indemnity by way of punishment for having caused the war.

IV.—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Of all the war aims, none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war. Whoever triumphs the world will have lost, unless some effective method of preventing war can be found. As a means to this end the Conference relies very largely upon the complete democratization of all countries, including Germany and Austria-Hungary, which now cannot fail to place themselves in line with other civilized nations; on the frank abandonment of every form of "imperialism"; on the suppression of secret diplomacy and the placing of foreign policy, just as much as home policy, under

the control of popularly elected legislatures; on the absolute responsibility of the Foreign Minister of each country to its legislature; on such concerted action as may be possible for the common limitation of the costly armaments by which all the peoples are burdened, and upon the entire abolition of profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in war scares and rivalry in preparation for war. But the Conference demands, in addition, that it should be an essential condition of the Treaty of Peace itself that there should be forthwith established a super-national authority, or League of Nations, which should not only be adhered to by all the present belligerents, but which every other independent sovereign State in the world should be pressed to join; the immediate establishment by such League of Nations not only of an International High Court for the settlement of all disputes between States that are of justiciable nature, but also of appropriate machinery for prompt and effective mediation between States in issues that are not justiciable; the formation of an International Legislature in which the representatives of every civilized State would have their allotted share; the gradual development, as far as may prove to be possible, of International legislation agreed to by and definitely binding upon the several States; and for a solemn agreement and pledge by all States that every issue between any two or more of them shall be submitted for settlement as aforesaid, and that they will all make common cause against any State which fails to adhere to this agreement.

V.—RESTORATION OF DEVASTATED AREAS

The Conference holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries immediately peace is declared will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communication in France, Belgium, the Tyrol and North Italy, East Prussia, Poland, Galicia, Russia, Roumania, and the other Balkan States, Armenia, and Asia Minor. Apart from Belgium, which has already been referred to, the Conference

holds that the restoration of these devastated areas should be undertaken at the expense of an International Fund, to which all the belligerent Governments should be required to contribute in proportions to be agreed upon, having regard among other things to their several responsibilities and participation in the damage; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings, and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage-earners themselves in homes and employment; and that to ensure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so far as the cost is contributed by the International Fund, should be made under the direction of an International Commission.

VI.—INQUIRY INTO WRONGDOING

The Conference welcomes the fact that public feeling will not be satisfied unless a full and free judicial investigation into the accusation so freely made on all sides that particular Governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence, and theft against individual victims, for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of war. The Conference draws attention, in particular, to the loss of life and property, of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including women and children), resulting from the inhuman and ruthless conduct of the submarine warfare. The Conference recommends that it should be part of the conditions of peace that there should be forthwith set up a Court of Claims and Accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or Government to answer the complaint, to pronounce judgment, and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or Government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong, or to their heirs.

VII.— BELGIUM

The Conference once more declares that the foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government of the wrong, admittedly done to Belgium; payment for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong; and the restoration of Belgium to complete and untrammelled independent sovereignty, leaving to the decision of the Belgian people the determination of their own future policy in all respects.

VIII.— THE BALKANS

The Conference insists on the restoration to their several peoples of the territories of Serbia and Montenegro. It suggests that the whole problem of the reorganization of the administration of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula might be dealt with by a special conference of their representatives, or by an authoritative International Commission, on the basis of (*a*) the complete freedom of these people to settle their own destinies, irrespective of Austrian, Turkish, or other dominion.

IX.— ALSACE AND LORRAINE

The Conference reaffirms its reprobation of the crime against the peace of the world by which Alsace and Lorraine were forcibly torn from France in 1871, a political blunder the effects of which have contributed in no small degree to the continuance of unrest and the growth of militarism in Europe; and the Conference, profoundly sympathizing with the unfortunate inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine who have been subjected to so much repression, asks that they shall be allowed to satisfy their inflexible desire for restoration to the French Republic.

X.— ITALY

The Conference declares its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian race and speech who have been left outside the inconvenient and indefensible boundaries that have, as a result of the diplomatic agreements of the past, been assigned

to the kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue.

XI.—POLAND, ETC.

With regard to the other cases in dispute, from Luxemburg on the one hand, of which the independence has been temporarily destroyed, to the lands now under foreign domination inhabited by other races — the outstanding example being that of the Poles — the Conference relies as the only way of achieving a lasting settlement on the application of the principle of allowing each people to settle its own destiny.

XII.—THE JEWS AND PALESTINE

The Conference demands for the Jews of all countries the same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. But the Conference further expresses the hope that it may be practicable by agreement among all the nations to set free Palestine from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may form a free State under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return, and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion.

XIII.—PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

The Conference realizes that the whole civilized world condemns the handing back to the universally execrated rule of the Turkish Government any subject people which has once been freed from it. Thus, whatever may be proposed with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, they cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his Pashas. The Conference disclaims all sympathy with the Imperialist aims of Governments and capitalists, who would make of these and other territories now dominated by the Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or militarism. If in these territories it is impracticable to leave

it to the peoples to settle their own destinies the Conference suggests that they should be dealt with in the same way as the Colonies of Tropical Africa, and placed for administration in the hands of a Commission acting under the Supernational Authority or League of Nations. The Conference further suggests that the peace of the world requires that Constantinople should be made a free port, permanently neutralized and placed (together with both shores of the Dardanelles and possibly some or all of Asia Minor) under the same impartial administration.

XIV.—COLONIES OF TROPICAL AFRICA

With regard to the Colonies of the several belligerents in Tropical Africa, from sea to sea (north of the Zambesi River and south of the Sahara Desert), the Conference disclaims all sympathy with the Imperialist idea that these should form the booty of any nation, should be exploited for the profit of the capitalist, or used for the promotion of the militarist aims of Governments. In view of the fact that it is impracticable here to leave the various peoples concerned to settle their own destinies, the Conference suggests that the interests of humanity would be best served by the full and frank abandonment by all the belligerents of any dreams of an African Empire; the transfer of all the present Colonies of the European Powers in Tropical Africa, together with the nominally independent Republic of Liberia, to the proposed Supernational Authority or League of Nations herein suggested; and their administration by an impartial Commission under that authority, with its own trained staff, as a single independent African State, on the principles of (1) the open door and equal freedom of enterprise to the traders of all nations; (2) Protection of the natives against exploitation and oppression and the preservation of their tribal interests; (3) all revenue raised to be expended for the welfare and development of the African State itself; and (4) the permanent neutralization of this African State and its abstention from participation in international rivalries or any future wars.

XV.—SUPPLIES AFTER THE WAR

That, in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships, and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries in proportion, not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs; and that, within each country, the Government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities.

XVI.—PREVENTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

The Conference cannot but anticipate that, in all countries without exception, the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition makers and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of millions of soldiers — in face of the scarcity of industrial capital and the insecurity of commercial enterprise — will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several Governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment more or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the Conference holds that it is the duty of every Government to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unemployed, when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. The Conference, therefore, urges upon the Socialist and Labor Parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their Governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads and railways, the erection of schools and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings, and the reclamation and afforestation

tion of land) that will be required in the near future, not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed, but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level year by year, and throughout each year, the aggregate demand for labor, and thus prevent there being any unemployment.

XVII.— ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Conference declares against all the projects now being prepared by Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in practically all countries, for an economic war after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations. Such an economic war, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defense be driven. The Conference realizes that all such attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the Conference sees in the alliance between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal Protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace. On the other hand, the right of each nation to the defense of its own economic interests cannot be denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Socialist and Labor Parties of all countries the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the Government towards commercial enterprise, on the principle of the open door, on Customs duties being limited strictly to revenue purposes, and on there being no hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But the Conference urges equally the importance of the utmost possible development by appropriate Government action of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in

all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, hours of labor, and the prevention of "sweating" and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression.

XVIII.—THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

The Conference declares that the proposals made for the security of peace in this memorandum will be made more secure if the Socialist International is reconstituted.

XIX.—THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT

The Conference holds that agreement among the warring Governments can be secured only by a free and frank discussion of each other's claims and desires.

[From the London *Times*, August 10, 1917].

THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL OF AMERICA

[The People's Council of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace grew out of a series of Conferences held in New York the end of May, 1917, and was formally organized in Chicago, Sept. 1st and 2nd. Its objects are]

II. OBJECTS

To strive for a speedy democratic and general peace based upon the principles of

No forcible annexations,

No punitive indemnities,

Free development of all nationalities and an international organization for the maintenance of world peace, including disarmament.

To defend our constitutional rights of free speech, free press, peaceful assemblage and the right to petition the government and to secure democratic control of foreign policies and a popular referendum of all questions of war and peace, and to work for the repeal of the conscription laws.

To uphold the civil and political rights of the workers, to prevent deterioration of their economic standards and the suspension or abrogation of labor laws; to demand that none of the revenue required for the prosecution of the war shall come from the taxation of the necessities of life.

Report on Peace Terms

The People's Council of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace at its constituent assembly reaffirms the declaration of its organizing committee in favor of a speedy, universal and durable peace, to be brought about by international agreement, not by the crushing of either group of

of peoples' representatives to meet and formulate their opinions, and be it further resolved, that we demand that the President immediately take the initiative in calling a conference to settle by negotiation the issues presented by the war, and that we demand the cessation of hostilities while armistice be arranged.

[Bulletin of the People's Council of America, Vol. I, No. 6, Sept. 25, 1917.]

RESOLUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR LABOR AND DEMOCRACY

[The American Alliance for Labor and Democracy met at Minneapolis, Sept. 6. It was presided over by Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor. Resolutions were unanimously adopted condemning the efforts of pacifists. The war aims of the United States were presented in the following resolutions, unanimously adopted.]

Since the United States entered the war the President has upon three notable occasions clearly and explicitly set forth the American aim, the objects which must be attained by any peace to which the United States can agree. We refer, especially to the war message of April 2, 1917, the note to Russia on May 26, and the reply to his Holiness the Pope, dated Aug. 27, 1917. The war objects stated by the President in these historic documents were as follows:

1. Recognition of the rights and liberties of small nations.
2. Recognition of the principle that government derives its just power from the consent of the governed.
3. Reparation for wrongs done and the erection of adequate safeguards to prevent their being committed again.
4. No indemnities except as payment for manifest wrongs.
5. No people to be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live.
6. No territory to change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty.
7. No readjustments of power except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its people.

8. A genuine and practical coöperation of the free peoples of the world in some common covenant that will combine their forces to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another.

We, the men and women of the trade union and Socialist movements of America, organized into the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, in submitting this record to our fellow-citizens, assert that in all history no Government has ever stated its aims on entering a war, or while such war was being fought, with anything approaching the definiteness, clarity, and candor revealed by these utterances. We assert, moreover, that in all essential particulars the aims thus set forth are entirely consistent with the great ideals of democracy and internationalism, for which the American labor movement has always stood and which are fundamental to its being.

We rejoice at the fact that we are thus solemnly committed to the principle of the complete autonomy and independence of nations. Only upon the basis of this generous nationalism can anything like a great and worthy internationalism be established. We rejoice, too, that this nation is thus solemnly pledged not only to refrain from attempting to extend its own dominion over any other nation or people, but to use its great influence to the end that no nation shall "attempt to extend its policy over any other nation or people."

We approve unreservedly the distinction drawn by the President between the German people and their Government, and we believe that by insisting that peace cannot be made with the Hohenzollern dynasty, but only with a democratized Germany, the President of the United States has, as befits his great station, rendered noble service to the cause of international democracy.

[From the *New York Times Current History*,
October, 1917.]

NATIONAL NONPARTISAN LEAGUE: RESOLUTIONS ON THE WAR

[The Nonpartisan League is the organization of political and economic radical democracy in the Northwest. Adopted in convention, Sept. 19, 1917.]

Our country being involved in a world war, it is fitting that the National Nonpartisan League, while expressing its loyalty and willingness to support the government in its every necessity, should declare the principles and purposes which we as citizens of the United States believe should guide our nation in the conduct of the war.

Whatever ideas we as individuals may have had, as to the wisdom of our nation engaging in this war, we realize that a crisis now confronts us in which it becomes necessary that we all stand unreservedly pledged to safeguard, defend and preserve our country.

In making this declaration of our position, we declare unequivocally that we stand for our country, right or wrong, as against foreign governments with whom we are actually engaged in war. Still we hold that when we believe our country wrong, we should endeavor to set her right.

The only justification for war is to establish and maintain human rights and interests the world over. For this reason we are opposed to waging war for annexation, either on our part or that of our allies, or demanding indemnity as terms of peace. Bitter experience has proved that any exactions, whether of land or revenue, serve only to deepen resentments and hatreds which inevitably incite to future wars.

We therefore urge that our government, before proceeding further in support of our European allies, insist that they, in common with it, make immediate public declaration

of terms of peace, without annexations of territory, indemnities, contributions, or interference with the right of any nation to live and manage its own internal affairs, thus being in harmony with and supporting the new democracy of Russia in her declaration of these fundamental principles.

We demand of no nation any concession which should be hid from the world. We concede to no nation any right of which we are ashamed. Therefore we demand the abolition of secret diplomacy. The secret agreements of kings, presidents and other rulers, made, broken or kept, without the knowledge of the people, constitute a continual menace to peaceful relations.

We demand that the guarantees of human conservation be recognized, and the standard of living be maintained. To this end we demand that gambling in the necessities of life be made a felony, and that the federal government control the food supply of the nation, and establish prices for producer and consumer.

As a direct result of the war, private corporations in our country have reaped unparalleled profits. The net earnings of the United States Steel Corporation for 1916 were \$271,531,730, as against \$23,496,867 in 1914, an increase of \$248,034,962.

The Du Pont Powder Company shows a similar record. Its net earnings for 1916 were \$82,107,693, as against \$4,831,793 in 1914, an increase of \$77,275,900.

We are unalterably opposed to permitting stockholders of private corporations to pocket these enormous profits, while at the same time a species of coercion is encouraged toward already poorly paid employees of both sexes, in urging them to purchase government bonds to help finance the war. Patriotism demands service from all according to their capacity. To conscript men and exempt the blood-stained wealth coined from the sufferings of humanity is repugnant to the spirit of America and contrary to the ideals of democracy.

We declare freedom of speech to be the bulwark of human liberty, and we decry all attempts to muzzle the public press

or individuals, upon any pretext whatsoever. A declaration of war does not repeal the Constitution of the United States, and the unwarranted interference of military and other authorities with the rights of individuals must cease.

The contributory causes of the present war are various; but above the horrible slaughter loom the ugly incitings of an economic system based upon exploitation. It is largely a convulsive effort on the part of the adroit rulers of warring nations for control of a constantly diminishing market. Rival groups of monopolists are playing a deadly game for commercial supremacy.

At the close of this war sound international standards must be established on the basis of a true democracy. Our economic organizations must be completely purged of privilege. Private monopolies must be supplanted by public administration of credit, finance and natural resources. The rule of jobbers and speculators must be overthrown if we are to produce a real democracy; otherwise this war will have been fought in vain.

Only in this spirit do we justify war, and only thus can lasting peace be established.

**PEACE TERMS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIAN
COUNCIL OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'
DELEGATES FOR THE INTER-ALLIED
CONFERENCE**

[The Russian peace program, as drawn up by the central executive committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates in the form of instructions to M. Skobelev, ex-Minister of Labor, as its delegate to the forthcoming Paris Conference.]

1. Evacuation by the Germans of Russia and autonomy of Poland, Lithuania and the Lettish provinces.
2. Autonomy of Turkish Armenia.
3. Solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question by a plébiscite, the voting being arranged by local civil authorities after the removal of all the troops of both belligerents.
4. Restoration to Belgium of her ancient frontiers and compensation for her losses from an international fund.
5. Restoration of Serbia and Montenegro with similar compensation, Serbia to have access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herzegovina to be autonomous.
6. Disputed Balkan districts to receive provisional autonomy, followed by a plébiscite.
7. Rumania to be restored her old frontiers on condition that she grant Dobrudja autonomy and grant equal rights to Jews.
8. Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria, to be followed by a plébiscite.
9. Restitution of all colonies to Germany.
10. Reestablishment of Greece and Persia.
11. Neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas and also the Suez and Panama canals. Freedom of navigation



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SKOBELEFF

Minister of Labor Under Kerensky



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for merchant ships. Abolition of the right to torpedo merchant ships in wartime.

12. All belligerents to renounce war contributions or indemnities in any form, but the money spent on the maintenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the war to be returned.

13. Commercial treaties not to be based on the peace treaty. Each country may act independently with respect to its commercial policy, but all countries to engage to renounce an economic blockade after the war.

14. The conditions of peace should be settled by a peace congress, consisting of delegates elected by the people and confirmed by Parliament. Diplomats must engage not to conclude secret treaties, which hereby are declared contrary to the rights of the people and consequently void.

15. Gradual disarmament by land and sea and the establishment of a non-military system.

The instructions to M. Skobelev end by recommending him to seek to remove all obstacles to the meeting of the Stockholm Conference and to secure the granting of passports.

[N. Y. *Tribune*, Oct. 22, 1917.]

PEACE PROGRAMS

THE "MINIMUM PROGRAM" OF THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE

[This program was agreed upon at an international gathering held at The Hague from the seventh to the tenth of April, 1915. The meeting was arranged by the "Dutch Anti-War Council" (or Anti-Oorlog Raad). The United States of America, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were represented and letters of sympathy were received from Denmark, France, Italy, Russia and Spain.

The object of the meeting was not to suggest steps to bring the war to an end, but to consider by what principles the future peace of the world could be best guaranteed. After full discussion the program was unanimously adopted. A series of very valuable studies by international committees of experts, dealing in detail with the problems unsolved in this program have been published in two volumes under the title *Recueil de Rapports sur les Différents Points du Programme Minimum*.

Nijhoff. The Hague, 1916.

See also Bourne, "Towards Enduring Peace."]

1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made contrary to the interests and wishes of the population concerned. Where possible their consent shall be obtained by plébiscite or otherwise.
2. The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, included in their boundaries, equality before the law, religious liberty and the free use of their native languages.

3. The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations.

4. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall be developed.

The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent organization and meet at regular intervals.

5. The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be created, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbitration (a) a permanent Court of International Justice; (b) a permanent International Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

6. The States shall bind themselves to take concerted action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case any State should resort to military measures instead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision or to the mediation of the Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

7. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments.

8. In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom of the seas assured.

9. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of the Parliaments of the respective nations.

Secret treaties shall be void.

PROPOSAL FROM THE NEUTRAL CONFERENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION, STOCKHOLM

[This was the statement issued by the International Conference organized on the initiative of Mr. Henry Ford. Easter, 1916.]

To the Governments, Parliaments and Peoples of the Warring Nations:

A conference composed of delegates from six neutral countries — Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States — has been convened at Stockholm upon the initiative of Henry Ford to work for the achievement of an early and lasting peace, based upon principles of justice and humanity. This conference represents no government. It has no official sanction. It represents the good will of millions throughout the civilized world who cannot stand idly by while the deadly combat rages unchecked. It does not attempt to impose its judgment upon the belligerents, but its members, as private individuals, unhampered by considerations which restrain governments, have resolved to do everything within their power to promote such discussion as may tend to bring the belligerents together on just and reasonable terms.

Through a thousand channels utterances have already reached the conference pleading that a long continuance of the struggle will mean ruin for all, but as both sides believe that only complete victory can decide the issue, ever new sacrifices of blood and treasure are made, exhausting the present and impoverishing the future. Still, we are convinced that an agreement between the warring nations might even now be reached were certain universal principles to be

accepted as a basis of discussion; principles which cannot be violated with impunity, whatever the military results of the war.

The first duty of a neutral conference, then, is to call attention to those universal principles and concrete proposals upon which agreement seems possible, and upon which there may be founded a peace that will not only satisfy the legitimate demands of the warring nations themselves, but also advance the welfare of humanity at large. The neutral conference does not propose to discuss all the issues at stake. Nor does it desire to set forth a plan for the construction of a perfect world. But it emphasizes the universal demand that peace, when it comes, shall be real, insuring mankind against the recurrence of a world war. Humanity demands a lasting peace.

In presenting this appeal to governments, parliaments and peoples for discussion and comment the neutral conference hopes that no formal objection may prevent its sympathetic consideration both by those in authority and by the people whom they represent.

(A) *Right of Nations to Decide Their Own Fate.*—History demonstrates that dispositions contrary to the wishes of the peoples concerned bring with them the danger of future wars of liberation. Hence the acceptance of these principles appears generally to be regarded as an essential prerequisite to the satisfactory settlement of this war; namely, that no transfer of territory should take place without the consent of the population involved, and that nations should have the right to decide their own fate.

It follows that the restoration of Belgium must first be agreed upon before there can be an understanding between the belligerent powers. Furthermore, the occupied French territory should be returned. A reconsideration of the difficult Alsace-Lorraine question is also an absolute necessity. The independence of Serbia and Montenegro should be assured.

In its wider interpretation, the principle of the right of nations to decide their own fate postulates the solution of a

problem like the Polish question by guaranteeing the union of the Polish nation as an independent people. Further applications would be the adjustment of the frontiers between Austria and Italy, as far as possible, according to the principle of nationality; autonomy for Armenia under international guarantee, and the solution of various national questions in the Balkans and in Asiatic Turkey by international agreement.

(B) *Economic Guarantees.*—Economic competition is generally admitted to be one of the causes of the present war. Hence the demand becomes more and more insistent that the economic activity of all peoples should be afforded development on equal terms. The recognition of the principle of the open door in the colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence would be an important step in this direction, as would also the internationalization of certain waterways, e.g., the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The German colonies ought to be returned, the exchange of colonies made possible by satisfactory compensation, and Germany's access to the Near East guaranteed.

(C) *Freedom of the Seas.*—The principle of the freedom of the seas should be recognized.

(D) *Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy.*—Effective parliamentary control of foreign policy should be established, so that secret treaties and secret diplomacy may no longer endanger the most vital interests of the nation.

(E) *International Organization.*—Far more important, however, for the welfare of humanity than the solutions thus far suggested is the creation of an international organization, founded upon law and justice, which would include an agreement to submit all disputes between States for peaceful settlement. Hence the almost universal opinion that in the coming treaty of peace the principle of such an international order of justice must be accepted.

(F) *Disarmament.*—Equally important with the insistence upon an international organization is the demand that disarmament be brought about by international agreement.

(G) *A World Congress.*—In order to bring about the

creation of an international order of justice it will be necessary to secure the adherence thereto of both belligerents and neutrals. The difficulties that result from the present catastrophe do not affect the warring nations alone. They affect the whole world. In their settlement the whole world should participate. A world congress should therefore be called together. Such a congress should concern itself with more than the immediate questions arising out of this war. Problems like that of guaranteeing political and spiritual freedom to special nationalities united with other peoples, though not direct issues of this war, are nevertheless of vital importance to the future maintenance of peace.

In the foregoing an attempt has been made to suggest a possible approach to the task of uniting again the international bonds that have been torn asunder in this fratricide war. Whatever may be the ultimate solution, there is abundant evidence of the growing conviction among belligerents and neutrals alike that the hope of the world lies in the substitution of law and order for international anarchy. The neutral conference, therefore, feels justified in hoping that the end of this war will witness the institution of an international order of justice which shall make possible an enduring peace for all mankind.

Easter, 1916.

PROGRAM PREPARED BY THE AMERICAN
SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF WOMEN FOR
PERMANENT PEACE

[For presentation to the proposed after-the-war
Congress of the International Committee of Women
for Permanent Peace.]

National Problems

1. Democratic control of foreign policies through Parliaments elected by men and women . . . such policies to be based upon the recognition of moral obligation toward other states and the intention to advance the welfare of all peoples.

2. Proposal that only civilian delegates shall have the voting Power at the Third Peace Conference at The Hague, the military delegates to have merely advisory functions. In general, members of legislative bodies, administrative officials, and non-official persons, as well as diplomats, to be selected. Women not to be debarred from this Conference nor from the Permanent International Conference (which it is hoped will be provided for by the Third Peace Conference).

3. Social, moral and political pressure by citizens on their own government for the attainment of specific measures discussed at the Congress of Women after the War.

4. All possible efforts to hasten the passing of animosities. Courses in schools and colleges on positive international ethics, on the principles of world organization including the relation of tariff barriers to the realization of world peace.

5. A persistent effort to extend the principles of democracy to all the departments of the government and especially, as far as possible, to secure a change in the fundamental law,

requiring a national plebiscite or referendum before declaration of war, or of a state of war, except in case of actual or imminent invasion of territory.

International Problems

I. What the *Peace Settlement Conference* should provide for:

- (1) A declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations.
- (2) That no transference of territory shall take place without the consent of its men and women, nor autonomy and a democratic government be refused to any people.
- (3) A Concert or League of Nations open to all States.
- (4) A drastic reduction of rival armies and navies, looking toward disarmament.
- (5) International protection for unorganized regions, such as the African dependencies.
- (6) New international adjustments giving adequate outlets or establishing changes of jurisdiction in the interests of justice, peace and of economic opportunity for all nations.
- (7) The international control of seas and of international waterways.

II. What the *Third Peace Conference* at The Hague should provide for. (It is hoped that this conference will be convened at an early date after the Peace Settlement Conference.)

- (1) A reconstruction of international law, based on the Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations.
- (2) The continued stability of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
- (3) A world Court of Justice (in addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, provided for in 1899), with jurisdiction over international disputes, not settled by negotiation, that are justiciable in character.

- (4) A permanent International Council of Conciliation which shall not only examine specific cases of friction but shall study and report on existing situations and policies leading to war and shall recommend methods that might prevent war.
- (5) A Permanent International Conference, meeting regularly every two or three years, which shall formulate rules of international law to govern in the decisions of the World Court.
- (6) A Permanent Continuation Committee of the Conference to carry out the provisions of the International Conference, to study international relationships and to prepare the programs for the International Conference.
- (7) Permanent International Administrative Commissions on matters of common international interest (such, for example, as the protection of unorganized regions, as referred to above, public health, waterways, immigration and emigration and protection of expatriated nationals, international finance and trade).

III. *Educational Foundations.*

An exposition by an international committee of the application of the universally recognized moral code to relationships among states and between citizens of different states. Such a code to be especially prepared for use in schools.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETY

[The League of Nations Society (1 Central Buildings, Westminster), was founded March 10, 1915. The chairman is the Rt. Hon. W. H. Dickinson, M.P.]

PROGRAM

1. That a Treaty shall be made as soon as possible whereby as many States as are willing shall form a League binding themselves to use peaceful methods for dealing with all disputes arising among them.
2. That such methods shall be as follows:
 - (a) All disputes arising out of questions of International Law or the interpretation of Treaties shall be referred to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or some other judicial tribunal, whose decisions shall be final and shall be carried into effect by the parties concerned.
 - (b) All other disputes shall be referred to and investigated and reported upon by a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation. the Council to be representative of the States which form the League.
3. That the States which are members of the League shall unite in any action necessary for insuring that every member shall abide by the terms of the Treaty.
4. That the States which are members of the League shall make provision for mutual defense, diplomatic, economic, or military, in the event of any of them being attacked by a State, not a member of the League, which refuses to submit the case to an appropriate Tribunal or Council.
5. That any civilized State desiring to join the League shall be admitted to membership.

LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

[On June 17, 1915, on the call of one hundred and twenty of the most influential and representative men from all sections of the country about four hundred met in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, and organized this League whose reason-for-existence is to "adopt a program of action to follow the present war which would look towards the possible prevention of future wars."

Ex-President Taft has served as President of the League and President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard as President of the Executive Committee from the beginning.]

PROPOSALS

We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their
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Photo by International Film Service

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M.P.



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economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory."

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES:
REFERENDUM ON PEACE

[In November, 1915, the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (which has a membership of 350,000); sent out a referendum on the subject of the several proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. (See above.)]

I. The Committee recommends action to secure conferences among neutral countries, on the initiative of the United States, for the purpose of defining and enunciating rules which will at all times give due protection to life and property upon the high seas.

II. The Committee recommends that for the decision of questions which arise between nations and which can be resolved upon the application of established rules or upon a determination of facts the United States should take the initiative in joining with other nations in establishing an International Court.

III. The Committee recommends that for consideration of questions which arise between nations and which do not depend upon established rules or upon facts which can be determined by an International Court the United States should take the initiative in joining with other nations in establishing a Council of Conciliation.

IV. The Committee recommends that the United States should take the initiative in joining with other nations in agreeing to bring concerted economic pressure to bear upon any nation or nations which resort to military measures without submitting their differences to an International Court or a Council of Conciliation, and awaiting the decision of the

Court or the recommendation of the Council, as circumstances make the more appropriate.

V. The Committee recommends that the United States take the initiative in joining with other countries in agreeing to use concerted military force in the event that concerted economic pressure exercised by the signatory nations is not sufficient to compel nations which have proceeded to war to desist from military operations and submit the questions at issue to an International Court or a Council of Conciliation, as circumstances make the more appropriate.

VI. The Committee recommends that the United States should take the initiative in establishing the principle of frequent international conferences at expressly stated intervals for the progressive amendment of international law.

[In response, over 96 per cent. of the vote was in favor of the proposition that the United States take the initiative in securing periodic international conferences for the purpose of codifying international law to meet new and changed conditions. A majority of more than two-thirds voted to approve of the proposition that this country take the initiative in forming a league of nations under a treaty agreeing to submit justiciable questions arising between any of its members to an international court, and non-justiciable questions to a council of conciliation for their respective decision or recommendation, before resorting to war. The vote in favor of the third proposal of the League amounted to a very considerable majority of the total membership, though a little short of the two-thirds necessary for official endorsement.]

[See Goldsmith, "A League to Enforce Peace," pp. 292-3.]

SOCIETY TO ELIMINATE THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

[This organization, stressing the economic causes of war and looking for their elimination by free trade and new types of world organization, represents the views of its Secretary, Mr. Roger W. Babson, of Wellesley Hills, Mass. Mr. Babson is an expert in statistics as an aid to the diagnosis of trade conditions.]

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The surest way to prevent war is to remove the temptation to war. This can best be done by providing the means by which nations can secure and retain peacefully, through some representative organization, the ends which they would otherwise seek to secure through war. Although the world cannot remain in *status quo*, there must be a more efficient means of determining policies and bringing about changes than by resort to war.

It is generally agreed that the causes of war in modern times are largely matters of commerce and trade. If some method can be found by which international trade routes shall become neutral, and further unfair legislation by one nation against another shall cease, a long step toward the elimination of wars will have been taken.

The present disturbed condition of the world's trade makes this a favorable moment for the consideration of a plan which should eliminate these economic causes of war. The neutralization of trade routes and the prevention of additional legislation by any one nation against the people or trade of any other nation, excepting by consent of a

representative international commission, supported by international force, presents such a method.

This plan provides security and opportunity for all, eliminates the necessity for the control of trade routes and barriers by any one power, and the opposition to such control by any other. It provides what perhaps no other plan does, an incentive to states to combine. Nations will naturally combine to protect the neutrality of trade routes and the joint regulation of the extension of natural barriers — once such neutrality and joint regulation have been secured — as the easiest and cheapest method of protection. Commercial alliance appeals where political alliance does not.

The plan involves the yielding of some so-called sovereign rights; but this is more than offset by an ultimate advantage of almost incalculable value. Unless nations are willing to join in a movement for international protection they must continue to compete in expenditures for national defense. There is no half-way ground.

FURTHER STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

An international commission, permitting the peoples of each nation to govern themselves so long as they do not block the peaceful growth of other nations, but obliging them to coöperate on international policies, could (1) take over certain strongholds and armaments of the nations in exchange for assuming their war debts; (2) regulate the shipping, mailing, cabling, etc., between nations so as to guarantee to all security of intercourse; and (3) have a veto of discriminatory tariffs, immigration restrictions, and other policies of separate nations which lead to war.

Such an international commission, built like the present great republics and getting its income from a uniform tax on trade, would operate along lines suggested by the founders of the League to Enforce Peace

A GERMAN PETITION TO THE REICHSTAG

Four German pacifist organizations, the German Peace Society, the League of the New Fatherland, the National Women's Committee for a Durable Peace, and the Central Organization for the Rights of Peoples, addressed recently to the Reichstag a petition demanding, in view of the situation caused by the Russian revolution, (1) that Germany declare itself ready to conclude a peace with Russia on condition that the rights of Germans in Russia be guaranteed in the same manner as those of other nationals within Russian borders; (2) that the government declare itself willing to complete the offer of peace to Russia of December 12, stating the sanctions it will advocate for a durable peace; (3) that the Reichstag declare for an international organization to maintain peace (a pacific alliance of all nations), and for the limitation of armaments, and (4) that the Reichstag declare itself ready to establish a foreign policy, based on the experiences of this war, which shall avoid the obstacles at present standing in the way of international harmony and coöperation.

[*Advocate of Peace*, Aug., 1917, p. 244.]

BUND NEUES VATERLAND

[The *Bund Neues Vaterland* (not to be confused with the Pan-German New Fatherland Society) formed soon after the outbreak of the war, has steadfastly stood for humanitarian ideals and international morality. Its pamphlet "Sollen wir Annektieren" is a powerful protest against annexation as opposed to the best interest even of Germany herself.]

1. Development of international organization.
2. Further development of international law by future Hague conferences.
3. No annexation.
4. No secret treaties.
5. Open door. Freedom of the seas.

[Bourne, *Towards an Enduring Peace.*]

MANIFESTO OF THE DEUTSCHE FRIEDENSGESELLSCHAFT

[Professor Ludwig Quidde of Munich, a writer on historical subjects, is most widely known for his book on Caligula, taken to be intended as a covert attack on the Kaiser. He has also written on militarism.]

Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Government, demands for annexation are being more or less publicly advocated. Six large agricultural associations go especially far in these ideas; indeed for one petition signatures are collected among those who because of "their rank and education consider themselves the spiritual leaders of public opinion." This movement has evidently the support of important circles. The worst of this is that those demands are known to the neutrals and to hostile countries, who make them the foundation of their accusations of German desires of conquest. Besides they kindle ill-feeling against Germany, as the Government and the whole German nation are held responsible for all this.

There is no doubt that the Imperial Government is unjustly accused in this respect, whatever may be her attitude towards other questions. Should such tendencies be publicly criticized, then the world would soon see that the greater part of the German nation is strongly opposed to them.

The prohibition to discuss the aims of the war, which is strictly maintained with respect to ourselves, prevents us from criticizing this question thoroughly; and from organizing our opposition to such tendencies.

So far we have gladly obeyed the order not to discuss these

questions. After our experience, however, of the way in which this prohibition and the above-mentioned agitation are exploited abroad to the detriment of German interests, we think it our duty to appeal to the Government to grant "free speech to a free nation."

Until this has been granted, the German Peace Association can do no more than utter a general protest against the danger of such annexation ideas. When such ideas are considered the aim of war, the war will be prolonged indefinitely, for months, perhaps for years. Their realization would not strengthen, but weaken Germany, abroad as well as at home, in peace and in future wars. A new war would be inevitable shortly after such a peace.

The German Peace Association and all friends of the people desire that the military supremacy of the Central Powers, which we hope will decide the peace, shall be turned towards the consolidation of Germany's position in the world, towards the development of the economical and national forces of the German nation. But they hope also, that the coming peace may contain the elements of a durable peace and lay the foundation for a lasting community of justice and culture between the nations, which must be restored after the peace, howsoever bitter their hostility may be at present. The association is convinced that a sensible consideration of the vital interests of the German nation will prevail over empty phrases and private interests, when the conditions of peace shall be drawn up.

L. QUIDDE,

O. UMFRID,

Stuttgart.

[Bourne, "Towards an Enduring Peace."]

STATEMENT BY DR. DAVID STARR JORDAN ON THE TERMS OF PEACE

[Dr. David Starr Jordan, Chancellor Emeritus of Leland Stanford University, an authority alike in natural science and international relations, prepared the following informal statement in the early summer of 1917 as his view of what would be a desirable settlement. His close personal study, in the field, of Alsatian and Balkan conditions gives it peculiar weight.]

I approve in principle the statement of the Russian committees as to the final terms of peace. These again, in principle, accord with the appeal of the Pope, and with the resolutions of the British Union for Democratic Control. These involve no annexation by force, no punitive indemnities, and, so far as may be, the relief by federation of oppressed nationalities. I do not believe that any nation or group of nations can attempt to punish a people for the past acts of its rulers, nor can any nation or group of nations be trusted to act as judge and executioner. And no great nation ever yet entered war with absolutely clean hands.

The important result is that no nation should gain by war, either in lands or in wealth. This means a return, as a basis of discussion, to a *Status quo Ante*. "*Status quo Ante*" is a phrase involving two conflicting ideas. In so far as it relates to national boundaries it must be accepted as a basis for discussion, a beginning of give and take. In so far as it applies to political conditions as they existed before the war, an unstable "Balance of Power"

constantly threatened by armament rivalries and new alliances, it cannot be too severely condemned. But to reject the political ideals involved does not prevent the temporary acceptance of its territorial actualities.

In opposition to the territorial *Status quo Ante* many considerations have been urged. The unrest of repressed nationalities has been greatly stimulated by the crude injustices of war time. It is especially desired to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, to form anew the Kingdom of Poland, to dismember Austria, to bring order to Turkey, and justice to the Balkans. All this may be done, but no result can be permanent if not founded on justice and on the will of the people concerned.

The German colonies taken in the war should be restored, with this reservation, that for German South Africa, Samoa and New Guinea, acceptable exchanges should be made. It would be a lame conclusion that these districts, politically and economically valueless to the possessing nation, should pass to the over-swollen Imperialism of Great Britain. Nor do I see a single legitimate objection to German colonization in Mesopotamia. So long as Germany is shut out by force from a colonial expansion that most of her people agree in desiring, the basis for controversy and war exists.

In return it would not violate the theory of no punitive indemnities if the German Government should return the sums extorted, brigand fashion, from cities of Belgium and France. There is no way that I know of for compelling this, but it would surely be a matter of justice and good morals to aid in future understandings.

The rehabilitation of Roumania is a matter for future agreement. As matters are, the nation has lost the Roumanian district of Bessarabia, has never controlled the Roumanian parts of Transylvania and Bukovina, and has seized without warrant the rich Danubian meadows of Dobruja.

To me the problem most difficult of solution is that of Alsace-Lorraine. The "Tragedy of Pride" prevents the

return of the provinces to France, and it is the fault of Prussia that, after forty-five years, there is still a question of Alsace-Lorraine. The harsh rule since war time makes a continuance of German rule almost unthinkable. In right the provinces should be made a free state, a bond of union between Germany and France, its fortifications should be dismantled, and under no pretext should its territory be divided. The "question of Alsace-Lorraine" is not a problem of race or language. The Germanic people of upper Alsace "being German, are more obstinately French than Frenchmen can be." The key to its solution is found in freedom, and its ultimate future may be in union with the kindred people of Switzerland.

The future of Poland cannot be settled in a word. Free trade, free schools and home rule would mean more than absolute political independence. The problem of access to the sea looms large, and still larger the relations with Lithuania, with Posen and with Galicia. Meanwhile, the old aristocracy still potent in Poland form a continuous threat to the political welfare of the State. But none of these matters can be settled by force or from the outside. Freedom, with poverty and ignorance on the one hand and an arrogant caste-system on the other, may open the way for anarchy, but only in freedom can a race find itself. If a people is unfit for self-government, as has been said of the Poles, the Irish and the Jews, then so much the more reason why they must have it. It is a necessary stage before anything higher.

The appeals of Finland strongly impress the world. It would seem, however, that the future of Russia demanded for Finland, Ukraina and other nationalities rather federation than separation. This again it is for the people concerned, not the armies of Europe, to decide.

The same thought applies to Austria. The separation of Bohemia and Jugoslavia from Austria-Hungary would increase, not reduce, the discord. If Austria proper is to re-join Germany, it is a matter for the people concerned to decide. The equal federation of these states would largely

abate the tyrannies of which the various peoples so justly complain.

The Trentino, largely Italian, might be allowed to choose for itself. The cession of Trieste, Fiume and Dalmatia to Italy, leaving Austria-Hungary without seaports, seems impossible, and it would be a source of greater friction than has yet existed.

The question of Serbia is not simple. An outlet to the sea through Herzegovina, Ragusa, Gravosa and Cattaro would subject a more or less alien people to an arbitrary rule. Cattaro alone would help little, as the mountains along Lovćen which separate Montenegro from the sea are inaccessible to railroads. The proposed outlet to Salonica is impracticable except by reciprocity of trade. Meanwhile the districts of Macedonia, annexed by Servia (Ochrida, Monastir, etc.), have been most tyrannically abused by the Serbian military caste, and their population is chiefly Bulgarian.

The injustices of the robber-treaty of Bucharest should be in some way corrected. The Dobruja taken by Roumania is a Bulgarian district, as is the greater part of Macedonia, divided between Serbia and Greece, from which the original Bulgarian population has been largely driven out by violence.

The Concert of Powers at the Treaty of London should have let the Balkans absolutely alone, or else they should have made an honest attempt to secure the welfare of the people. This "Concert" has made the problem of Albania wholly insoluble. For Constantinople it has left only the two alternatives — autonomy with international government, or a renewed effort to modernize Turkish rule.

Can we not ask that Congress should, in substance, declare that the United States of America has entered on the great war in a spirit of altruism, hoping to stay the slaughter, and asking no reward, when Belgium, France and Serbia are redeemed? When this is guaranteed and the seas made free as the World's Open Highway, we shall hope to lay down our arms, returning to our normal status of peace.

We shall approve of no forced annexations, of no compulsory indemnities, no attempt to punish any peoples for their rulers' sins, and of no exploitation of commercial or economic fruits of victory. We ask no guarantees for the future save those involved in the good will of free peoples. We appeal to all nations to grant, through federation and autonomy, relief to repressed nationalities, believing that in coöperation and conciliation rather than through unchecked national sovereignty, the future of civilization may be conserved.

Memorandum on Conceivable Terms of Peace

1. Evacuation of Belgium, without keeping hold of any kind, unless it be required to be unfortified, and guaranteed in its neutrality.
2. Evacuation of France without hold of any kind.
3. The reorganizing of Alsace-Lorraine as an independent, unfortified, buffer state, its neutrality guaranteed by the other nations.
4. The German colonies should be returned, except German Southwest Africa and the islands in the Pacific. For these proper exchanges should be made. Permission might be granted to buy the Belgian Congo or Portuguese colonies.
5. Tsingtau should be returned to China. In return the leases of Japan in South Manchuria might be extended beyond 1923.
6. Italy should have the Trentino, not Trieste, not Fiume, not Albania.
7. For Bulgaria, the Treaty of Bucharest should be revised. The Dobruja (Silistria), should be returned; also Kavalla, Monastir and Ochrida — the part of Macedonia south of Uskub and east of the Struma.
8. Greece should have Epirus and the Islands of the East, except those at the mouth of the Dardanelles.
9. Montenegro should have Scutari and the whole of the Lake of Scutari.

10. Servia offers serious difficulties, having no outlet on the sea, and no possibility of using the little railway of Montenegro, from Virpazar on the lake to Antivari on the sea. To reach the sea, Servia must include unwilling populations, either Herzegovina with Ragusa, Gravosa and Cáttaro, or else the bulk of Albania, with Durazzo. The Serbian army officers have been very brutal towards Bulgarian and Albanian subjects.
11. Constantinople is one of the great problems. To have it in control of Germany or of Russia will meet great objection. To make of the region east of the Enos-Midia Line and across in Asia a similar district, a separate neutralized, unfortified state, would have advantages, likewise serious embarrassments. On the whole it may be best to leave it in Turkey, under some sort of guarantees. In any case the Dardanelles and Bosphorus should be open and unfortified. The Berlin-Bagdad scheme is no war matter, any more than the British "Cape to Cairo" railway, and should not be opposed by Russia.
12. Palestine (Zion), should have autonomy or independence. Syria (Damascus), should be given autonomy.
13. Arabia is apparently already independent of Turkey.
14. Armenia must have autonomy and such guarantees as may be possible. Russian rule may be acceptable, for in the words of an Armenian leader, "there are degrees even in Hell!"
15. The problems of Russia must be settled by the Russian people. The demands for autonomy of Finland, Ukrainia, Caucasus, Armenia, Siberia, seem to point towards Federation.
16. The only hope of Austria seems to be Federation; a matter which the incoherent nationalities must settle somehow for themselves.
17. The problem of Poland and Lithuania must be worked out by the people. Russian and Austrian Poland

might be united, under a form of government to be chosen. But indications point toward stormy times, whatever the solution. The German Baltic provinces need to be considered.

18. The matter of indemnities is yet to be settled. It is not likely to be possible for any nation to enforce their payment. There is but one way to collect indemnities, unless granted.
19. The matter of disarmament is of prime importance. The poverty of Europe will guarantee its permanence, unless the United States becomes a militant nation.
20. Outside of the west of Europe no nation pays much regard to rights of minorities or of smaller nationalities within their limits. Otherwise, geographical matters would have less importance.
21. None of these matters can be settled by war. The safety from war demands that no nation gain any good thing from it.

PEACE PROGRAM OF THE UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

[The Union of Democratic Control was formed in England shortly after the outbreak of the war with the object of securing a new course of diplomatic policy. Its Secretary has been Mr. Morel, author of various works on Africa and the Congo abuses and "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" dealing especially with Morocco. Among its spokesmen in Parliament are Messrs. Ponsonby, Trevelyan, MacDonald and Snowden.]

"A stage in the war has been reached when the democracies of all the belligerent countries are beginning to work towards a peace based on the same general principles. The frankest statement of those ideas is contained in the declaration of the Russian democratic government in favor of:

"Peace without annexations and without indemnities on the basis of the right of nations to decide their own destiny." The Russian Government further declared:

"The government deems it to be its duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony or at occupying by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations."

On behalf of Great Britain on May 23, Lord Robert Cecil, replying in the House of Commons, declared that:

"Our aims and aspirations were dictated solely by our determination to secure a peace founded on national liberty

and international amity, and that all imperialistic aims based on force and conquest were completely absent from our program."

President Wilson, in his recent message to Russia, declared:

"No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrong done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of the peoples."

The German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag on May 17:

"We did not go to war, and we are not fighting now against almost the whole world, in order to make conquests but only to secure our existence, and firmly to establish the future of the nation."

We have here the common principles by which all the governments now profess to be guided.

The frame of mind of the various nations is now such that no government can afford to lay itself open to the charge of prolonging the war for the purpose of annexing new territory, either in Europe or outside Europe.

In consequence of this unanimity of profession the Executive Committee of the Union for Democratic Control has considered what these declarations mean in terms of practical politics, and makes the following suggestions which are not final nor incapable of modification, but as a suitable basis for further examination and discussion.

The settlement arrived at when the war concludes will necessarily be imperfect. The stability of peace will depend quite as much on the methods adopted for dealing with new international difficulties as they arise and the existence of international machinery for meeting racial, economic and other rivalries in the future, as upon the immediate wisdom of the settlement. Machinery for making international

changes without war is one of the indispensable conditions of permanent peace.

No Forcible Annexations

As a preliminary to any rearrangement of territorial boundaries, it ought to be made perfectly clear that all claims based on conquest, imperialistic ambition or strategic considerations such as a German demand for a revision of strategic frontiers in Belgium and elsewhere, an Italian demand for an Italian Dalmatia or a Russian demand for Constantinople, are ruled out on principle. There must be a complete acceptance of a policy of "no annexations."

Our suggestions are as follows:

(a) Belgium.

The complete reestablishment of the sovereign independence and integrity and the economic restoration of Belgium must be absolutely secured.

(b) France.

The invaded districts of France must be evacuated.

(c) Servia, Montenegro and Roumania must be evacuated and their independence restored.

(d) Alsace and Lorraine.

The disposition of Alsace and Lorraine should be decided on the principles of the right of the population to control its own destiny. The decision would not necessarily imply the allocation of the whole of both provinces to either France or Germany. Neither should the policy of autonomy be excluded.

In this, as in other cases where the views of a population are subject to dispute, the question ought to be decided, by a plébiscite or otherwise, under the supervision of an impartial international commission and free from the interference of accompanying armies.

(e) Trentino.

The claims of Italy to Trentino or other "unredeemed" districts ought to be decided by the same process.

(f) Poland.

Poland should be free and independent. The population

of Austrian Poland and the Polish districts of Prussia should decide whether they wish to become part of Poland.

(g) Austro-Hungarian Empire.

An unfortunate impression was created by the allied note to President Wilson of January 10 that it is the fixed determination of the allies to break up the Austro-Hungarian empire into independent states. This intention ought to be explicitly repudiated by all the allies, as it has been by the Russian democracy. But it must be made clear that freedom for the component population of that empire can be obtained by self-government within that empire, as it can be secured for the Finns in Russia and for the Irish within the British empire.

(h) Other Problems.

There are very complicated problems such as Polish claims on Dantzig, Bulgaria's claim on Macedonia, Roumania's claim on Transylvania, and the future status of Persia which obviously cannot be settled by any military decision, but which ought to be referred to an international commission appointed with the coöperation and authority of the nations of Europe.

(i) Turkey.

Russian democracy has repudiated the imperialistic policy of the czar to annex Constantinople. The way is, therefore, open for a proposal to neutralize or internationalize the city and the straits. It is against the interest of the world that the great trading waterways of the world should be in the hands of single powers.

The policy of international control over the Ottoman empire should be maintained and extended so as to provide full security for the Christian peoples and freedom of development for other races under the suzerainty of the sultan.

But no immediate settlement of the Turkish empire could be regarded as final. The arrangements would necessarily have to be revised from time to time by the League of Nations. The maximum of freedom for the various nationalities and freedom of trade between all the parts, and

equality of economic opportunity for the nationals of all European powers should be the policy followed.

(k) *German Colonies.*

Great Britain should repudiate definitely any claim to annex German colonies by right of conquest.

As recently as 1885, by the general act of the conference of Berlin an assignment of sovereign rights in Africa was made by the great powers. A shifting of the political frontiers in existence before the war has become inevitable. It may be that such territorial readjustments will involve political changes under which some part of the African territory hitherto administered by Germany may be transferred.

The principle of no annexations, however, requires a frank recognition that in the interests of a lasting peace Germany is not less entitled than other great powers to organize and develop over-sea dependencies.

The great zone of tropical Africa should be neutralized under an international guarantee, and absolute freedom of enterprise established there.

A less exclusive trade policy enforced throughout Africa by international arrangement would greatly facilitate the adjustment of national territorial claims.

Under a general rearrangement of territories the Pacific islands might be dealt with as well as Africa.

No Punitive Indemnities

Belgium is entitled to special relief from Germany owing to the circumstances under which she was forced into war.

No indemnities should be demanded in the sense of payments to recover the expenses of the war, but there should be a common fund provided by all the belligerent nations to assist the recovery of the parts of the world most seriously devastated by the war. An international commission should decide the allocation of the common funds.

Guarantees of Permanent Peace

The foundation of all future hopes of permanent peace lies in the establishment of a League of Nations. That will

become a reality only in so far as all the peoples are led to see that such a league offers better hope of national security than the old system of competitive armament. We cannot hope to destroy militarism so long as there is a chance of governments being able to persuade their people that the only means of national security lies in preponderant military power. Our first task is to convince the masses of every country that in a League of Nations they may find a means of defense which renders their old militarism unnecessary.

Such a League of Nations, with a common undertaking to submit disputes to arbitration and to form an international council or parliament for dealing with international problems as they become critical, has been proposed by President Wilson on behalf of the United States, and accepted in principle by the British, French, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German Governments.

The second condition indispensable to permanent peace is to persuade the German and Austrian populations that their right to equal opportunity for economic expansion and for access to raw materials will be secure without their being obliged to fight for them. To secure this, the nations should agree to reciprocal equality of commercial opportunity in all their dependencies. Upon the breaking down of commercial exclusiveness depends the good-will of the future. The policy of economic warfare laid down by the Paris conference should be repudiated as being opposed to international peace.

The disappearance of secret diplomacy is essential to permanent peace. Secret treaties should be prohibited by international agreement and should be regarded as void. All treaties should be sanctioned by the national parliaments and subject to periodical revision.

The largest measure of agreement for the reduction of armaments on land and sea should be obtained at the settlement.

We suggest that while the removal of the motive for arming among nations will prove to be the only real guarantee for an effective reduction, a method might be adopted by means of international inspection of armament establish-

ments for controlling the execution of any agreement for immediate reduction which may be reached by the settlement.

Nations should agree to abolish private enterprise in the production of armaments.

This question should be surveyed in the light of the infraction of the rights of neutrals in time of war, and of the security of economic opportunity for all nations in time of peace.

The Executive Committee of the Union for Democratic Control.

NORMAN ANGELL

J. A. HOBSON

F. W. PETHICK LAWRENCE

E. D. MOREL

PHILIP SNOWDEN, M. P.

CHARLES TREVELYAN,
M. P.

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

F. W. JOWETT, M. P.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD,
M. P.

ARTHUR PONSONBY, M. P.

HELENA M. SWANWICK
IRENE COOPER-WILLIS

[This program was reprinted in this country by the American Union against Militarism and in the N. Y. *Call* of July 30, 1917.]

FABIAN SOCIETY
PROPOSED ARTICLES OF SETTLEMENT

July 17, 1915

[The Fabian Society, founded in London in 1884 by a group of brilliant Socialist "intellectuals," maintains a Research Department for which Mr. L. S. Woolf prepared the following project—probably the most complete draft of an international constitution yet elaborated.]

The signatory States, desirous of preventing any future outbreak of war, improving international relations, arriving by agreement at an authoritative codification of international law and facilitating the development of such joint action as is exemplified by the International Postal Union, hereby agree and consent to the following Articles:

The Establishment of a Supernational Authority

1. There shall be established as soon as possible within the period of one year from the date hereof (a) an International High Court for the decision of justiciable issues between independent Sovereign States; (b) an International Council with the double function of securing by common agreement, such international legislation as may be practicable, and of promoting the settlement of non-justiciable issues between independent Sovereign States; and (c) an International Secretariat.

The Constituent States

2. The independent Sovereign States to be admitted as Constituent States, and hereinafter so described, shall be:

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[Courtesy of *Cartoons Magazine*]

Willy Sluiter in *De Nieuwe Amsterdammer*, Amsterdam.

TO THE PEACE PALACE

It Will Soon Be Time to Get It Ready for Use.

11

- (a) The belligerents in the present war;
- (b) The United States of America;
- (c) Such other independent Sovereign States as have been represented at either of the Peace Conferences at The Hague, and as shall apply for admission within six months from the date of these Articles; and
- (d) Such other independent Sovereign States as may hereafter be admitted by the International Council.

Covenant Against Aggression

3. It is a fundamental principle of these Articles that the Constituent States severally disclaim all desire or intention of aggression on any other independent Sovereign State or States, and that they agree and bind themselves, under all circumstances, and without any evasion or qualification whatever, never to pursue, beyond the stage of courteous representation, any claim or complaint that any of them may have against any other Constituent State, without first submitting such claim or complaint, either to the International High Court for adjudication and decision, or to the International Council for examination and report, with a view to arriving at a settlement acceptable to both parties.

Covenant Against War Except as a Final Resource

4. The Constituent States expressly bind themselves severally under no circumstances to address to any Constituent State an ultimatum, or a threat of military or naval operations in the nature of war, or of any act of aggression; and under no circumstances to declare war, or begin military or naval operations of the nature of war, or violate the territory or attack the ships of another State, otherwise than by way of repelling and defeating a forcible attack actually made by military or naval force, until the matter in dispute has been submitted as aforesaid to the International High Court or to the International Council, and until after the expiration of one year from the date of such submission.

On the other hand, no Constituent State shall, after submission of the matter at issue to the International Council

and after the expiration of the specified time, be precluded from taking any action, even to the point of going to war, in defense of its own honor or interests, as regards any issues which are not justiciable within the definition laid down by these Articles, and which affect either its independent sovereignty or its territorial integrity, or require any change in its internal laws, and with regard to which no settlement acceptable to itself has been arrived at.

The International Council

5. The International Council shall be a continuously existing deliberative and legislative body composed of representatives of the Constituent States, to be appointed in such manner, for such periods and under such conditions as may in each case from time to time be determined by the several States.

Each of the eight Great Powers — viz., Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States of America — may appoint five representatives. Each of the other Constituent States may appoint two representatives.

Different Sitzings of the Council

6. The International Council shall sit either as a Council of all the Constituent States, hereinafter called the Council sitting as a whole, or as the Council of the eight Great Powers, or as the Council of the States other than the eight Great Powers, or as the Council for America, or as the Council for Europe, each such sitting being restricted to the representatives of the States thus indicated.

There shall stand referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers any question arising between any two or more of such Powers, and also any other question in which any of such Powers formally claims to be concerned, and requests to have so referred.

There shall also stand referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers, for consideration and ratification, or for reference back in order that they may be reconsidered,

the proceedings of the Council for America, the Council for Europe, and the Council of the States other than the eight Great Powers.

There shall stand referred to the Council for Europe any question arising between two or more independent Sovereign States of Europe, and not directly affecting any independent Sovereign States not represented in that Council, provided that none of the Independent Sovereign States not so represented formally claims to be concerned in such question, and provided that none of the eight Great Powers formally claims to have it referred to the Council of the eight great Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole.

There shall stand referred to the Council for America any question arising between two or more independent Sovereign States of America, not directly affecting any independent Sovereign State not represented in that Council, provided that none of the independent Sovereign States not so represented formally claims to be concerned in such question, and provided that none of the eight Great Powers formally claims to have it referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole.

There shall stand referred to the Council for the States other than the eight Great Powers any question between two or more of such States, not directly affecting any of the eight Great Powers and which none of the eight Great Powers formally claims to have referred to the Council sitting as a whole.

The Council shall sit as a whole for —

(a) General legislation and any question not standing referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers, the Council of the States other than the eight Great Powers, the Council for Europe or the Council for America respectively;

(b) The appointment and all questions relating to the conditions of office, functions and powers of the International Secretariat, and of the President and other officers of the International Council;

(c) The settlement of Standing Orders, and all questions relating to procedure and verification of powers;

(d) The financial affairs of the International Council and International High Court, the allocation of the cost among the Constituent States, and the issue of precepts upon the several Constituent States for the shares due from them;

(e) The admission of independent Sovereign States as Constituent States; and

(f) Any proposal to alter any of these Articles, and the making of such an alteration.

Membership of the Council and Voting

7. All the Constituent States shall have equal rights to participation in the deliberations of the International Council. Any Constituent State may submit to the International Council sitting as a whole any proposal for any alteration of International Law, or for making an enactment of new law; and also (subject to the provisions of these Articles with regard to the submission of justiciable issues to the International High Court) may bring before the Council any question, dispute or difference arising between it and any other Constituent State.

When the International Council is sitting as the Council of the eight Great Powers or as the Council of the States other than the eight Great Powers each of the States represented therein shall have one vote only.

When the International Council is sitting as a whole or as the Council for Europe or as the Council for America the number of votes to be given on behalf of each State shall be as follows:

As agreed to by the Hague Conference, the relative position of the States works out into the following scale of votes:

Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States of America	20 votes each
Spain	12 "
The Netherlands	9 "
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, China, Roumania, Turkey...	6 " "

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico.....	4	"	"
Switzerland, Bulgaria, Persia	3	"	"
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia, Siam	2	"	"
The other Constituent States.....	1	vote	"

Legislation Subject to Ratification

8. It shall be within the competence of the International Council to codify and declare the International Law existing between the several independent Sovereign States of the world; and any such codifying enactment, when and in so far as ratified by the Constituent States, shall be applied and enforced by the International High Court.

It shall also be within the competence of the International Council from time to time, by specific enactment, to amend International Law, whether or not this has been codified; and any such enactment when and in so far as ratified by the several Constituent States shall be applied and enforced by the International High Court.

Whenever any Constituent State notifies its refusal to ratify as a whole any enactment made by the International Council, it shall at the same time notify its ratification of such part or parts of such enactment as it will consent to be bound by; and the International Council shall thereupon reenact the parts so ratified by all the Constituent States, and declare such enactment to have been so ratified, and such enactment shall thereupon be applied and enforced by the International High Court.

When any enactment of the International Council making any new general rule of law has been ratified wholly or in part by any two or more Constituent States, but not by all the Constituent States, it shall, so far as ratified, be deemed to be binding on the ratifying State or States, but only in respect of the relations of such State or States with any other ratifying State or States; and it shall be applied and enforced accordingly by the International High Court.

Non-Justiciable Issues

·9. When any question, difference or dispute arising between two or more Constituent States is not justiciable as defined in these Articles, and is not promptly brought to an amicable settlement, and is of such a character that it might ultimately endanger friendly relations between such States, it shall be the duty of each party to the matter at issue, irrespective of any action taken or not taken by any other party, to submit the question, difference or dispute to the International Council with a view to a satisfactory settlement being arrived at. The Council may itself invite the parties to lay any such question, difference or dispute before the Council, or the Council may itself take any such matter at issue into its own consideration.

The Constituent States hereby severally agree and bind themselves under no circumstances to address to any other Constituent State an ultimatum or anything in the nature of a threat of forcible reprisals or naval or military operations, or actually to commence hostilities against such State, or to violate its territory, or to attack its ships, otherwise than by way of repelling and defeating a forcible attack actually made by naval or military force, before a matter in dispute, if not of a justiciable character as defined in these Articles, has been submitted to or taken into consideration by the International Council as aforesaid for investigation, modification and report, and during a period of one year from the date of such submission or consideration.

The International Council may appoint a Permanent Board of Conciliators for dealing with all such questions, differences or disputes as they arise, and may constitute the Board either on the nomination of the several Constituent States or otherwise, in such manner, upon such conditions and for such term or terms as the Council may decide.

When any question, difference or dispute, not of a justiciable character as defined in these Articles, is submitted to or taken into consideration by the International Council as aforesaid, the Council shall, with the least possible delay,

take action, either (1) by referring the matter at issue to the Permanent Board of Conciliators, or (2) by appointing a Special Committee, whether exclusively of the Council or otherwise, to enquire into the matter and report, or (3) by appointing a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the matter and report, or (4) by itself taking the matter into consideration.

The Constituent States hereby agree and bind themselves, whether or not they are parties to any such matter at issue, to give all possible facilities to the International Council, to the Permanent Board of Conciliators, to any Committee or Commission of Enquiry appointed by either of them, and to any duly accredited officer of any of these bodies, for the successful discharge of their duties.

When any matter at issue is referred to the Board of Conciliation, or to a Special Committee, or to a Commission of Enquiry, such Board, Committee or Commission shall, if at any time during its proceedings it succeeds in bringing about an agreement between the parties upon the matter at issue, immediately report such agreement to the International Council; but, if no such agreement be reached, such Board, Committee or Commission shall, so soon as it has finished its enquiries, and in any case within six months, make a report to the International Council, stating the facts of the case and making any recommendations for a decision that are deemed expedient.

When a report is made to the International Council by any such Board, Committee or Commission that an agreement has been arrived at between the parties, the Council shall embody such agreement, with a recital of its terms, in a resolution of the Council.

When any other report is made to the Council by any such Board, Committee or Commission, or when the Council itself has taken the matter at issue into consideration, the Council shall, after taking all the facts into consideration, and within a period of three months, come to a decision on the subject, and shall embody such decision in a resolution of the Council. Such resolution shall, if necessary, be ar-

rived at by voting, and shall be published, together with any report on the subject, in the Official Gazette.

A resolution of the Council embodying a decision settling a matter at issue between Constituent States shall be obligatory and binding on all the Constituent States, including all the parties to the matter at issue, if either it is passed unanimously by all the members of the Council present and voting; or where the proposed enactment does not affect the independent sovereignty or the territorial integrity, nor require any change in the internal laws of any State, and where such enactment shall have been assented to by a three-fourths majority of the votes given by the representatives present and voting.

The International Secretariat

10. There shall be an International Secretariat, with an office permanently open for business, with such a staff as the International Council may from time to time determine.

It shall be the duty of the International Secretariat to make all necessary communications on behalf of the International Council to States or individuals; to place before the President to bring before the Council any matter of which it should have cognizance; to organize and conduct any enquiries or investigations ordered by the Council; to maintain an accurate record of the proceedings of the Council; to make authentic translations of the resolutions and enactments of the Council, the report of the proceedings, and other documents, and to communicate them officially to all the Constituent States; and to publish for sale an *Official Gazette* and such other works as the Council may from time to time direct.

Subject to any regulations that may be made by the International Council, the International Secretariat shall take charge of and be responsible for (a) the funds belonging to or in the custody of the International Council and the International High Court; (b) the collection of all receipts due to either of them; and (c) the making of all authorized payments.

The International High Court

11. The International High Court shall be a permanent judicial tribunal, consisting of fifteen Judges, to be appointed as hereinafter provided. Subject to these Articles it shall, by a majority of Judges sitting and voting, control its own proceedings, determine its sessions and place of meeting, settle its own procedure, and appoint its own officers. It may, if thought fit, elect one of its members to be President of the Court for such term and with such functions as it may decide. Its members shall receive an annual stipend of ———, whilst if a President is elected he shall receive an additional sum of ———. The Court shall hear and decide with absolute independence the issues brought before it in conformity with these Articles; and shall in each case pronounce, by a majority of votes, a single judgment of the Court as a whole, which shall be expressed in separate reasoned statements by each of the Judges sitting and acting in the case. The sessions of the Court shall be held, if so ordered, notwithstanding the existence of a vacancy or of vacancies among the Judges; and the proceedings of the Court shall be valid, and the decision of a majority of the Judges sitting and acting shall be of full force, notwithstanding the existence of any vacancy or vacancies or of the absence of any Judge or Judges.

The Judges of the Court

12. The Judges of the International High Court shall be appointed for a term of five years by the International Council sitting as a whole, in accordance with the following scheme: Each of the Constituent States shall be formally invited to nominate one candidate, who need not necessarily be a citizen or a resident of the State by which he is nominated. The eight candidates severally nominated by the eight Great Powers shall thereupon be appointed Judges by the International Council sitting as the Council of the eight Great Powers. The remaining seven Judges shall be appointed by the International Council sitting as a whole, after selection by exhaustive ballot from among the candi-

dates nominated by the Constituent States other than the eight Great Powers. On the occurrence of a vacancy among the Judges nominated by the eight Great Powers, the State which had nominated the Judge whose seat has become vacant shall be invited to nominate his successor, and the candidate so nominated shall thereupon be appointed by the International Council sitting as the Council of the eight Great Powers. On the occurrence of a vacancy among the other Judges, each of the Constituent States other than the eight Great Powers shall be invited to nominate a candidate to fill the vacancy; and the International Council sitting as a whole shall, by exhaustive ballot, choose from among the candidates so nominated the person to be appointed.

A Judge of the International High Court shall not be liable to any legal proceedings in any tribunal in any State, and shall not be subjected to any disciplinary action by any Government, in respect of anything said or done by him in his capacity as Judge; and shall not during his term of office be deprived of any part of the emoluments or privileges of his office. A Judge of the International High Court may be removed from office by a resolution of the International Council sitting as a whole, carried by a three-fourths majority.

The Court Open Only to State Governments

13. The International High Court shall deal only with justiciable questions, as defined in these Articles, at issue between the national Governments of independent Sovereign States, and shall not entertain any application from or on behalf of an individual person, or any group or organization of persons, or any company, or any subordinate administration, or any State not independent and Sovereign. The International High Court may, if it thinks fit, deal with a suit brought by a Constituent State against an independent Sovereign State which is not a Constituent State; or with a suit between two or more such States.

Justiciable Issues

14. The justiciable questions with which the International High Court shall be competent to deal shall be exclusively those falling within one or other of the following classes, viz.:

(a) Any question of fact which, if established, would be a cause of action within the competence of the Court;

(b) Any question as to the interpretation or application of any international treaty or agreement duly registered as provided in these Articles, or of International Law, or of any enactment of the International Council; together with any alleged breach or contravention thereof;

(c) Any question as to the responsibility or blame attaching to any independent Sovereign State for any of the acts, negligences or defaults of its national or local Government officers, agents or representatives, occasioning loss or damage to a State other than their own, whether to any of the citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of such State, or to its national Government; and as to the reparation to be made, and the compensation to be paid, for such loss or damage;

(d) Any question as to the title, by agreement, prescription, or occupation, to the sovereignty of any place or district;

(e) Any question as to the demarcation of any part of any national boundary;

(f) Any question as to the reparation to be made, or the amount of compensation to be paid, in cases in which the principle of indemnity has been recognized or admitted by all the parties;

(g) Any question as to the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of an independent Sovereign State by the Government of another independent Sovereign State, as being due to any of its citizens, companies or subordinate administrations, or to itself;

(h) Any question which may be submitted to the Court by express agreement between all the parties to the case.

The question of whether or not an issue is justiciable

within the meaning of these Articles shall be determined solely by the International High Court, which may determine such a question whether or not formal objection is taken by any of the litigants.

If any State, being a party to any action in the International High Court, objects that any point at issue is not a justiciable question as herein defined, the objection shall be considered by the Court; and the Court shall, whether or not the objecting State enters an appearance, or argues the matter, pronounce upon the objection, and either set it aside or declare it well founded.

It shall be within the competence of the International High Court, with regard to any justiciable question in respect of which it may be invoked by one or more of the parties, summarily to enjoin any State, whether or not a party to the case, to refrain from taking any specified positive action or to discontinue any specified positive action already begun, or to cause to be discontinued any specified positive action begun by any person, company or subordinate administration within or belonging to such State, which in the judgment of the Court is designed or intended, or may reasonably be expected to change the *status quo* with regard to the question at issue before the Court, or seriously to injure any of the parties to the case. Any such injunction of the International High Court shall be binding, and shall be enforceable, in the same way as a judgment of the Court, in the manner hereinafter described.

Immediate Publicity for All Treaties, Existing and Future

15. No treaty or agreement between two or more independent Sovereign States shall be deemed to confer any right to invoke the International High Court, or shall be treated as valid, or be in any way recognized by the International Council or the International High Court, or shall be held to confer any rights, to impose any obligations, or to change the status or legal rights of any person, company, subordinate administration, district or State, unless a duly authenticated copy of such Treaty or Agreement has been deposited by one

or all of the States that are parties to it, in the Registry of the International High Court, within twelve months from the date of these Articles, in accordance with any rules that may from time to time be made by the Court for this purpose; or in the case of a Treaty or Agreement hereafter made, within three months from the date of such Treaty or Agreement.

It shall be the duty of the officer in charge of the Registry immediately after deposit to allow the duly accredited representative of any Constituent State to inspect and copy any Treaty or Agreement so deposited; and promptly to communicate a copy to the International Secretariat for publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Undertaking to Submit All Justiciable Questions to the International High Court

16. The Constituent States severally undertake and agree to submit to the International High Court for trial and judgment every question, difference or dispute coming within the definition of a justiciable question as laid down by these Articles that may arise between themselves and any other independent Sovereign State or States; and at all times to abstain, in respect of such questions, from anything in the nature of an ultimatum; from any threat to take unfriendly or aggressive action of any kind with a view to redressing the alleged grievance or punishing the alleged wrongdoing; and from any violation of the territory of any other State or attack on the ships of such State or other military or naval operations, or other action leading or likely to lead to war.

Enforcement of the Decrees of the Court

17. When in any case upon which judgment is given by the International High Court, the Court finds that any of the parties to the case has, by act, negligence, or default, committed any breach of international obligation, whether arising by Treaty or Agreement, or by International Law, or by enactment of the International Council in accordance with these Articles, the Court may simply declare that one

or other litigant States is in default, and leave such State voluntarily to make reparation; or the Court may, in the alternative, itself direct reparation to be made or compensation to be paid for such wrong, and may assess damages or compensation, and may, either by way of addition to damages or compensation, or as an alternative, impose a pecuniary fine upon the State declared in default, hereinafter called the recalcitrant State; and may require compliance with its decree within a specified time under penalty of a pecuniary fine, and may prescribe the application of any such damages, compensation, or fine.

In the event of non-compliance with any decision or decree or injunction of the International High Court, or of non-payment of the damages, compensation, or fine within the time specified for such payment, the Court may decree execution, and may call upon the Constituent States, or upon some or any of them, to put in operation, after duly published notice, for such period and under such conditions as may be arranged, any or all of the following sanctions — viz.:

(a) To lay an embargo on any or all ships within the jurisdiction of such Constituent State or States registered as belonging to the recalcitrant State;

(b) To prohibit any lending of capital or other moneys to the citizens, companies, or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national Government;

(c) To prohibit the issue or dealing in or quotation on the Stock Exchange or in the press of any new loans, debentures, shares, notes or securities of any kind by any of the citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or of its national Government;

(d) To prohibit all postal, telegraphic, telephonic and wireless communication with the recalcitrant State;

(e) To prohibit the payment of any debts due to the citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national Government; and, if thought fit, to direct that payment of such debts shall be made only to one or other of the Constituent Governments,

which shall give a good and legally valid discharge for the same, and shall account for the net proceeds thereof to the International High Court;

(f) To prohibit all imports, or certain specified imports coming from the recalcitrant State, or originating within it;

(g) To prohibit all exports, or certain specified exports consigned directly to the recalcitrant State, or destined for it;

(h) To prohibit all passenger traffic (other than the exit of foreigners), whether by ship, railway, canal or road, to or from the recalcitrant State;

(i) To prohibit the entrance into any port of the Constituent States of any of the ships registered as belonging to the recalcitrant State, except so far as may be necessary for any of them to seek safety, in which case such ship or ships shall be interned;

(j) To declare and enforce a decree of complete non-intercourse with the recalcitrant State, including all the above-mentioned measures of partial non-intercourse;

(k) To levy a special export duty on all goods destined for the recalcitrant State, accounting for the net proceeds to the International High Court;

(l) To furnish a contingent of war-ships to maintain a combined blockade of one or more of the ports, or of the whole coastline of the recalcitrant State.

The International High Court shall arrange for all the expenses incurred in putting in force the above sanctions, including any compensation for loss thereby incurred by any citizens, companies, subordinate administrations or national Governments of any of the Constituent States other than the recalcitrant State, to be raised by a levy on all the Constituent States in such proportions as may be decided by the International Council; and for the eventual recovery of the total sum by way of additional penalty from the recalcitrant State.

When on any decree or decision or injunction of the International High Court execution is ordered, or when any sanction or other measure ordered by the Court is directed to be put in operation against any Constituent State, it shall

be an offense against the comity of nations for the State against which such decree, decision, injunction or execution has been pronounced or ordered, or against which any sanction or other measure is directed to be enforced, to declare war, or to take any naval or military action, or to violate the territory or attack the ships of any other State or to commit any other act of aggression against any or all of the States so acting under the order of the Court; and all the other Constituent States shall be bound, and do hereby pledge themselves, to make common cause with the State or States so attacked, and to use naval and military force to protect such State or States, and to enforce the orders of the International High Court, by any warlike operations that may for the purpose be deemed necessary.

[For further discussion of this, the most completely elaborated of the various programs for international organization, see "International Government: Two Reports by L. S. Woolf, prepared for the Fabian Research Department, with an Introduction by Bernard Shaw: Together with a Project by a Fabian Committee for a Supernational Authority that will Prevent War." Brentano's, 1916.]

PRESIDENT ELIOT'S PROPOSAL FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE

To the Editor of The New York Times:

The urgent international problem to-day is how to bring about a frank and sincere conference of the belligerent nations without an armistice—since neither group would now take the obvious risks of an armistice—a conference consultative and not arbitral, and only preliminary to the official conference of Governments which must devise and propose a real settlement. This problem is difficult, but not insoluble.

After three years of warfare, strenuous and continuous beyond all precedent, the military situation to-day is described fairly well by the word stalemate. For each party it is inconclusive; and there is no umpire. Either party can hold the other in trench warfare. The Entente Allies can drive the Germans back for short distances, but neither side has as yet won a decisive victory in trench warfare, or captured an army in open country. Because of the superiority of the Entente Allies and the United States in number of men, industrial productiveness, and financial strength, Germany in all probability can be brought to a condition of exhaustion before the Allies will be; but this result can be brought about only by prolonged and desperate sacrifices of human life and of the savings of the nations, and at the cost of infinite human woe.

Although all the nations involved are longing for peace, their Governments are in no condition to discuss terms of peace. The political and industrial change brought about by the war are tremendous; but they are manifestly incomplete. Democracies have been obliged to change many

of their habitual modes of action; autocracies are facing internal agitations; one autocracy has just disappeared, but no stable government has as yet taken its place; many industries have to be carried on under new conditions as regards both labor and capital; and war itself is conducted in new ways which disregard the ethics heretofore thought to be universally accepted. There is a general wondering as to what is going to happen next, which indisposes responsible persons to large committals, or decisions which cannot be recalled. The Entente Allies do not state clearly their minimum demands or lowest terms for peace, and the Central Monarchies state no terms at all.

Under such circumstances it is wholly natural for combative and indignant men and women to say, "What is the use of talking with the German rulers about terms of peace; they will not keep their word if they can obtain any military advantage by breaking it?" "We must fight till we are plainly victorious." On the other hand, the various official and unofficial statements of the terms on which the Allies would be willing to make peace produce on the German mind, so far as their opponents can discover, only this effect: "We are fighting a war of defense against dismemberment or imprisonment; we must fight to the last gasp in the hope that some favoring chance or discord among our enemies may save us from the threatened destruction." This is, indeed, a horrible dilemma, and many righteous men say that there is no way of escape from it, except by the overpowering of one or other of the combatants. Before settling down, however, to this long struggle is it not worth while to try a limited preliminary experiment on human capacity for good feeling and sound reasoning even under the most adverse circumstances?

Even under the actual very discouraging circumstances, he would be a bold man who should affirm that it is impossible to bring appointed conferees from all the belligerent nations into one room for the oral discussion of subjects previously agreed upon, the conferees being selected by the several Governments, but receiving no instructions either

before or during the conference from the appointing powers, and having no power or commission except to make a brief public report of their conclusions. The function of the several Governments would be limited to the appointment of the conferees and the granting of the necessary safe conducts. In order to keep the size of the conference moderate, each small State might be restricted to two conferees and each large State to four.

The two principal subjects of discussion ought to be:

I. The means of so organizing the civilized world that international war can be prevented — by force when peaceable means have failed.

II. The removal or remedying in good measure of the public wrongs, injustices, and distrusters which contributed to the outbreak of the present war, or have been created during its course — wrongdoings and passions which will cause future wars unless done away with.

There follows a list of the subjects which might well be discussed under each of these two principal heads, the conference itself making choice among them:

UNDER I

(a) Will the nations concerned publicly recognize, as a settled principle of international action, that no nation shall henceforth attempt to exercise rule or domination over any other nation, large or small, occidental or oriental?

(b) Can the boundaries of the European States be so readjusted that no European population shall be held by force to an unnatural allegiance contrary to their wishes?

(c) Shall the freedom of the seas and of the canals and channels connecting great seas be placed under international guarantees for peace times but not for war times?

(d) Will all the nations agree that enlargements of national territory, extensions of national trade, and concerted migrations shall hereafter be brought about only by the consent and with the good-will of all parties concerned, and shall be maintained only by the parties' sense of mutual service and advantage? For expansion of trade,

the universal reliance shall hereafter be the policy of the "open door"; and for relief from congestion of population, the policy of "peaceful penetration." Enlargements of territory by purchase or other voluntary contract shall be subject to the approval of the International Council. (See below.)

(e) Will the present belligerents agree to form an offensive and defensive alliance for the purpose of instituting and maintaining an International Council composed of one delegate from each nation, and an Executive Commission composed of one Commissioner from each of either three or five great powers — such, for example, as Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States, or the United States, France, and Germany, the Chairman of the commission to be in either case an American — and an international army and international navy — the function of all these bodies combined to be to prevent international war, if need be by the use of force, and therefore to see that forces adequate to that end are maintained on call, these forces to be decidedly superior to the existing armies and navies of any two nations combined? Other nations might later be admitted to that alliance by the joint action of the International Council and the International Executive Commission, provided that their forms of government might properly be called constitutional or free and that they were prepared to make some substantial contribution to the effective forces of the alliance; but no such addition to the first group of nations should be made until at least five years had elapsed from the conclusion of peace.

(f) Will the nations agree that as soon as the international army and international navy have been put into working order a gradual systematic reduction of armaments shall be made, under the direction of the International Council and Executive Commission, so soon as experience has demonstrated the safe limits of reduction?

(g) Will all the existing Governments agree, in the interest of permanent peace, that for the future the power to declare war and to maintain war by taxation and borrow-

ings shall reside in an elective assembly under conditions which give to the mass of the people, or their elected representatives, control over all questions of war or peace?

(h) Will all the nations agree to the suppression of secret diplomacy except as preliminary or tentative intercommunication; so that no treaty, understanding, or international arrangement should take any effect until publicly discussed and approved in representative assemblies of the nations concerned?

(i) Inasmuch as the present war and many previous wars have been promoted and prolonged because of the existence in most nations of a permanent military class having no other occupation than war and preparation for war, will the belligerent nations now agree to abolish within a reasonable time, each by appropriate legislative and executive action, its "regular" or professional military class, and to substitute for its present military establishment an unpaid, democratic army, analogous to the Swiss, based on universal training and liability to service? The Swiss Army is here taken as an example because the military constitution of Switzerland has produced an extraordinarily effective army without creating a military class or a militaristic spirit in the Swiss people. Those nations in the alliance which maintain a navy would be expected to cause the navy to be manned on the same principles of universal training and liability to service; but the proportion of officers permanently employed may be larger in a navy than in an army, because a larger proportion of a navy than of an army will be constantly in active service.

(j) Will the belligerent nations now consent to attempt to secure for the world, through the measures indicated above, complete freedom from military or naval aggression?

(k) Will the nations represented in the new alliance agree that the expenses of the International Council and Executive Commission shall be borne by each of the allied nations in proportion to its population, and that each nation shall pay the expenses of its quota in the international army and international navy?

(1) Will the belligerent nations now agree that another conference at The Hague shall be called soon after the close of the war to consider and recommend for adoption by the several nations a new body of international agreements concerning the conduct of war, to include the new arrangements necessitated by the use, not yet fully developed, of the high explosives, the submarine, and the airplane, and to include also the establishment of an International Court with a suitable code of procedure, and of an International Council of Inquiry and Conciliation to take cognizance of incipient international contentions?

UNDER II

(a) The partition of Poland.

(b) The cutting off of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1870-71.

(c) The failure to give Italy in 1866, certain territories long subject to Austria, but unquestionably belonging to the Italian nationality.

(d) The discords and enmities introduced into the Near East, and particularly into the Balkan States, by the unjust treaties of 1878 and 1913, made under the oversight of the principal European powers.

(e) The destruction wrought by the German and Austrian occupation of Belgium and Northern France, Poland, and Serbia, and the Russian invasion of East Prussia, and the various means of restoring those countries, such as indemnities, repayment of fines and requisitions, and loans from any nations that are able and willing to make them at no interest for a time and a slowly rising rate up to a maximum of 5 per cent.

(f) The oppression of several distinct nationalities which have long been miserable under the control of Turkey.

The status of the German colonies lost during the present war could be another appropriate subject for consideration by the conference. The conference might also consider whether permanent international peace and a just constitution of the International Council could be promoted by the

application of the principle of federation to some groups of nationalities to which that principle is not now applied, as for instance to the Scandinavian kingdoms as one group and the Balkan States as another.

It would certainly facilitate the proceedings of an international conference in the interest of durable international peace if it could be understood beforehand that all the participating nations had come to the conclusion that war on the modern scale and with the new implements of destruction is not an available means, in the present state of the civilized world, of settling international disputes or of extending national influence and power.

What democracy, by its elected executive, or what autocrat can set this experiment on foot? Switzerland would seem an appropriate State to start the experiment and provide the meeting-room.

Asticow, Me.

Charles W. Eliot.

Aug. 21, 1917.

SIX PEACE PROGRAMS: A COMPARISON OF THE MAIN PROPOSALS

From the *Manchester Guardian*, Monday, August 27, 1917

THE ALLIES

Note to President Wilson, January, 1917

<i>Belgium Serbia and Montenegro</i>	"Restoration with the compensations due."
<i>Rumania France and Russia (Invaded Territories)</i>	"Evacuation, with fitting reparation."
<i>German Colonies</i>	Not mentioned.
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czechs, and Slovaks to be "liberated from foreign domination."
<i>Turkey</i>	The subject peoples of Turkey to be liberated and the Ottoman Empire to be expelled from Europe.
<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	Provinces or territories formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wishes of their inhabitants to be restored.
<i>Poland</i>	The Allies accept the declaration of the Tsar that the war-aims of Russia include "the creation of a free Poland from all three of her now incomplete tribal districts."
<i>Indemnities</i>	No mention. See also "compensation" and "reparation" above.



[Courtesy of the New York Times Current History Magazine]
(From *De Nieuwe Amsterdammer*, Amsterdam.)

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM

PEACE ANGEL: "I don't see where I can ever get hold
of it."



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<i>Other Points</i>	<p>"Whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations."</p> <p>No intention to seek "the extermination or the political extinction of the Germanic peoples."</p>
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THE POPE

August, 1917

<i>Belgium</i> <i>Serbia and Montenegro</i> <i>Rumania, France and Russia</i> (Invaded Territories) <i>German Colonies</i>	<p>"The reciprocal restoration of territories which are now occupied" appears to cover all these, though specific mention is only made of Belgium ("total evacuation, with a guarantee of her full political, military, and economic independence against no matter what power"), the occupied parts of France and the German colonies.</p>
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	<p>Territorial questions at issue between (1) Austria and Italy and (2) Germany and France to be examined "with a conciliatory disposition," taking into consideration the aspirations of the inhabitants "in the measure of the just and possible."</p>
<i>Turkey</i>	<p>Such questions as those of Armenia (and also the Balkan States) are to be dealt with "in the same spirit of equity and justice," as is recommended in the case of Italy's claims on Austria and those of France to Alsace-Lorraine.</p>
<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	<p>See under Austria-Hungary.</p>
<i>Poland</i>	<p>"The territories forming part of the ancient kingdom of Poland" are to be dealt with according to the principles stated above.</p>
<i>Indemnities</i>	<p>Generally speaking, no indemnities and no compensations. The States will recoup themselves by disarmament. If there are exceptions, these must be considered "with justice and equity."</p>

<i>Other Points</i>	Restriction of armaments; compulsory arbitration, and a League of Nations; the "true freedom and common use of the seas" to be assured.
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BRITISH LABOR PARTY

August, 1917

<i>Belgium</i>	The "foremost condition of peace" is the complete restoration of Belgium, with payment for all the damages done.
<i>Serbia and Montenegro</i>	Restoration. The future of the Balkan States to be dealt with by a special conference of their representatives or by an international commission. These States to be free to settle their own destinies, irrespective of Austria, Turkish, or other Dominion.
<i>Rumania, France and Russia</i> (Invaded Territories) <i>German Colonies</i>	The general principle laid down in this program is "no annexations—leaving to each people the freedom to settle its own destinies."
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	The Italians to be united to their mother-country.
<i>Turkey</i>	Subject peoples freed from Turkey cannot be handed back. If the peoples freed cannot be left to settle their own destinies, they should be placed under commissions acting by the authority of the League of Nations. Constantinople should be made a free port, neutralized and placed, together with both shores of the Dardanelles, under a similar commission. Palestine to be made "by agreement among all the nations," a free Jewish State under international guarantee.
<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	Alsace and Lorraine to be allowed to satisfy their "inflexible desire" for restoration to France.

<i>Poland</i>	The principle of "allowing each people to settle its own destiny" is to be applied.
<i>Indemnities</i>	No indemnities "by way of punishment." See also under Belgium, above. Apart from Belgium, the restoration of devastated area should be undertaken at the expense of an international fund.
<i>Other Points</i>	A League of Nations, an International High Court, and an "International Legislature," recommended; economic war-after-war condemned; the "open door" and a Free Trade tariff demanded. All the present colonies of the European Powers in Tropical Africa should be transferred to the League of Nations, and administered by a Commission under that authority as a single independent African State, to be permanently neutralized.

GERMAN MAJORITY SOCIALISTS

Stockholm, June, 1917

<i>Belgium</i> <i>Serbia and Montenegro</i> <i>Rumania, France and Russia</i> (Invaded Territories) <i>German Colonies</i>	Restoration.
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	Austrian Socialists' views accepted (see last column).
<i>Turkey</i>	Not mentioned.
<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	Not to be restored to France, but to have "full equality as an independent member of the German State." Cultural autonomy for the French inhabitants.
<i>Poland</i>	Russian Poland to be independent, and also Finland. The Prussian Poles to have cultural autonomy.

<i>Indemnities</i>	No indemnities and no compensation for damage, except international help if an invaded State lacks resources of its own.
<i>Other Points</i>	An obligatory international arbitration court; restriction of armaments; right of capture at sea and use of armed merchantmen to be abolished; commercial "war-after-war" to be forbidden; secret diplomacy to be abandoned; protective duties to be abolished; the "open door" to be applied in the colonies. The liberation of Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thibet, Korea to be demanded by the Socialists of the nations which rule these countries.

GERMAN MINORITY SOCIALISTS

Stockholm, July, 1917

<i>Belgium</i>	Full independence to be restored, with compensation for damage done, "especially for the economic values that have been taken away."
<i>Serbia and Montenegro</i>	Serbia to be reëstablished as a "self-governing, independent State." All Serbs to be united in a single national State, which should be combined with the other Balkan States in a Republican Balkan Federation.
<i>Rumania, France and Russia</i> (Invaded Territories) <i>German Colonies</i> <i>Austria-Hungary</i> <i>Turkey</i>	The German Minority Socialists do not make definite proposals on these points, but lay down the general principles of peace without annexation, based upon national self-government. "Regulation of frontiers must be conditional upon the assent of the populations concerned, and not an act of force." "We reject a policy of colonial conquest. The possession of any colony without its own self-administration is nothing else than the possession of an unfree people, and, just as slavery, is incompatible with our principles." The bearing of all this on the future of Turkey is not clear.

<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	The people of Alsace-Lorraine should have a "direct and free vote" as to its future.
<i>Poland</i>	The "national unity" of the Poles approved. "To admit the right of Russian Poland to national independence, but to deny that same right to Prussian and Austrian Poland is contradictory."
<i>Indemnities</i>	No indemnities, which "simply mean the plundering of the vanquished by the victor." See also Belgium, above.
<i>Other Points</i>	General disarmament; compulsory international arbitration; national minorities to have "the right to develop their national life"; democratic control of foreign policy and abolition of secret treaties; "any economic barriers" and "any economic struggle" between States condemned.

AUSTRIAN SOCIALISTS

Stockholm, May, 1917

<i>Belgium</i>	Annexations condemned.
<i>Serbia and Montenegro</i>	Independence of Serbia to be restored; access to the sea perhaps to be secured by reunion with Montenegro. The other Balkan States to come to an understanding among themselves on the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples."
<i>Rumania, France and Russia</i> (Invaded Territories) <i>German Colonies</i>	The first article of this program demands a "peace without annexations."
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	The subject peoples of Austria-Hungary to remain an "integral part" of the Empire, but to have national autonomy.

<i>Turkey</i>	Not mentioned. Uncertain whether "national autonomy" is intended to apply to any part of Turkey. In general, the program says that "the disintegration of existing great States would only serve the vicious Imperialistic aims of other great States."
<i>Alsace-Lorraine</i>	Not mentioned.
<i>Poland</i>	Russian Poland (and Finland) to have independence. The Austrian and German Poles to have autonomy within the boundaries of Austria and Germany.
<i>Indemnities</i>	No indemnities.
<i>Other Points</i>	Diminution of the Protectionist system demanded and the "open door" in colonies; economic "war-after-war" condemned; right of capture at sea to be abolished; disarmament, with "purely defensive national militias"; nationalization of war industries.

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SOME OF THE MORE RECENT BOOKS
AND ARTICLES DEALING WITH
THE PROBLEMS OF THE
SETTLEMENT

COMPILED BY PAULINE K. ANGELL

I. *QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY AND
NATIONALITY*

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II. QUESTION OF SEAS AND MARKETS

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NOTE

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